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1. From the Golden Age to the Decline 
 
Imagine a philosopher who lived and worked in Oxford or Cambridge at the turn of the 1950s and 
the 1960s, and suppose she has been hibernating for about sixty years. After a tense stand-off, she 
wakes up in present-day Britain with all her memories intact. In a sense, of course, to her eyes almost 
everything has changed since then. But even focusing only on her professional field, namely 
philosophy, she feels deeply disoriented, for in the meantime many radical transformations have 
occurred. One of the novelties concerns the place of the later Wittgenstein –– or, more generally, the 
weight and influence of what in this book is labelled the later Wittgensteinian tradition –– in analytic 
philosophy.i The imaginary philosopher remembers that in the 1950s Oxford and to a lesser extent 
Cambridge were the ‘mecca’ of analytic philosophy, and Wittgenstein –– the later Wittgenstein –– 
was the champion of that philosophical tendency: a great majority of scholars in the Oxbridge analytic 
community shared a body of methodological and theoretical points and attitudes stemming from 
Wittgenstein’s teaching; in those years, the later Wittgensteinian paradigm in philosophy was so 
dominant in Britain that to many it seemed not unreasonable to presume that it was about to have a 
similar impact on the philosophical landscape of all English-speaking countries, including the United 
States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada (Forguson 2001: 325). But when, after sixty years or so, 
the imaginary philosopher wakes up, her first impression is that during the hibernation period things 
must have gone on differently and unexpectedly. She ascertains that the later Wittgensteinian tradition 
–– its assumptions, purposes, methods and philosophical style –– has been largely forgotten or 
rejected by present-day analytic philosophers. Looking closer at the present philosophical scene, 
however, she also notices that, after all, there are still many Anglo-American philosophers who 
develop Wittgenstein-inspired views in their articles and books: but this happens in a context in which 
the overall number of professional philosophers has increased amazingly, and where it is not 
uncontroversial how to define what counts as mainstream and what counts as peripheral philosophy 
(Weatherson 2014; Bonino and Tripodi 2018b). “How did we get here from there?” is the question 
recently posed by Tim Williamson (Williamson 2014). The same question is at stake in the present 
book.  
The basis of the present work is the conviction that the imaginary hibernating philosopher’s  
disoriented responses are by and large correct, and point in the right direction. Such responses can be 
roughly spelt out in the following terms: in the history of analytical philosophy from the 1950s to the 
present day, the later Wittgensteinian tradition gradually lost its centrality in Britain, and never 
reached a comparable consideration in the United States of America. The main purpose of this book 
is to outline an explanation of this historical-philosophical fact: the decline of the later 
Wittgensteinian tradition throughout the historical development of analytic philosophy, from the 
  
1950s to the present day. Chapter 1 sketches out the book’s main explanandum. Chapters 2-7 attempt 
to explain it. An entirely different book would be required to account for a second fact: that on both 
shores of the Atlantic Ocean the Wittgensteinian tradition never ceased to exist or do a great deal of 
interesting philosophy; it is beyond the purposes of the present book to provide a picture of the various 
recent philosophical uses or rediscoveries of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Chapter 7, however, 
takes a small step in that direction: it doesn’t really outline the Wittgensteinian field –– to borrow 
Pierre Bourdieu’s terminology –– in the recent history of analytic philosophy, but it provides some 
preliminary data for accomplishing the task in future work. 
This is through and through a history of philosophy book. However, the historical-philosophical 
phenomena discussed and, hopefully, in part explained in the book are complex and multifaceted, so 
as to require the support of different perspectives borrowed from the history of ideas, intellectual 
history, and the sociology of knowledge, broadly conceived. The point is not to deny that 
philosophical arguments, as well as their conclusions, do matter. However, neither the arguments nor 
their conclusions are enough to explain philosophical success or failure, since the “‘intrinsic force of 
true ideas’ perpetually meets resistance from all quarters, in the shape of interests, prejudices and 
passions” (Bourdieu 1999: 220). Social mechanisms and broadly cultural conditions play a role which 
is difficult to overestimate, though sometimes it is not easy to understand the details. Therefore this 
book is very inclusive methodologically, occasionally combining the traditional methods of the 
history of philosophy (such as conceptual analysis, rational reconstruction and the examination of the 
historical context) with a variety of sociological tools and concepts (both qualitative and quantitative), 
with categories borrowed from economic history (belonging especially to the Annales school), and 
with so-called distant reading methods, introduced into literary history some decades ago by Franco 
Moretti (Bloor 1976; Braudel 1980/1997; Bourdieu 1984a; Kusch 1995 and 2000; Wallerstein 2000; 
Moretti 2005 and 2013).  
 
1.1 The Rise 
Since perhaps not everybody is going to agree with this book’s main assumptions –– especially with 
the reality or factuality of the book’s main historical-philosophical explanandum –– in what follows 
a few preliminary words will be added concerning the rise and the fall of the later Wittgensteinian 
tradition in contemporary analytic philosophy. The background of the story is well known, so the 
details will be omitted. After returning to Cambridge in 1929, Wittgenstein was welcomed by the 
intellectual élite as the legendary author of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. As John Maynard 
Keynes once famously wrote in a letter to Lydia Lopokova: “Well, God has arrived. I met him on the 
5.15 train” (Monk 1990: 255). In Cambridge, Wittgenstein started to give lectures and at-homes, 
which would in the following two decades deeply change the entire philosophical climate in Britain. 
  
From 1930 to 1941, and then from 1945 to 1947, many people attended his lectures and were 
influenced by him in various ways. Some of them were, or were going to become, professors of 
philosophy or other disciplines such as mathematics in British, Scandinavian, Australasian and 
American universities, among them George Edward Moore, Alice Ambrose, Max Black, Richard 
Braithwaite, Margaret Masterman, Karl Britton, Maurice Cornforth, Ruben Lewis Goodstein, Austin 
Duncan-Jones, Margaret Macdonald, John Wisdom, John Findlay, Douglas Gasking, Casimir Lewy, 
Norman Malcolm, George A. Paul, Rush Rhees, Yorick Smythies, Alan Turing, Georg Henrik von 
Wright, Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, Allan Cameron Jackson, Georg Kreisel, Cecil Alec Mace, 
and Stephen Toulmin (Hacker 1996: 77, 138). 
In most cases, his pupils venerated Wittgenstein: Geach once compared Wittgenstein’s classes to 
Quaker prayer meetings (Malcolm, 1958/2001), and von Wright observed that “to learn from 
Wittgenstein without coming to adopt his forms of expression and catchwords and even to imitate his 
tone of voice, his mien and gestures was almost impossible” (Wright 1955: 527). Wittgenstein was 
aware of such shortcomings of his teaching. He felt he was a failure as a teacher: as he once said, 
“The only seed that I am likely to sow is a certain jargon” (Malcolm, 1958/2001: 53); he also believed 
that “his ideas were generally misunderstood and distorted even by those who professed to be his 
disciples” (von Wright 1955: 527). In fact, he even doubted that “he would be better understood in 
the future,” for “he felt as though he were writing for people who would think in a different way, 
breathe a different air of life, from that of present-day men” (von Wright 1955: 527). Accordingly, he 
shunned the idea of funding a school and, more generally, of being imitated, “not at any rate by those 
who publish articles in philosophical journals” (Wittgenstein 1980a: 61e). According to von Wright, 
“that was one reason why he did not himself publish his later works” (von Wright 1955: 527). As a 
matter of fact, however, his lectures and personal conversations, the circulation of the Blue and Brown 
Books and, above all, the posthumous publication, in 1953, of the Philosophical Investigations (later 
followed by the publication of several other parts of his Nachlass) made Wittgenstein's later 
philosophy the dominant way of thinking in Cambridge in the 1950s and 1960s (Hacker 1996: chapter 
6). 
This is not to say that everybody in Cambridge followed or at least admired the Wittgensteinian 
revolution in philosophy. This is rather to suggest something less general and more precise, which 
can be summarised in the following three points. First, almost everybody in the new generation of 
Cambridge philosophers was deeply impressed by Wittgenstein’s later way of philosophising, and set 
up its own work based on that model. Secondly, even those who, like C.D. Broad and Bertrand 
Russell, were more critical towards it, did not deny its importance and centrality. Broad watched 
“with a fatherly eye the philosophic gambols of … [his] younger friends as they dance[d] to the highly 
syncopated pipings of Herr Wittgenstein’s flute” (Broad 1925: 7). Nonetheless, Broad felt compelled 
  
to say that “to refuse the chair to Wittgenstein would be like refusing Einstein a chair of physics” 
(Drury 1984: 141). Something similar is true of Russell, a philosopher Wittgenstein used to admire 
greatly, even though he later came to regard him as one who was not “going to kill himself doing 
philosophy” any more (Malcolm 1958/2001: 57): Russell wondered “why a whole school finds 
important wisdom” in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, which he regarded, on the contrary, “to have 
grown tired of serious thinking and to have invented a doctrine which would make such an activity 
unnecessary,” so as to have become “at best, a slight help to lexicographers, and at worst, an idle tea-
table amusement” (Russell 1959: 216-7); at the same time, however, Russell could not help 
acknowledging that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was the leading philosophical tendency in Britain 
during that period, overtaking both Tractatus-inspired analysis and logical positivism. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, in particular from the point of view of an “external” history 
of philosophy, from Cambridge the later Wittgensteinian tradition came to Oxford, and from Oxford 
–– as Ryle once put it –– it “spread waves over the philosophical thinking of much of the English-
speaking world,” especially after the second world war (Ryle 1951/2009: 259; Hacker 1996: 77). In 
the early 1940s the philosophical atmosphere in Oxford was still dominated by Cook Wilson realists 
and British idealists (Marion 2000): Wittgenstein was still a somewhat distant figure, though a 
younger and more logic-friendly generation was arising: for example, philosophers such as Gilbert 
Ryle, John Austin, Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire, and Paul Grice (Dummett 1978a: 63). After the 
war everything changed: Wittgenstein’s name was all of a sudden on everybody’s lips, not as the 
author of the Tractatus, but rather as the author of the Blue and Brown Books, and as the philosophical 
genius who taught in Cambridge (von Wright 1993: 38). 
Two main factors fostered the Wittgensteinian turn in Oxford in the second post-war period. The 
first was the presence of Ryle, the Waynflete Professor and editor of Mind. As is well-known, Ryle 
had met Wittgenstein in 1929 at the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society, they had established a 
friendship, and Ryle had been deeply influenced by him. After the war Ryle became the veritable deus 
ex machina of the British philosophical academia (Forguson 2001: 329; Magee 1971: 128): in a 
context characterised by the growth of the undergraduate population (more than 60% students in just 
two years, from 1946 to 1948), the contingent of philosophers working at the University of Oxford 
dramatically increased, from 11 people in 1939 to 43 people in 1950 (Forguson 2001: 328); Ryle 
governed this process, gathering together about twenty philosophers in Oxford, all considerably 
younger than himself (Rée 1993: 8). Some of them were pupils and followers of Wittgenstein: besides 
Waismann, there were Paul, Toulmin, Wisdom and Anscombe.ii 
The second factor was the opportunity for Oxford philosophers, after 1953, to have direct and 
almost systematic access to Wittgenstein’s later work. Thus in the mid-1950s most leading 
philosophers in Oxford , with the partial but significant exception of Austin –– who saw himself as 
  
working in the tradition of Cook Wilson, Pritchard and Russell –– were deeply influenced by 
Wittgenstein’s later way of thinking: among them Hart, Hare, Foot, Urmson, Pears, Warnock, 
Dummett and, to a lesser extent, Grice, to name but a few; besides, of course, Ryle and his 
“lieutenant”, Peter Strawson (Rée 1993: 8; see also Mehta 1962: 58). 
In Britain Wittgenstein’s influence became overwhelming. As Stephen Mulhall has pointed out, in 
that period the expression ‘contemporary philosophy’ in introductory textbooks referred to  ordinary 
language philosophy and to (what is in this book labelled) the later Wittgensteinian tradition (Mulhall 
1994: 444). In the introduction to the first anthology devoted to the new Oxford school –– Logic and 
Language, a collection of essays edited by Antony Flew and published in 1951 by Basil Blackwell –
– the editor acknowledged the debt all the contributors had towards “the genius of one man above all, 
… whose name is almost unknown outside the world of academic philosophy”, although “everyone 
who belongs to that world will see throughout this volume marks of the enormous influence, direct 
and indirect, of the oral teachings of Professor Wittgenstein” (Flew 1951: 93. See also Rée: 13): as 
Hacker once pointed out, seven of the nine articles were written by people who were directly 
acquainted with Wittgenstein or studied under him, namely Ryle, Findlay, Paul, Waismann, Wisdom 
and Macdonald, the author of two contributions; the author of the eighth paper, Herbert Hart 
(Hacker’s supervisor in the following years), was highly influenced by Wittgenstein (Hacker 1996: 
163). The same point made by Hacker has been emphasised by other followers and friends of 
Wittgenstein: according to Warnock, Wittgenstein extended the most powerful influence upon British 
philosophy during that period (Warnock 1958: 62); Hart once called the Investigations “our Bible” 
(Hacker 1996: 163, 311); Urmson confirmed that in that period Wittgenstein’s thought permeated the 
philosophical atmosphere in Britain (Urmson 1961/1967: 305); Strawson attributed to Wittgenstein 
“an extraordinary, almost unique, power to dissolve philosophical illusion” (Pivcevic 1989: 7); and 
Ryle declared that “Wittgenstein has made our generation of philosophers self-conscious about 
philosophy itself” (Ryle 1951/2009: 266; see also Ryle 1957). Moreover, a similar picture has been 
confirmed even by critics and rivals of Wittgenstein: for example, Ernest Gellner described that 
period in Britain as one when “criticising Wittgenstein was unthinkable” (Gellner 1959/1979: 30); 
and Conrad Hal Waddington once said that at the Royal Society people “were not used to anybody 
standing up to Wittgenstein” (Robertson 1977).  
The expectations created by the success of Wittgenstein’s new philosophical methods were 
extremely high. The words uttered by Bernard Williams in a 1978 conversation with Bryan Magee 
describe ‘The Spell of Linguistic Philosophy’ very vividly, thus representing a widespread 
philosophical climate: 
 
  
Many questions of philosophy turned out, each of them, not to be any one 
question at all. They were often a collection of different worries, different 
puzzles, which had been put together under some simplifying formula, and 
when you saw through that and had analytically taken the problems apart, 
you’d find that many traditional questions of philosophy had not been solved 
but had disappeared. You no longer needed to ask them. And the promise this 
offered was very great –– and extremely exciting. There really were people 
who were saying that the whole of philosophy would be over in fifty years. It 
would all be finished. (Williams 2001: 114) 
 
To the eyes of one or two generations of linguistic philosophers –– all of them somewhat inspired by 
Wittgenstein’s later views –– the end of traditional philosophy would be achieved thanks to the 
definitive dissolution of traditional philosophical problems, with the resulting extinction of both 
metaphysics and empiricism (Strawson 1960). Francis Sparshott, who was an undergraduate in that 
period, once recalled with “a deep nostalgia” the “wonderful feeling of euphoria in the air,” in which 
students in the cafés “not only assumed that the ‘ordinary language’ mode had superseded all other 
ways of doing philosophy, but agreed that the task of philosophy would soon be finished” (Forguson 
2001: 331).  
Similar enthusiasm extended to other provinces of English-speaking philosophy, for two main 
reasons. The first is that Oxford philosophy, viewed from afar, appeared to many as a uniform and 
compact philosophical tendency, sometimes called ‘Oxford linguistic philosophy’ (Forguson 2001: 
331): upon closer examination, however, the impression of homogeneity was in part an illusion 
(Hacker 1996: 159), especially because there was a deep difference between Wittgenstein’s 
conception of philosophy as “grammatical clarification” and Austin’s view of philosophy as 
“linguistic phenomenology” (von Wright 1989: 45-6); nonetheless, the presence (or the partial 
illusion of the presence) of a unitary “movement” facilitated the success of a philosophical style and 
even the emergence of an intellectual fashion. The second reason is that in the post-war period it 
became possible for students and professors to travel more frequently: not only did the newly 
established Oxford post-graduate programme in philosophy attract many PhD students from the 
United States and the rest of the world (John Searle, Peter Unger and Stephen Schiffer among them), 
but some American philosophers (such as Morton White, Willard Van Orman Quine, Nelson 
Goodman and Wilfrid Sellars) visited Oxford and had intellectual exchanges with Oxford scholars. 
The graduate programme was dominated by Ryle, who effectively lobbied for its institution, giving 
it the mark of linguistic philosophy (Forguson 2001: 334). 
From the 1950s to the mid-1960s, during the golden age of linguistic philosophy, most scholars in 
  
Britain shared a set of Wittgensteinian points and assumptions, both methodological and substantial. 
The one that this book will regard as the most important, and the one on which the next chapters will 
focus more closely, is the idea –– defended by Wittgenstein throughout his intellectual life –– that 
there is a deep and sharp divide between science and philosophy. On this view, science and philosophy 
are not just conceptually distinct: they really are separated; they operate on different levels. Science 
is a substantive doctrine, a general theory that aims to solve problems by discovering new truths and 
causally explaining and systematising empirical facts. Philosophy –– that is, Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical grammar and its descendants such as Ryle’s logical geography and Strawson’s 
connective analysis –– is a second level activity, which aims to dissolve philosophical problems by 
reaching conceptual clarity, rather than achieve substantial and general knowledge; it works entirely 
a priori, by describing the conceptual connections (and exclusions) in the web of one or more words 
(Hacker 2001: 23). 
Furthermore, in the 1950s and the early 1960s most analytic philosophers in Britain shared not 
only a Wittgensteinian metaphilosophical frame, but also many specific philosophical views. One 
point concerned logic: formal logic mirrors neither the logical structure of the world, nor the deep 
structure of any possible language. Another point regarded metaphysics: what is necessary is not 
determined by certain features of reality but is a byproduct of either our language or our conceptual 
scheme (in a nutshell: the necessary is what we could not conceive as being otherwise); necessary 
statements (including logical and mathematical statements) are not true (and impossibly false) 
descriptions of facts (let alone “super-facts”), but are disguised grammatical rules that govern the use 
of one or more words occurring in them. Still another point concerned the philosophy of language: in 
doing philosophy a careful examination of ordinary language is essential, though ordinary language 
is not the last word in philosophy; grammar is where the line between sense and nonsense is drawn. 
Yet another point concerned the philosophy of mind and action: Cartesianism and, more generally, 
mentalism are false (e.g., an “inner process” stands in need of outward criteria; a private language is 
impossible); explanations of actions in terms of reasons are not causal explanations; a philosophical 
anthropology (that is, a philosophical investigation of persons) should be conceived of as the 
grammatical description of the web of concepts related to actions, norms and reasons. 
 
1.2 The Fall 
The widespread sharing of all or most of these metaphilosophical and philosophical views was 
probably the distinctive feature of analytic philosophy in Britain in the 1950s and the early 1960s. As 
suggested by the science fiction story told above, however, in present-day analytic philosophy things 
have changed a great deal since that time. Virtually none of the later Wittgensteinian cornerstones 
mentioned above, which once were part of a body of commonly shared views in the analytic 
  
community, are accepted any more, let alone taken for granted, by mainstream (or, if you dislike this 
controversial notion, by most) analytic philosophers and by graduate students in philosophy, not only 
in the United States but by now in Britain as well: normally, analytic philosophers reject, or simply 
do not take into account, the idea that science and philosophy are deeply divided, the a-theoretical or 
even anti-theoretical conception of philosophy (and the philosophical style associated with it), 
Wittgenstein-inspired views of language and logic, the linguistic and anti-metaphysical conception 
of necessity, anti-mentalism, the non-causal account of reasons, and so forth.  
In recent years, various Anglo-American philosophers seem to have become aware of a sort of 
epochal change that, according to many, took place in analytic philosophy in the last forty years, in 
the era of so-called “late analytic philosophy” (Bonino and Tripodi 2018b). No matter how they 
evaluate the facts, many of them agree, for example, that as a matter of fact in analytic philosophy 
the linguistic turn –– to which the later Wittgensteinian tradition certainly belongs –– has already 
gone by. According to Cora Diamond, for instance, “Various ideas about the significance of logic and 
language to philosophy,” which were characteristic of early and middle analytic philosophy, “virtually 
disappear in late analytic philosophy”; she suggests that this change depends on the resurgence of 
metaphysics (Bonino and Tripodi 2018b: 24). John Skorupski has pointed out that late analytic 
philosophers by now reject earlier views about philosophy and language: “Philosophical questions, 
specifically, metaphysical questions are, it is now generally held, genuine questions. How they relate 
to science is debated. But (it is thought) they certainly cannot be dissolved by linguistic analysis” 
(Bonino and Tripodi 2018b: 41). And Tim Williamson has noticed that in many respects late analytic 
philosophy has more in common with early analytic philosophy –– Russell arguably being the 
paradigm case –– than with the intervening period of middle analytic philosophy, first of all because 
middle analytic philosophers such as Wittgenstein, the logical positivists and ordinary language 
philosophers belonged to the linguistic turn, whereas both late and early analytic philosophers are not 
linguistic philosophers in any distinctive sense. Of course they can be, and sometimes are, seriously 
concerned with language: some of them aim to understand the semantics of natural languages; others 
employ artificial formal languages to build systematic theories. However, as Williamson puts it, 
“those activities do not make one a linguistic philosopher, because they imply no special relationship 
of philosophy to language”  (Bonino and Tripodi 2018b: 47). Of course, many disciplines study 
language: linguistics, history, literary studies, psychology, sociology, computer science. However, as 
Williamson emphasises, the linguistic turn “was supposed to be more than that. Late analytic 
philosophy has woken up to the failure of linguistic philosophy to deliver on its methodological 
promises, its failure even to study language systematically enough” (Bonino and Tripodi 2018b: 48). 
The end of the linguistic turn, however, is just an example, though a central one. The decline of 
Wittgenstein in the recent history of analytic philosophy is a visible event. In the above-mentioned 
  
article devoted to the transformations of analytic philosophy in the last forty years, Williamson told 
an interesting anecdote taken from the peculiar context of the University of Oxford (Williamson 
2014). The anecdote witnesses the decline of Wittgenstein in the recent history of analytic philosophy. 
The episode goes back to a 1994 meeting of the so-called Tuesday group at the University of Oxford, 
a seminar originally founded by Ayer in 1959, in order to counterbalance Austin’s Saturday morning 
meetings. Williamson remembers that “Susan Hurley read a carefully reasoned paper against the 
Private Language Argument to an audience that included many leading Oxford philosophers. The 
audience was divided by age. Roughly, those over fifty did not take the possibility that Wittgenstein’s 
argument was fundamentally flawed seriously, although they also did not explain how it worked or 
what it showed; those under fifty were more sympathetic to Hurley’s objections” (Williamson 2014: 
27-28).iii According to Williamson, the snapshot encourages a reflection on what he calls “the fear 
factor”: 
 
Of course, the flame is kept alive by surviving groups of Old Believers. Some 
others, more willing to believe that there has been progress in philosophy 
since 1970, still find value in engaging with Wittgenstein’s work. Neverthe-
less, his influence has declined drastically over the past forty years. No doubt 
that could be roughly measured by his proportion of citations in journals. But 
what strikes me most forcefully is that the fear factor has gone. As a test of 
authority, of intellectual or other kinds, admiration tells less than fear. In the 
1970s, even non-Wittgensteinian philosophers were often afraid to speak out 
against Wittgenstein. They are no longer so. (Williamson 2014: 28) 
Oxford, of course, offers a peculiar point of view. Compare for example the Philosophy Faculty of 
the University of Oxford during the golden age of linguistic philosophy –– there were more than 
twenty philosophers, all Wittgensteinians or at any rate highly influenced by Wittgenstein –– with the 
professors of the same Faculty who nowadays have ‘Wittgenstein’ in their area of specialisation; there 
are only six philosophers, namely Bill Child, Edward Harcourt, John Hyman, Adrian Moore, 
Katherine Morris, and Stephen Mulhall. iv  It is also quite impressive to list chronologically the 
professorial fellowships at the University of Oxford since the 1950s. Here is the list of the Waynflete 
Professors of Metaphysical Philosophy: Gilbert Ryle (1945–1967); Peter Strawson (1968-1987); 
Christopher Peacocke (1989-2000); Dorothy Edgington (2003-2006); John Hawthorne (2006-2015); 
Ofra Magidor (2016-present). And here are the Wykeham Professors of Logic: Alfred Jules Ayer 
(1959-1978); Michael Dummett (1979-1992); David Wiggins (1993-2000); Timothy Williamson 
(2000-present). 
  
As is obvious, however, the phenomenon is not limited to Oxford. For example, in a recent 
interview Danièle Moyal-Sharrock confirmed the state of affairs for Britain in general and for London 
in particular: “I founded the [British Wittgenstein] Society,” she said, “in reaction to the decline of 
Wittgenstein’s reputation in the UK, particularly London universities,” so as “to help ensure that 
Wittgenstein’s work has the impact on our civilisation that it deserves to have” (Moyal-Sharrock  
2014). 
Unsurprisingly, in the United States things are even worse for the later Wittgensteinian tradition. 
Perhaps nobody said it better than Newton Garver in the mid-1980s:v 
 
There is no doubt whatever that Wittgenstein has been noticed in America, 
and there is every reason to believe this will continue to be the case into the 
foreseeable future. On the other hand, Wittgenstein has no significant 
following here. People recognize him, read him, cite him, and discuss him; 
but few take up philosophy in his manner or modify their thinking in line with 
the main thrusts of his work. In literature there may be no difference between 
being noticed and having an impact, but there certainly is a difference in 
science: Velikovsky's Worlds in Collision has been widely noticed and 
continues to be discussed, but it cannot be said to have had an impact on 
modern science. In the same sense one has to say that Wittgenstein has had 
little impact on such American philosophers as Carnap, Hempel, Feigl, 
Grünbaum, Quine, Chisholm, Goodman, Rawls, Kripke, Dworkin, Gewirth, 
Donagan, Kaplan, Searle –– even though they have all noticed Wittgenstein. 
The exceptions are fewer: Black, Malcolm, Bergmann (selectively), and Foot. 
(Netwon Garver 1987: 207)  
 
More generally, there are many different indicators and data revealing and in some case even 
measuring the decline of the later Wittgensteinian tradition, both in Britain and in the United States. 
In the Anglo-American academic world, the main courses in philosophy are normally ‘Metaphysics,’ 
‘Philosophy of language,’ ‘Philosophy of science,’ ‘Philosophy of mind,’ ‘Epistemology,’ ‘Logic,’ 
and so forth, and normally they are not characterised by the acceptance of a later Wittgensteinian 
paradigm. For the mainstream analytic eye, ‘Wittgenstein’ is the name of a great philosopher and a 
founding father, but it refers to a somewhat historical subject, not far from ‘Modern philosophy,’ 
‘American pragmatism’ or the even more exotic ‘Continental philosophy’. 
Of course, Wittgenstein is quite unanimously considered a classic, and there are endless works of 
commentary, interpretation and exegesis on his thought, as well as comparative analyses of the form 
  
“Wittgenstein and ...”. In the titles of all journal articles, books and academic dissertations recorded 
by the Philosopher’s Index in the period 1950-2009, there are 8,679 occurrences of ‘Wittgenstein,’ a 
datum which indicates that Wittgenstein is less popular than philosophers such as Kant (occurring in 
18,407 titles), Hegel (16,358), Marx (13,981), or Heidegger (11,582), but nonetheless he is more 
popular than philosophers such as Sartre (5,455), Husserl (5,377), Locke (5,082), Spinoza (4,997) or 
Dewey (4,851), and far more popular than analytic philosophers such as Quine (1,744) or Kripke 
(629) (Bonino and Tripodi 2019). Notice also that the number of occurrences of ‘Wittgenstein’ 
slightly but regularly increases, from the first to the last decade.vi 
Does all this mean that speaking of a decline of Wittgenstein, as is repeatedly done in this book, is 
nothing but an illusion? No, it only means that the decline took place in a more restricted area. The 
above-reported result reveals something interesting about Wittgenstein’s place in contemporary 
philosophy, with a special focus on the English-speaking philosophical world (since the Philosopher’s 
Index may to a certain extent have an anglophone bias) but without any constraint concerning a 
specific philosophical current or tradition. The decline of Wittgenstein is a more local phenomenon, 
which belongs to the history of Anglo-American analytic philosophy. However, it is a real and 
measurable phenomenon, as is clearly shown by certain results recently achieved by scientometrics. 
The authors of the study took into account a corpus of 4,966 articles taken from five important 
philosophical journals belonging to the analytic tradition –– The Philosophical Review, Noûs, The 
Journal of Philosophy, Mind, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research –– from the period 
1985-2014, and they provided a list of the most cited philosophers. There is little doubt that the results 
obtained strongly confirm the ‘decline view’ described above. Wittgenstein has only 199 citations, 
therefore occupying the 63rd position in the ranking, far from the top rankings: 1) David Lewis (2119 
citations), 2) Willard Van Orman Quine (921), 3) Donald Davidson (899), 4) Hilary Putnam (685), 5) 
Tyler Burge (668), 6) Jerry Fodor (649), 7) Gottlob Frege (574), 8) Timothy Williamson (544), 9) 
Bertrand Russell (540), 10) Saul Kripke (489);vii in the ranking Wittgenstein is also exceeded by such 
different philosophers as Crispin Wright, Michael Dummett, Bernard Williams, Robert Stalnaker, 
John Rawls, George Edward Moore, Immanuel Kant, Peter Strawson, Rudolf Carnap, and Wilfrid 
Sellars, among others (Buonomo and Petrovich 2018: 166). Notwithstanding his lasting centrality as 
a subject of exegesis and research for philosophy in general (not to mention the other human 
sciences), the presence and influence of Wittgenstein is nowadays much less evident in current 
philosophical theories, as far as the analytic tradition is concerned; in the analytic context –– the 
specific and unique context that really matters in the present book –– Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
views, especially his later views, have been increasingly ignored or neglected, his name rarely 
mentioned. 
For example, to put it hyperbolically, it often seems that an analytic philosopher who works on the 
  
issue of mental causation (with the aim of achieving substantial results) would probably consider a 
debate on the later Wittgensteinian idea that reasons are not and cannot be causes in a somewhat 
similar way as a contemporary astronomer would view a debate over the Ptolemaic model; serious 
work –– the typical analytic philosopher of mind seems to take for granted –– begins after those 
hypotheses have been rejected or abandoned. viii  This is probably one reason why several 
contemporary Wittgensteinian philosophers had, and still have, the impression they are being put 
aside without argument (and they also think that the analogy between the Wittgensteinian paradigm 
and the Ptolemaic one is nothing but a sign of the “scientism” of current mainstream analytic 
philosophy). 
It was already in the 1970s that Oets Kolk Bouwsma disapproved of his students’ return to 
philosophical theories, “as if Wittgenstein had never existed” (Rollins 1985: 210). According to the 
late Norman Malcolm, 
 
One might suppose that within a few years after the publication of the 
Philosophical Investigations, the direction of philosophical work would have 
sharply altered. Philosophers would no longer be searching for the universal, 
the essential. But if one supposed this, one would be wrong. Books containing 
theories of art, of thinking, of belief, of ethics, of action, of knowledge, of 
language, continue to abound. (Malcolm 1993: 48) 
 
Von Wright observed that if analytic philosophy is an ally of “the two forces which more than any 
other have stamped contemporary civilisation: science and technology,” then “of the Investigations 
one might say that its spirit is alien and even hostile to the typically ‘analytic’ approach” (von Wright 
1993: 25, 32). In 2005 Anthony Kenny confessed that 
 
By the time I came to publish a collection of such papers in The Legacy of 
Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984) I had to lament that the 
philosophical influence of Wittgenstein seemed to be diminishing rather than 
increasing. Some of Wittgenstein’s insights into philosophy of language and 
philosophy of mind, I had believed, constituted irreversible advances in the 
subject. But now they were obscured or forgotten. Metaphysical weeds that 
his probing should have rooted up once and for all returned in ever more 
abundant strength. (Kenny 2005: vii) 
 
Hacker made a similar point, underlining at the same time a difference between the legacy of the early 
  
Wittgenstein and that of the late Wittgenstein:  
 
By the mid 1960s its [Wittgenstein’s later thought’s] influence was already 
declining and twenty years later it was evident that in many respects the spirit 
of the Tractatus, merged with … scientistic character of post-positivist ideas 
derived in part from members of the [Vienna] Circle, had triumphed over the 
spirit of the Investigations and its Oxonian offspring. (Hacker 1996: 1) 
 
A brief look at the Philosophy Family Tree –– a “genealogy” of philosophers, in which the “parent” 
relation is the relation between dissertation advisor and dissertation advisee ––  provides some hints 
of the decline of Wittgenstein in Anglo-American analytic philosophy.ix Wittgenstein has only 4 direct 
pupils (Anscombe, A.C. Jackson, Gasking, and Goodstein) and 115 descendants (i.e., the pupils of 
the pupils). However, if our purpose is to provide an approximate and preliminary map of 
Wittgenstein’s influence on the Anglo-American academy, we should be aware that this data has a 
very low recall, since there are too many false negatives: consider, for example, people such as Max 
Black, whose advisor was Susan Stebbing, or Malcolm, who studied under Moore, or as von Wright, 
who was originally supervised by Eino Kaila; it is difficult to deny that all of them are Wittgensteinian 
philosophers (perhaps Black is the least orthodox of the three), so they should be included in the list. 
On the other hand, if one takes a more inclusive attitude, the data increases recall but loses precision: 
many false positives –– in particular, many non-Wittgensteinian analytic philosophers –– are included 
in the list. Consider some examples. Malcolm seems to have had 70 advisees, but 47 of them had 
Sydney Shoemaker as “forefather,” and this makes it likely that their original relationship with 
Wittgenstein has disappeared or, at least, become looser and looser. Von Wright’s most famous pupil, 
namely Jaakko Hintikka, worked at least in part outside the Wittgensteinian orthodoxy. Anscombe 
had 3 advisees, that is, Kenny, Philippa Foot, and Michael Dummett, the last two having in turn 37 
advisees: some of them were more analytic than Wittgensteinian, some others cannot be considered 
Wittgensteinian under any reasonable respect. The genealogy of Reuben Goodstein includes Johan 
van Benthem, whose logical work, at least prima facie, cannot be labeled ‘Wittgenstein-inspired’ 
under any respect. If one tries to obtain a rough and ready equilibrium between recall and precision, 
considering all the branches starting with people such as Black, Malcolm, von Wright, Rhees, Hacker, 
Kenny, Geach, Ambrose and Winch, one counts less than one hundred “somewhat more orthodox” 
Wittgensteinians. This number can be tentatively evaluated by comparing it with the list of advisees 
which one finds in the branches starting with Quine: 247 advisees, among them Donald Davidson, 
David Lewis and Gilbert Harman. 
A comparable picture also emerges when one takes into account different kinds of data, such as 
  
the articles published in analytic journals, philosophy series and encyclopaedias of philosophy. First 
of all, notice that in 1978 the journal Philosophical Investigations was founded. The founding editor 
was Frederick E. Mosedale. But soon afterwards, and for many years later, the journal was edited by 
Dewi Z. Phillips, a Wittgensteinian philosopher of religion belonging to the so-called Swansea 
School, associated with the names of Roy F. Holland, Peter Winch and Rush Rhees. Since then, the 
journal has focused on Wittgenstein’s philosophy, the philosophy of his pupils and followers, and a 
Wittgenstein-inspired critique of the current analytic mainstream. Now, a question naturally arises: 
Why did the Swansea scholars feel the need to launch such a new journal? In an article published in 
the same year –– 1978 –– on Metaphilosophy, with the title ‘On Saying What is Obvious,’ Mosedale 
seemed to provide a general answer, albeit indirectly: 
 
I am interested in understanding the decline of interest in ordinary language 
(OL) philosophy. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that I am interested in 
understanding how contemporary philosophers have made their peace with 
one of the challenges presented by OL philosophers. I assume that many 
philosophers have lost interest in OL philosophy because they have somehow 
come to see that this challenge is defective. I, as yet, have been unable to 
decide whether the challenge is defective. What have others detected which I 
have not? (Mosedale 1978: 14) 
 
Taking a slightly different perspective, one can also easily conjecture that the foundation of such a 
full-blooded Wittgensteinian journal is perhaps symptomatic of the fact that at the end of the 1970s 
it had already become relatively more difficult –– of course, not impossible but still difficult, at least 
more difficult than it used to be –– to publish articles written in the spirit of Wittgenstein in leading 
analytic journals such as The Journal of Philosophy, Mind and The Philosophical Review.x 
Consider, furthermore, the authoritative philosophy series The Library of Living Philosophers, 
edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp (since 1981, from Lewis Edwin Hahn). It contains only one monograph 
dedicated to an orthodox Wittgensteinian philosopher, namely von Wright, published in 1989. Notice 
also that –– as Cora Diamond once observed –– in the 1996 Supplement of the Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy “there [was] nothing … on Wittgenstein on knowledge, belief…. Wittgenstein [was] a 
non-figure for post-1967 philosophy of logic”; in a such a context, Diamond felt the need “to advise 
students with an interest in Wittgenstein that, if it is possible for them to do so, they play down that 
interest when they apply for positions teaching philosophy” (Diamond 2001: 113). Lars Herzberg 
made analogous considerations about the ninth volume of the Routledge Encycopedia of Philosophy: 
“Certain philosophers in the tradition from Wittgenstein, such as Rush Rhees and Cora Diamond, are 
  
almost totally neglected. … It is also interesting to note that in the article on Wittgenstein, Saul Kripke 
is singled out as the outstanding guide to his later thought” (Hertzberg 2006: 83). Hertzberg also 
emphasised a structural asymmetry: 
 
The marginalisation of Wittgenstein often takes the form of regarding 
philosophers whose work is inspired by his as forming their own enclave. In 
the leading journals of the field, one would rarely find a work, say, by Quine 
or Davidson, or a work written in their spirit, reviewed by someone from a 
Wittgensteinian tradition, while it is quite common for philosophers, say, of 
a Quinian, Davidsonian or other mainstream persuasion to review works 
written by philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein. The latter is of course 
entirely as it should be; it is the former situation that is regrettable. (Hertzberg 
2006: 84) 
 
For the present purposes, the above evidence of the decline of the later Wittgensteinian tradition in 
the analytic philosophical community, if compared to the central place it occupied during the golden 
age of linguistic philosophy in the 1950s and 1960s, is something more than a mere sketch or 
suggestion: it is a fact. A fact confirmed by evidence taken from multiple sources: historical-
philosophical evaluation, academic history, editorial and publishing data, personal memories, citation 
analysis. Therefore it is likely that the historical-philosophical picture outlined in this chapter (though 
not perhaps every detail of it) will satisfy those who already shared the same viewpoint: for example, 
Frascolla, Marconi and Voltolini, who wrote that “there is little doubt that interest in Wittgenstein's 
philosophy has been declining in the last twenty years”, and “this is particularly true with analytic 
philosophers” (Frascolla, Marconi and Voltolini 2010: 1), or Hanjo Glock, according to whom 
nowadays “there is a pervasive feeling that his [Wittgenstein’s] influence is in decline”, this 
impression being “not confined to Wittgenstein’s detractors”, but being also “shared by many of his 
admirers” (Glock 2008a: 375). Nonetheless, it is also possible that those who previously had a 
different opinion or feeling are not convinced yet. In particular, there could be two kinds of sceptics. 
Those, for example, who believe that Wittgenstein is still as central as always in analytic philosophy, 
perhaps because this is suggested by their peculiar subjective viewpoint; citation data provided above 
suggests that they are probably overgeneralising to the entire landscape from more or less scattered 
impressions deriving, as it were, from their own private garden. On the other side, those who find it 
neither surprising nor interesting that a philosopher who died nearly seventy years ago is not 
mainstream any more; therefore they maintain that there is nothing worth investigating in this respect. 
Both kinds of sceptical readers may be asked to suspend judgment for a moment, regarding the 
  
starting point of this book –– what is actually its main explanandum, namely, the fact that 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy has lost its centrality in Britain and never reached a comparable 
position in the United States –– as something like an “excuse” and a “chance” to narrate a hopefully 
interesting story of a significant part of the history of analytic philosophy. Here it is worth 
emphasising once again that this investigation focuses narrowly on the history of analytic philosophy, 
since it will neither take into account the great amount of exegetical or historical works on 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, the so-called Wittgenstein studies; nor will it touch upon the large and 
multifaceted sets of questions concerning the non-analytic uses of Wittgenstein.xi This is, at least in 
part, a novel account, for the account of the same facts provided by Peter Hacker in his Wittgenstein’s 
Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy –– according to which, roughly, the decline of 
Wittgenstein’s influence amounts to the end of analytic philosophy (Hacker 1996: chapter 8) –– is 
difficult to accept entirely, first of all because it runs the risk of confusing the description of the 
historical-philosophical processes with their evaluation. However, it goes without saying for everyone 
who reads both this introductory chapter and the next ones, this book is greatly indebted to Hacker’s 
work. Moreover, this book is not a rational reconstruction and is critical towards the view, often 
accepted or even taken for granted by analytic philosophers, that the driving forces in the history of 
philosophy are first and foremost philosophical arguments. The book is sympathetic to the perspective 
according to which the driving forces operate underneath the surface of arguments, at a broadly 
cultural and even social level (see, for example, Bourdieu 1984a and 1999, Bloor 1976, Kusch 1995). 
The book can be regarded as an attempt to show or perhaps just suggest the validity of that perspective 
in a particular case-study, the story of the decline of Wittgenstein in the history of analytic philosophy. 
However, this attempt is made not by moving entirely in the fields of intellectual history and the 
sociology of philosophy: the main topic of the book is still, after all, a battery of philosophical 
arguments; yet, its aim is to present, understand and evaluate such arguments in the broadly cultural 
and, to a lesser extent, social context. 
Notes 
 
i Throughout the book (in fact, even in the title), the concepts analytic philosophy and later Wittgensteinian tradition are 
employed, though both of them are inevitably vague and theory-laden. Both concepts have a less controversial core: for 
example, there is no doubt that Russell, Carnap, Quine and David Lewis are analytic philosophers, whereas Anscombe, 
Malcolm, Kenny and Hacker are somewhat “orthodox” Wittgensteinians. These concepts also have a more controversial 
periphery. For example: Is Wittgenstein himself an analytic philosopher? And what about the fact that Kripke is at the 
same time a full-blooded analytic philosopher and a sui generis Wittgensteinian, or that philosophers so different from 
each other as Crispin Wright and John McDowell may both be seen as heterodox Wittgensteinians? However, a 
preliminary clarification –– never mind a definition –– of these notions would require the writing of a separate monograph 
(by the way, Glock 2008b is, among other things, that work). The present book is based on the assumption that, though 
fuzzy and somewhat controversial, the concepts of analytic philosophy and later Wittgensteinian tradition are 
indispensable and, in fact, fertile. This is enough for our present purposes. 
ii Lynd Forguson analysed the subjects discussed in examinations at the University of Oxford, in both Greats and PPE: 
“The 1946 examinations in these subjects are practically indistinguishable in general philosophical orientation from those 
 
  
 
in the immediate pre-war years. However, questions reflecting the special interests of the Oxford ordinary language 
philosophers began to appear on both papers of the “Greats” examination as early as 1947. They occur with increasing 
frequency throughout the 1950s, with the 1957 Logic paper on the “PPE” examination containing no fewer than eleven 
of fourteen questions inviting an ordinary language approach” (Forguson 2001: 333). As to B.Phil examination papers, 
“in the early years, the ordinary language philosophy approach was also much in evidence among the questions, from the 
first examination in 1948 through the early 1960s” (Forguson 2001: 334). 
iii Oxford’s peculiar place in this story emerges from a second episode told by Williamson. It took place in 2000 in a 
graduate class on philosophical logic at the University of Oxford. A student kept on defending the Wittgensteinian view 
that contradictions are meaningless rather than false. Williamson replied by providing the “standard” responses: 
contradictions have true negations, whereas the negation of a meaningless sentence is itself meaningless. Feeling perhaps 
that it was a dialogue de sourds, eventually Williamson “became exasperated and said, ‘Maybe Wittgenstein was just 
wrong; it wouldn’t be the first time’. There was a collective gasp of shock”. Williamson commented: “I have never again 
witnessed such a reaction when Wittgenstein’s name was taken lightly” (Williamson 2014: 28). 
iv All of them took their DPhil at Oxford. It might be interesting to see who their supervisors were. Bill Child: David 
Pears and, after his retirement, David Charles (personal communication). Edward Harcourt: Michael Dummett, until his 
retirement, then Paul Snowdon and Bernard Williams; however, the first person who taught Wittgenstein to Harcourt was 
Kathy Wilkes, who was a graduate student at Princeton at the time of Rorty and Harman (personal communication). John 
Hyman: Peter Hacker (Glock and Hyman 2009). Adrian Moore: Michael Dummett (however, as an undergraduate at 
Cambridge he attended lectures by Elizabeth Anscombe and Bernard Williams) (Lodge 2018). Katherine Morris had 
multiple supervisors: Brian Farrell, Richard Wollheim, Gareth Evans, Jennifer Hornsby and David Pears (personal 
communication). Stephen Mulhall: Peter Hacker, but Anthony Kenny gave a bit of bibliographical advice (personal 
communication). 
v This doesn’t mean that his remarks and omissions are entirely shareable: for example, it is surprising that among the 
exceptions he mentioned neither Sellars nor Cavell. 
vi Here are the percentages of titles containing ‘Wittgenstein’ over a corpus of more than 19,500,000 titles: 0.0076% in 
the 1950s; 0.0226% in the 1960s; 0.0401% in the 1970s; 0.0534% in the 1980s; 0.0573% in the 1990s; 0.0680% in the 
2000s. Similar results come out from a search using Google Ngram-Viewer (rather than the Philosopher’s Index): 
https://books.google.com/ngrams. 
vii It is nice to notice that, as will become evident in the next chapters, many of these most frequently cited analytic 
philosophers have a central role in the story reconstructed in the present book. Arguably, this will make the provided 
explanation of the decline of Wittgenstein more elegant, if not more convincing. 
viii The analogy with the Ptolemaic-Copernican controversy is in part a hyperbole: this is shown, to mention just an 
example, by the well-known and highly respected work that Julia Tanney has recently done on reasons and causes (Tanney 
2015). Yet, indeed, it is a hyperbole only in part. 
ix The Tree has some or perhaps many lacunas. However, it can be taken into account with the due caution. 
x Notice also, incidentally, that up to 1984 the masthead of the journal Philosophical Investigations stated: “The journal 
seeks to express, extend or criticise ways of philosophising influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin and Gilbert 
Ryle.” However, in the first issue of 1985 this statement was removed without discussion and has never reappeared since. 
As Tommi Uschanov noticed, “this was probably due merely to the lack of submissions about Austin and Ryle” (Uschanov 
2000; see also Uschanov 2002) for, as Lynd Forguson put it, OLP had by then become “a kind of disease similar to 
deconstruction” (Forguson 2001, 326). 
xi To be frank, there is another restriction to mention here: the focus in this book is almost entirely limited to philosophical 
fields such as epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and so forth, whereas moral and 
political philosophy are not taken into due consideration. Arguably, this restriction is not without consequences, for (i) 
the (recent) history of moral and political philosophy in the analytic tradition has its peculiarities (see for example the 
interview to Jonathan Wolff in Bonino and Tripodi 2018b: 48-50); (ii) some of these peculiarities concern the 
philosophical legacy of Wittgenstein (think for example to the centrality for moral philosophy of a Wittgenstein-inspired 
author such as Bernard Williams, or to the role played by Elizabeth Anscombe in fostering a normative, substantive turn 
in moral philosophy). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
2. The Core and the Periphery 
 
The earliest attacks against the later Wittgensteinian tradition were part of the ‘intellectual war’ be-
tween the London School of Economics and the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. One of the 
sources of discord, though by no means the only one (suffice it to think of the Keynes-Hayek debate 
in economics), was the well-known antagonism between Wittgenstein and Popper, the philosophical 
champion of the LSE.xi Popper regarded himself as the one mainly responsible for the fall of logical 
positivism, but he arguably also had a role in the decline of Oxford linguistic philosophy. In the vein 
of Russell’s remarks on the slight help for lexicographers provided by Wittgenstein’s lazy later phi-
losophy (Russell 1959a: 217), in the preface to the first edition of his The Logic of Scientific Discovery 
Popper had dismissed Wittgenstein’s semantic views of the a priori as purely verbal minutiae and 
problems about mere words (Coffa 1991: chapter 18); against this view he quoted Kant, according to 
whom, “Whenever a dispute has raged for any length of time, especially in philosophy, there was, at 
the bottom of it, never a problem about mere words, but always a genuine problem about things” 
(Popper 1935/1959/2002: xv). In 1945 Popper had also criticised the “scholasticism and mysticism” 
of Wittgenstein’s doctrine “that while science investigates matters of fact, it is the business of philos-
ophy to clarify the meaning of terms,” noting that “it is characteristic for the views of this school that 
they do not lead to any chain of argument that could be rationally criticised, and that it therefore 
addresses its subtle analyses exclusively to the small esoteric circle of the initiated” (Popper 
1945/2009: 19). In a long footnote, he also claimed that “Wittgenstein’s method leads to a merely 
verbal solution,” suggesting that we are “faced with that kind of position which I have described 
elsewhere, in connection with Hegel, … as a reinforced dogmatism;” then he concluded that “not 
only does Wittgenstein’s theory invite every kind of metaphysical nonsense to pose as deeply signif-
icant; it also blurs what I have called … the problem of demarcation” (Popper 1945/2009: 282-3). 
Wittgenstein, for his part, always had little regard for Popper’s (social) philosophy, which he presum-
ably found vulgar and simplistic, and it is likely that he was offended by those footnotes; therefore 
when in 1947 Ryle published an approving review of The Open Society and its Enemies in Mind, 
Wittgenstein did not hesitate to break a friendship dating back to 1929 (Ryle 1947; Hacker, 1996: 
313). Popper, of course, did not hold back his tendency to criticise Wittgenstein, and in 1959, in the 
preface to the second edition of The Logic of Scientific Discovery, he directed his arrows against the 
methodological hegemony of linguistic analysis in Britain, confessing that he did not “care what 
methods a philosopher (or anybody else) may use, so long as he has an interesting problem, and so 
long as he is sincerely trying to solve it” (Popper 1935/1959/2002: xix). 
2.1 Paradigm-Case Arguments 
  
 
It is not therefore surprising that the protagonists of the early attacks on linguistic philosophy came 
from the LSE. One of them was the philosopher John Watkins, who taught at the LSE and was heavily 
under the spell of Popper, so that for a while he was regarded, as witnessed for example by Paul 
Feyerabend, as Popper’s ‘pit bull’ (Feyerabend 1995: 95; see also Musgrave 1999).xi The episode in 
question took place in 1957, when Watkins published in Analysis a sharp criticism of so-called para-
digm-case arguments (Watkins 1957a).xi Some linguistic philosophers believed that being called ‘P’ 
is (with some qualifications) a sufficient condition for being a P. This belief had important philosoph-
ical consequences. Suppose for example that someone, say, a sceptic, claims that something, the Ps, 
does not exist. Then you notice that not only is this o in front of us paradigmatically called ‘P,’ but o 
clearly exists (it is right here, in front of us). To deny that this o is a P is a sign that one is not fully 
grasping the meaning of ‘P,’ because the paradigmatic application of ‘P’ to o is at least partly consti-
tutive of the meaning of ‘P.’ Therefore, either the sceptic does not fully understand what ‘P’ means, 
or he is using ‘P’ in some non-standard or deviant sense. For example, if something is paradigmati-
cally called ‘table’ (that is, if it is uncontroversial that any reasonable speaker, who is fully competent 
about how the word ‘table’ has to be used in English, calls it ‘table’), then it is indeed a table. There-
fore a sceptic about material things, i.e., one who denies that there are things like, say, tables, chairs, 
and people, is either foolish or semantically deviant. So that scepticism about tables is easily refuted 
by exhibiting a paradigmatic application of the word ‘table.’ 
The argument was potentially very general, and it was easy to find applications of it in Oxford 
philosophy in the 1940s and 1950s. Austin, for example, presented a paradigm-case argument dis-
cussing perception with Ayer. Ayer claimed that all perception should be explained in terms of sense 
data (Ayer 1940). Austin noticed that Ayer’s argument entailed that one never sees a material object, 
and that there is no perception of material objects such as chairs, but only perception of sense data. 
However, he argued, look, this is a chair; you cannot deny that this is what we all paradigmatically 
call ‘chair’ (Austin 1962a). 
It is controversial among interpreters whether Wittgenstein himself put forward this kind of argu-
ment. Perhaps he came close to doing so in the following passage from the Investigations: 
 
If anyone said that information about the past could not convince him that 
something would happen in the future, I should not understand him. One 
might ask him: What do you expect to be told, then? What sort of information 
do you call a ground for such a belief? What do you call “conviction”? In 
what kind of way do you expect to be convinced?—If these are not grounds, 
then what are grounds? (Wittgenstein 1953: § 481) 
 
  
 
At any rate –– what is most relevant for the present purposes –– it is uncontroversial that several 
Wittgenstein-inspired philosophers such as Urmson, Flew, Malcolm, and Black produced paradigm-
case arguments. A special role in this story was played by a combination of views originating from 
Moore, reinterpreted by Wittgenstein, and borrowed by Malcolm. In his attempt to defend common 
sense against the Cartesian sceptic, Moore famously stood up and declared: “Here is one hand, … 
and here is another hand” (Moore 1939: 166). According to him, these truisms express or describe 
special empirical facts, which we know with absolute certainty. Wittgenstein, especially in his later 
thoughts then merged into On Certainty, interpreted Moore’s truisms as having the peculiar function 
of rules that are partly constitutive of our rationality, rather than as empirical or factual self-evident 
assertions (Wittgenstein 1969; see also Coliva 2010). In the 1940s Malcolm came to Cambridge from 
the United States to investigate (how to refute) scepticism under the supervision of Moore, but then 
he met Wittgenstein and became a pupil of his and, in the next decades, his principal “voice” in 
America. In 1942 Malcolm used to believe that “ordinary language is correct language” (Malcolm 
1942/1964: 15); but when other philosophers, such as for example Roderick Chisholm, replied that it 
would be absurd to argue, say, against Columbus that people paradigmatically applied the word 
‘round’ to things such as apples and cherries, rather than to the Earth, which on the contrary they 
paradigmatically called ‘flat’, Malcolm came to weaken his dubious claim. Nevertheless, he never 
ceased to apply paradigm case arguments or stress the philosophical authority of ordinary language 
(Chisholm 1951; Malcolm 1951; see also Soames 2003: chapter 7). For example, he was still ready 
to refute scepticism about the reality of the past by pointing to a paradigmatic application of expres-
sions such as ‘I had breakfast one hour ago.’ Any competent speaker has to accept that this is a case 
of past event. If they do not assent to it, they do not fully grasp the meaning of some words occurring 
in sentences such as ‘I had breakfast one hour ago’ and/or in expressions such as ‘past event,’ or 
perhaps they are using such words in non-standard ways (Malcolm 1951). 
Max Black, to provide a further example, considered the case of a sceptic about causes, who denies 
that there are and, in fact, can be causes, since he thinks that the very notion of a cause is self-contra-
dictory. Black refuted this kind of sceptic by pointing out the case of a thirsty man who stretches out 
his hand, picks up a bottle and drinks. This, he remarked, is what we normally call ‘making something 
happen’; it is, more precisely, a paradigmatic application of the expression ‘making something hap-
pen’. Therefore, he concluded, there are cases of making something happen and, a fortiori, there are 
causes. Either the sceptic does not have a full understanding of the word ‘cause’ or the expression 
‘making something happen,’ or he is using these terms in some deviant or non-standard sense (Black 
1958b). Similarly, Flew provided an argument concerning the validity of induction (Flew 1956); and 
other examples could be given as well (e.g., Urmson 1956; see also Marconi 2009). 
  
 
In his 1957 article Watkins criticised the view of meaning associated with paradigm-case argu-
ments. Supporters of paradigm-case arguments, he pointed out, misleadingly identify connotation 
(meaning) with denotation (reference), or were at least convinced that connotation is derivative with 
respect to denotation. For example, they claimed that if a speaker is not willing to assent to a sentence 
such as ‘This is a cat,’ i.e. if she is not willing to apply referentially the word ‘cat’ to this animal in 
front of her, then she does not have a full grasp of what ‘cat’ means. Paradoxically enough, this bad 
conception of meaning was quite similar to the so-called Augustinian picture of language described 
and criticised by Wittgenstein at the beginning of the Investigations (Wittgenstein 1953: §§ 1 and ff.). 
However, Watkins remarked, not only is meaning also connotation, that is, not only does it also de-
pend on a set of criteria, on a definition, and so forth; but nor can we rule out the possibility that 
denotation depends on connotation, so that –– so to speak –– connotation comes first. But then a 
sentence such ‘o is a P’ (e.g., ‘This, in front of me, is a cat’) is factual rather than conceptual, empirical 
rather than meaning-constitutive, open to falsification rather than “analytically” true (Watkins 1957a 
and 1957b; cf. Flew 1957, Richman 1961 and Williams 1961). In modern, updated terms, one could 
say that paradigm-case arguments depend on a referential view of lexical competence, not giving due 
consideration to its inferential aspects (Marconi 1997). Taking into account inferential competence 
as well, one would make room for a possible counter-objection from the sceptic, who could easily 
acknowledge that this o (this object in front of her) exists; however, the sceptic could argue, though 
it appears to be a P, actually it is not a real P, because being a P depends on a definition or set of 
criteria Q1…. Qn, whereas this o is not Q1 or … or Qn; hence, it cannot be a P: for example, this 
existing object is not a cat but, say, a Martian artefact extremely similar to (or even indiscernible 
from) a real cat, for it does not meet the criteria that determine its deep nature or essence (Marconi 
2009). 
Watkins’s attack on paradigm-case arguments was connected to two major philosophical issues, 
which were to become crucial for the future of the later Wittgensteinian tradition. First, a peculiar 
picture of science: more precisely, a view of the criteria for the demarcation of science from pseudo-
science, and a view of the role played in science by observation and theory, respectively. Second, a 
metaphilosophical view of the relationship between science and philosophy, the so-called continuity-
discontinuity issue. As to the first issue, notice that ordinary language philosophers may happen to 
be faced with a scientist, rather than with a traditional sceptic. Apparently, Wittgensteinian philoso-
phers had in mind ordinary language terms (‘table,’ ‘cat,’ ‘breakfast,’ ‘hand’ and so forth) and, in 
particular, observational terms. However, one could ask, in analogy with Watkins, what about theo-
retical terms, i.e., terms that –– as a scientific realist would argue –– refer to unobservable entities, 
whose existence is postulated by virtue of merely theoretical (non-observational) reasons? What 
  
 
comes first, the observational or the theoretical? As to the latter issue, according to linguistic philos-
ophers there are uses of words, call them paradigmatic uses, which are (partly) constitutive of seman-
tic competence. There are also uses that are non-constitutive, call them factual or empirical. Conse-
quently, there is a difference between conceptual and factual statements; a difference on which the 
philosophy-science divide is ultimately based too.  
 
2.2 Words and Things 
It is likely that paradigm-case arguments were the first among the later Wittgensteinian cornerstones 
to be demolished in the history of analytic philosophy (Burge 1992: 13); and Watkins was partly 
responsible for that. It took longer, however, until philosophers came to appreciate entirely the im-
portant general and metaphilosophical consequences of the debate. In the same years, however, a 
second episode relating to the LSE’s assault on Oxford linguistic philosophy proved to have a much 
wider impact than Watkins’s criticism of paradigm-case arguments: the publication in 1959 –– by 
Victor Gollancz, Ltd. –– of Ernest Gellner’s famous or, according to many, infamous book Words 
and Things: a Critical Account of Linguistic Philosophy and a Study in Ideology (Gellner 1959/1979). 
The buzz of the work was so strong that one might be tempted to think that its analysis could provide 
a possible answer to the general question raised in this book, namely: How to explain the decline of 
the later Wittgensteinian tradition in the history of analytic philosophy?This is exactly what Tommi 
Uschanov did in a couple of interesting articles published at the beginning of the 2000s, both devoted 
to “the strange death of ordinary language philosophy”. According to Uschanov, the decline of Witt-
genstein’s later philosophy or, as Uschanov prefers to say, “the way in which OLP has been written 
out of history in recent decades is largely the result of Gellner’s widespread influence” (Uschanov 
2000 and 2002).xi 
A Czech, and then naturalised British anthropologist and sociologist, Gellner was at the time of 
publication a colleague of Watkins and Popper and Reader in Sociology at the London School of 
Economics, where he was also responsible for teaching philosophy. Some years earlier, however, he 
had studied philosophy at Balliol College, Oxford, thus becoming well-acquainted with leading 
linguistic philosophers such as Ryle, Pears, Anscombe, Urmson, Hampshire and Hare. In the early 
fifties, Gellner used to give talks in Oxford and write papers in a style similar to that of linguistic 
philosophers; Ryle appreciated his work and allowed him to publish in Mind (Hall 2011: 107, 159; 
see, for example, Gellner 1951). During the mid-1950s, however, he began diverging intellectually 
from Oxford philosophy, even from those people to whom he was personally close (Hall 2011: 159). 
Soon the later Wittgenstein became his bête noire, so that in 1959, encouraged by Russell (who wrote 
a laudatory preface), he published Words and Things. In doing so, in the British philosophical field 
he became a sort of “ally” of Russell himself, the author of the two quotations inserted by Gellner at 
  
 
the beginning of the text, as an epigraph: 
 
The later Wittgenstein … seems to have grown tired of serious thinking and 
to have invented a doctrine which would make such an activity unnecessary. 
I do not for one moment believe that the doctrine which has these lazy 
consequences is true. 
 
The desire to understand the world is, they think, an outdated folly. (Russell 
1959a) 
 
At the same time, Gellner was also on the same anti-Wittgensteinian side as his colleagues at the LSE, 
Popper and Watkins. He had been personally acquainted with Popper since the 1940s and had always 
admired his thought, though he sometimes assumed a critical attitude and often kept a certain distance 
(Hall 2011: 93, 106). 
Gellner’s criticism of linguistic philosophy was two-fold: philosophical and sociological. As 
Martin Kusch once emphasised, in philosophical controversies charges of relativism, irrationalism 
and total scepticism occupy a central role (Kusch 1995: 270). This is particularly true of Gellner’s 
criticism of linguistic philosophy, in which these kinds of charges are made on almost every page, 
often flavoured with sarcasm and irony: linguistic philosophy implies relativism (Gellner 1959/1979: 
116) and is tangled up in behaviourism (1959/1979: 121); linguistic philosophy has an anti-scientific 
and quasi-religious character, based on “face-saving devices” such as withdrawals, caution, 
ambiguity, ineffability, ad-hoc-ness, insinuation and taboos, which preserve it from falsification; 
linguistic philosophy is also based on the illusion of neutrality and superiority, which depends on its 
relying on the incontrovertible authority either of Wittgenstein (“one of the sages of Lagado”) or of 
ordinary language, which linguistic philosophers regard as “somehow sacrosanct and outside the fray 
and neutral in virtue of some kind of fundamental and absolute status” (Gellner 1959/1979: 148-9, 
188, 136, 158). 
Moreover, according to Gellner, linguistic philosophy is embedded into an “a-historical 
atmosphere” (Gellner 1959/1979: 120) and its vision of the history of thought is, to say the least, 
naïve. “There is a first stage of intellectual innocence and health,” he wrote, “in which people just 
use language, without puzzling about it and hence without puzzling philosophically about the world” 
(Gellner 1959/1979: 171). The next stage is when people begin to puzzle about the world, and this 
makes them postulate philosophical theories and “occamistically” suppose that there are only one or 
two ways to use language, rather than a hundred and more. Sooner or later (“probably sooner,” as 
Gellner pointed out) they find themselves in trouble. “But the cure is simple,” and it consists in “the 
  
 
cult of the idiosyncrasy of various kinds of use of language” fostered by Wittgenstein in the 
Investigations and anticipated by Moore (Gellner 1959/1979: 172). 
Gellner also reported four more fundamental “mistakes or half-truths” perpetuated by linguistic 
philosophers. First, the paradigm-case argument, which Gellner characterised as an “argument from 
the actual use of words to the answer to philosophical problems, or from a conflict between the actual 
use of words to the falsity of a philosophical theory” (Gellner 1959/1979: 30). Second, a generalised 
version of the naturalistic fallacy, according to which linguistic norms can legitimately be inferred 
from currently accepted usage (Gellner 1959/1979: 36-39). Third, the contrast theory of meaning, 
which holds that any meaningful term must have both a possible example and a possible 
counterexample, a correct application and an incorrect one: concepts used “without antithesis” are 
meaningless, because nothing could conceivably count as their misapplication (Gellner 1959/1979: 
39-43). Fourth, polymorphism, a doctrine that emphasises the great variety of linguistic uses for any 
given word, and from this insistence on the variety of uses, both between and within concepts, it 
(according to Gellner incorrectly) draws the conclusion that general assertions about the use of words 
are impossible (Gellner 1959/1979: 30; see also 1959/1979: 44-50). 
In Gellner’s view, these four pillars of linguistic philosophy have a great deal in common: they are 
all rooted in a common model of how language works; and they are all related to a misleading 
metaphilosophical picture, according to which philosophy is nothing but a piecemeal descriptive 
activity, whose aim is clarification and the “dissolution of philosophic problems by appeals to the 
actual use of words” (Gellner 1959/1979: 43). In fact, according to Gellner, in linguistic philosophy 
these two elements –– a model of how language works and a therapeutic metaphilosophy –– are 
strictly interrelated, so as to form “an amusing symbiosis, a logical circularity”: 
 
If philosophy is essentially therapeutic, then indeed attention to the individual 
cases is essential, and generalities are irrelevant (for therapy is always of the 
individual) even if true, and hence one must see language polymorphically. 
In the reverse direction: if the correct view of language is polymorphic, then 
indeed philosophy must be therapeutic, for in an inherently diversified field, 
where nothing general can be said, we can cure but we cannot build theories. 
(Gellner 1959/1979: 258) 
 
Gellner provided several examples of how linguistic metaphilosophy worked by referring to Wisdom 
(“Philosophy begins and ends in platitude”) and, of course, to Wittgenstein (“Philosophy only states 
what everyone admits,” “Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can 
in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is”) 
  
 
(Wittgenstein 1953: §§ 599, 123). But he also attached paramount importance to Moore’s quotation 
from Bishop Butler in Principia Ethica: “Everything is what it is and not another thing” (Moore 1903; 
Gellner 1959/1979: 49, 100). This, Gellner suggested, had often been interpreted by linguistic 
philosophers as meaning that “everything is what it is said to be and should not be explained in terms 
of something else” (Gellner 1959/1979: 91), but he also emphasised that, to his eyes, the crucial point 
of this metaphilosophical stance was the insistence on the idea that philosophy is a “second-order 
study,” so that “its findings cannot be about ‘first-order’ issues, or, in plainer words, about the world” 
(Gellner 1959/1979: 100-1).  
This brings us to Gellner’s most famous objection to Oxford linguistic philosophy, namely, that it 
is deeply conservative, “conservative in a general, unspecific way,” for it focuses on “showing that 
the reasons underlying criticisms of accepted habits are in general mistaken" (Gellner 1959/1979: 
224–225). A mix of modesty (it does not interfere with anything) and messianic style (it fosters a 
revolution in philosophy), not only does linguistic philosophy defer to the linguistic habits of common 
men, a “prostration” before common sense that, following Russell, Gellner compared to Tolstoy’s 
attitude towards the peasants (here Gellner commented with dry humour: “Fortunately, Tolstoy’s 
muzhiks were not able to take up and propagate his doctrine. Wittgenstein’s did”) (Gellner 1959/1979: 
113; Russell 1959b: 8-9).xi But linguistic philosophy also preserves the social status quo, the status 
quo of Oxford upper class, the ivory tower to which most of its members used to belong (Gellner 
1959/1979: 60, 235; see also Cohen 1960). Linguistic philosophy is a philosophy suitable for 
gentlemen: 
 
Nothing is justified. It is merely explained that justification is redundant, that 
the need for it is pathological. The philosophy is simultaneously esoteric –– 
it is so refined and subtle in its effects that a prolonged habituation to its 
practices, and hence leisure, is necessary before one sees the point –– and yet 
its message is that everything remains as it is, and no technicality is required. 
No vulgar new revelation about the world, no guttersnipe demands for reform, 
no technical specialisms are encouraged.(Gellner 1959/1979: 238) 
 
To make this point clearer, Gellner revisited Thorstein Veblen’s Theory of Leisure Class, 
characterising the minute pedantry of linguistic philosophy in terms of conspicuous triviality, a kind 
of conspicuous waste of time, talent and, ultimately, money (Gellner 1959/1979: 246; see also Veblen 
1899). Gellner emphasised two consequences of the above-mentioned social conditions of linguistic 
philosophy: first,  a special sense of decorum, which rules out as indecorous any attempt to criticise 
it radically, so that any “external” criticism is banned and only intra-paradigmatic micro-debates are 
  
 
allowed (Gellner 1959/1979: 191); second, an ideology (Gellner 1959/1979: 231, 237-8), based on 
the repulsion towards or lack of interest in science and “technicality,” power and responsibility, 
critical ideas (Gellner 1959/1979: 239). Linguistic philosophers share an entirely misleading picture 
of how science works: in this regard, Gellner refers to the “strong arguments … against seeing science 
in this way … powerfully expounded by Professor K.R. Popper” (Gellner 1959/1979: 67-8). 
Linguistic philosophers are professional, academic philosophers, but they have been “trained in an 
untechnical, literary manner” (Gellner 1959/1979: 240). They have the cult of (verbal) 
meticulousness, but scorn arguments (1959/1979: 241). They insist on the practical irrelevance of 
philosophy (Gellner 1959/1979: 241-2) and, as they sometimes explicitly state, have a strong 
preference for “the ritual as a case of l'art pour l’art” (or “pure research”), which is easily explicable 
in the above-mentioned Veblenesque terms (Gellner 1959/1979: 252). 
 
2.3 The Impact of Gellner 
There are three related questions concerning Gellner’s attack on linguistic philosophy, which should 
be kept apart from one another. The first concerns Gellner’s philosophical arguments: are they 
tenable? No direct answer to this question will be provided here. The second question is: Is Gellner’s 
sociological analysis by and large correct? This questions will be briefly taken into account in chapter 
4 below. Let us now focus on the third question, the most important for the present purposes: Is 
Gellner’s attack really responsible for the decline of the later Wittgensteinian philosophical tradition? 
In answering this question, one must distinguish between two different contexts: the context of 
analytic philosophy, in which arguably we can properly speak of a decline of Wittgenstein, on the one 
hand, and the wider and more heterogenous context of non-analytic philosophies, non-philosophical 
academic disciplines and non-academic culture, which falls largely outside the scope of the present 
investigation, on the other hand. In the latter contexts, the widespread influence of Words and Things 
was undeniable; and it is likely that the main reason for its popularity was, as Uschanov remarked, 
its novel attempt to explain the conservatism of linguistic philosophy not only philosophically but 
also sociologically (Uschanov 2000).xi Consider, for example, the way in which Herbert Marcuse 
criticised Wittgenstein in his One-Dimensional Man (1964), or the pages dedicated to Wittgenstein 
in Perry Anderson’s ‘Components of the National Culture’ (1968): they are quite explicitly reworked 
versions of Gellner’s 1959 main arguments (Marcuse 1964; Anderson 1968). A more tacit influence 
is recognisable in such different readers of Wittgenstein as Jürgen Habermas and Gilles Deleuze, to 
mention just a couple of them (Uschanov 2000). 
In the former context, however, that is, in the context of the rise of analytic philosophy, the tangle 
is much more complicated and difficult to unravel. Around twenty years after the publication of Words 
and Things, most Anglo-American analytic philosophers considered Oxford linguistic philosophy a 
  
 
dead intellectual option, for reasons not so dissimilar to those wished for by Gellner: its hostility 
towards science, its “obscurantism”, and its opposition to philosophical progress; its sacred devotion 
for ordinary language; its relativistic claim that all forms of life, the religious as well as the scientific 
ones, are equally legitimate; and, above all, its trivialisation of the task of philosophy, which Gellner 
compared to a dangerous euthanasia of philosophy (Gellner 1959/1979: 49).  
Nevertheless, it is a strong overstatement to suppose, as Uschanov tends to, that the attitude taken 
by analytic philosophers towards Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, never mind the decline of the later 
Wittgensteinian tradition in the history of analytic philosophy, depended on Gellner’s impact. 
Nowadays, Words and Things is nearly forgotten within the analytic community (Uschanov 2000).xi 
Moreover, even though immediately after its publication Words and Things temporarily became, as 
Marshall Cohen noted, “the most discussed work of English philosophy since A.J. Ayer’s Language, 
Truth and Logic” (Cohen 1960: 178; see also Ayer 1936), since the beginning its reception on both 
shores of the Atlantic was –– with few exceptions –– overwhelmingly hostile. As editor of Mind,  
Ryle wrote to the publishers, Victor Gollancz Ltd: 
 
You recently sent me a review copy of Words and Things by Ernest Gellner. 
I am returning it to you (separately) since I shall not have a review of the book 
in Mind. Abusiveness may make a book saleable, but it disqualifies it from 
being treated as a contribution to an academic subject. (cited in Russell 1997: 
607) 
 
In a letter to the Times Russell protested that Mind should not boycott books that do not endorse its 
editor’s views, and in turn Ryle replied that “in the book referred to by Earl Russell … about 100 
imputations of disingenuousness are made against a number of identifiable teachers of philosophy; 
about half of these occur on pages 159-192 and 237-265” (Metha 1962: 3). Gellner himself partici-
pated in the discussion, attributing to Ryle a sheer misunderstanding: the problem of linguistic phi-
losophy is its inherent evasiveness, which does not require any conscious dishonesty. 
Then the controversy expanded in the Economist and other journals. On the side of Gellner and 
Russell there were Conrad Dehn (a correspondent), Leslie Farrell (private solicitor to the Queen), 
Thomas Creed (a Queen’s Consel), Arnold S. Kaufman and Bernard Crick (the political scientists), 
Joan Robinson (the Cambridge post-Keynesian economist) and I.A. Richards (the literary critic) (Me-
hta 1962; Uschanov 2000). Only very few professional philosophers belonged to this small pro-
Gellner group: the previously mentioned John Watkins, Geoffrey Mure, one of the last British Ideal-
ists, and the American philosopher Hans Meyerhoff (Mehta 1962; Musgrave 1999; Watkins 1960; 
Uschanov 2000). Besides them, the vast majority of academic philosophers defended the reputation 
  
 
of both Mind and its editor, and emphasised the abusiveness of Gellner’s attack: this was, no doubt, 
the main keyword, considering the reviews in their entirety, from the review written by Alec Kass-
man, editor of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, to that sent by Kevin Holland, an Oxford 
undergraduate (Mehta 1962). This attitude was also shared, as was easily foreseeable, by Oxford 
linguistic philosophers such as John Wisdom, Brian McGuinness, Geoffrey Warnock and Michael 
Dummett, according to whom Words and Things did not even have “the smell of honest or seriously 
intentioned work” (Dummett 1960/1978: 436; see also Uschanov 2000). More significantly, the same 
attitude was almost unanimously taken by the reviewers of such journals as The Journal of Philosophy 
(Arnold Isenberg), The Philosophical Review (Willis Doney, one of Malcolm’s pupils), the Times 
Literary Supplement (an anonymous reviewer), Synthese (Gabriël Nuchelmans), The British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science (Anthony Quinton), The Philosophical Quarterly (Stephan Körner) 
(Isenberg 1961; Doney 1962; Anonymous 1959; Nuchelmans 1961; Quinton; Körner 1959). All of 
them complained about Gellner’s rude and ultimately abusive style, which may perhaps characterise 
a (talented) caricaturist, as John N. Findlay described Gellner on the Indian Journal of Philosophy, 
though not a professional philosopher and serious academic scholar (Findlay 1961b). The same views 
were accepted by most Anglo-American academic philosophers, from Alan Donagan to Morton 
White, from Alasdair MacIntyre to Richard M. Hare up to Ayer, even though he was antagonistic to 
linguistic philosophy and a recent victim of Ryle’s and Austin’s academic power in Oxford 
(Uschanov 2000; Donagan 1959; White 1960a; MacIntyre 1959; Hare 1960; Ayer 1959); even the 
most neutral and sympathetic reviewers such as Watkins himself, H.B. Acton, P.L. Heath, and the 
Oxford logician William Kneale made several concessions to Ryle’s academic viewpoint (Acton 
1959; Heath 1962; Kneale 1959). Marshall Cohen radically emphasised the role played in this story 
by common academic membership when he suspected Gellner of professional envy towards the pres-
tigious Oxford professors he used to spend time with some years earlier (Cohen 1960). 
The story of the reception of Gellner’s work is quite telling, and it can be used to set the stage for 
this and the next chapters. To a large extent independently of Gellner, in the decades following the 
publication of Words and Things many analytic philosophers, especially in the United States, reached 
some of the anti-Wittgensteinian conclusions achieved by Gellner in his 1959 work. Russell had been 
somewhat prophetic when he wrote in the preface to Words and Things: “Whatever may be the first 
reaction to Mr. Gellner's arguments, it seems highly probable –– to me, at least –– that they will 
gradually be accorded their due weight” (Russell 1959b: 13). Consider, for example, the question 
posed by Gellner some years after the publication of Words and Things: 
 
  
 
If you do not feel a generalised intellectual anxiety, if you feel no need to find 
and make explicit and to evaluate the basic premisses of your activities, why 
the devil philosophise in the first place? (Gellner 1964: 60) 
Or consider, more precisely, Gellner’s argument that, once completed, the Oxford euthanasia of phi-
losophy would for linguistic philosophers mean the chance to find themselves out of a job (Gellner 
1959/1979: 49). Similarly, in 1958 C.D. Broad had complained:  
An influential contemporary school, with many very able adherents in 
England and the U.S.A., would reduce philosophy to the modest task of 
attempting to cure the occupational diseases of philosophers. In their writings 
the word ‘Philosopher’ is commonly used to denote the holder of some 
opinion … which the writer regards as characteristically fatuous… . (I will 
not speculate) how long an impoverished community, such as contemporary 
England, will continue to pay the salaries of individuals whose only function, 
on their own showing, is to treat a disease which they catch from each other 
and impart to their pupils. (Broad 1958: 102; see also Gellner 1959/1979) 
 
The spirit, though not the letter, of the Gellner-Broad argument seems to be endorsed in one of the 
most recent and well-known analytic criticisms of linguistic metaphilosophy, namely, the one pre-
sented by Timothy Williamson in his discussion of Paul Horwich’s Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy 
(Williamson 2013: e8; see also Horwich 2010 and 2013). The unique purpose of Horwich’s later 
Wittgensteinian philosophy, Williamson remarks, seems to be to therapeutically criticise traditional 
theoretic philosophy, making fully explicit its misleading scientism, its tendency to overgeneralise 
from few scattered data, in a word: its dogmatism, in Wittgenstein’s sense. In this picture, however, 
 
90% of philosophy is a waste of space, while the remaining 10% consists of 
praiseworthy demolitions of the 90%. Horwich does not explain why 
taxpayers should be expected to fund a branch of the academy with that 
structure. Would it not be cheaper and more effective simply to abolish 
philosophy altogether? (Williamson 2013: e8) 
 
More generally, Williamson’s anti-exceptionalist conception of philosophy, according to which the 
aim of (analytic) philosophy is to answer questions taken at face-value, generalising and explaining 
  
 
all (or most) available data, seems to agree, in many respect, with Gellner’s attack on linguistic phi-
losophy (Williamson 2007; see chapter 6 below for a more detailed discussion). 
The similarity is quite striking. One way to highlight it is to tell the story of how linguistic philos-
ophy was undermined by analytic philosophers in the two or three decades following the publication 
of Words and Things, especially in the United States. This story will be extensively reconstructed in 
the next chapters (see especially chapters 4 to 5). For the moment, it will suffice to say that American 
analytic philosophers rediscovered some of the critical, anti-Wittgensteinian views that had been pre-
viously put forward by Gellner: they defended these views by using different arguments and adopting 
a more professional and scientific philosophical style, but they agreed with Gellner about some basic 
metaphilosophical issues, including the relationship between science and philosophy, the role of gen-
eral explanatory theories in philosophy and the critique of the absolute authority of ordinary lan-
guage.xi 
On the other hand, however, most Anglo-American philosophers, in particular those who belonged 
to the rising analytic tradition, reacted with hostility towards Words and Things. Thus it is natural to 
ask: Why? Part of the answer seems to be: because of its style. Most reviewers shared the view that 
Gellner’s style and rhetoric were strongly insinuating and crudely polemical, and they almost unani-
mously found it not only deplorable but totally illegitimate in the academic context. Because of its 
style –– which they described as journalistic rather than academic, witty rather than serious, express-
ing a polemic rather than an argument –– they did not acknowledge Gellner as part of the scientific 
community, either in Britain and or the United States. Analytic philosophy was (and still is) altogether 
academic,xi and a professional style was a conditio sine qua non for membership in the philosophic 
academia. Therefore the radical difference in style prevailed over substantial and metaphilosophical 
agreement. 
 
2.4 American Hegemony 
A slightly different issue deserves attention here. It is likely that not even the overall attack coming 
from the London School of Economics –– including not only Gellner’s invective but also Popper’s 
unpleasant comments on Wittgenstein and Watkins’s critique of paradigm-case arguments –– should 
be identified as mainly responsible for the strange death of linguistic philosophy. Again, here the 
question is: Why? Arguably, part of the answer is that these attacks came from the “periphery”. The 
London School of Economics was becoming more and more influential (Popper arrived there from 
New Zealand in 1946), but it was still somewhat peripheral, with respect to Oxford or Cambridge 
(Lacey 2004: 132; Akehurst 2010: 11; Rée 1993: 7). Russell, the main sponsor of Gellner, was 87 
years old: he had published his last scientific (rather than popular) works many years earlier and this, 
  
 
despite his everlasting authority, made him in a sense a somewhat marginal figure. Finally, and most 
importantly, from a geopolitical and economic point of view the centre of the world had moved: 
Britain used to be the “core” of the leading global empire, but it had irremediably become more 
peripheral, with respect to the United States (see, for example, Arrighi 1994: 47-74, 159-195). 
The post-war hegemony of the United States had conspicuous effects not only on habits but also 
on culture, including academic philosophy. No detailed argument will be given in support of this 
rather uncontroversial claim; a few data and remarks will suffice to illustrate it. During the 1950s and 
1960s, there was a multiplication of universities, departments, journals, books, professors and re-
searchers in the United States; significant funding was allocated to research programs and academic 
philosophers themselves, especially in publicly funded universities such as New York, Ohio, Wis-
consin and California, but also in the private ones. From 1945 to 1975 the number of undergraduates 
increased by nearly 500 percent, and that of graduate students by almost 900 percent (Geiger 1999: 
61). In the 1960s the number of undergraduates doubled (from 3.5 million to 8 million), the number 
of doctorates awarded tripled, the number of hired professors increased exponentially, and at the peak 
of the process (1965-1972) new community colleges were opening every week (Metzger 1987: 124). 
In particular, philosophy departments in the United States developed and specialised as never before 
(Kuklick 2001: 14). The members of the American Philosophical Association numbered about 260 
in 1920, 1 thousand in 1960, and would become more than 8 thousand in the 1990s (Kuklick 2001: 
258; see also Schwartz 1995 and Soames 2008/2014 for similar data). Taking into account all the 
universities in the United States, the overall total of doctoral dissertations in philosophy numbered 
about 5 hundred in the 1940s, it became more than 1 thousand in the 1950s, and then doubled in the 
1960s (more than 2 thousand PhD dissertations in philosophy) and again in the 1970s (more than 4 
thousand theses) (www.proquest.com). 
In the 1950s, Harvard, the “American Cambridge,” was perhaps the most important philosophy 
department in the United States, followed by Michigan, Princeton, Yale, Columbia, and, to a lesser 
extent, Cornell, UCLA, Chicago, Brown, and Berkeley. In the mid-1960s, Harvard was still at the 
top, but it had been joined by other universities, for example Princeton, and there were several new 
entries in the ranking: MIT, Pittsburgh, Southern institutions such as Virginia, Duke and North Car-
olina, and Catholic universities such as Fordham and Notre Dame. As a consequence, little by little 
Harvard lost its privileged position and became nothing but a primus inter pares. More funds to uni-
versities and research centres also meant new opportunities for researchers to travel and study in 
different countries and states (California universities, to mention just one example, benefited from 
coast to coast air travel). This exponential development led to the creation of a “Harvard-Oxford 
axis,” more and more dominated by the Americans (Kuklick 2001: 243). The academic exchanges 
increased rapidly: for example, American philosophers such as Goodman, Quine and Morton White 
  
 
spent a period in Oxford; Wilfrid Sellars gave lectures in London. British philosophers such as Grice 
and Austin lectured in Harvard, followed by Hart, Ayer and Bernard Williams. Donald Davidson, 
Daniel Dennett, Burton Dreben, Robert Nozick, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Martha Nussbaum, Syd-
ney Shoemaker, and Paul Ziff visited Britain, before coming back to their universities in the United 
States. 
More importantly, in Britain professional philosophers’ salaries and quality of life gradually de-
creased, if compared with those of their colleagues in the United States, thus causing a serious brain 
drain (Balmer, Godwin and Gregory 2009). The very expression ‘brain drain’ was first coined by the 
British Royal Society in 1963 to describe the outflow of natural and social scientists from Britain to 
the United States and Canada in the 1950s and early 1960s. The report (‘The Emigration of Scientists 
from the UK’) highlighted the migration of UK-trained scholars to the United States, claiming that 
around 7% of British PhD candidates migrated permanently to the US (Royal Society 1963). This 
salary-driven brain drain is a clear sign of the reversed core-periphery relationship between the former 
empire and the former colony (Giannocolo 2004; Balmer, Godwin and Gregory 2009). As empha-
sised by the Royal Society, the brain drain had relevant economic effects in the United Kingdom: not 
only the cost of educating the migrants, but also the “much more serious economic consequences of 
the loss to this country of the leadership and the creative contributions to science and technology 
which they would have made in their working lives” (Royal Society 1963). 
The emigration of British philosophers was part of the same process. As John Searle once recalled, 
when in 1959 he left the University of Oxford, where he held a non-temporary position, to return to 
California, most of his Oxonian colleagues asked him if he had gone crazy. Fewer than ten years 
later, the same people called him to ask whether there was a vacant position in Berkeley.xi The anec-
dote somehow reveals a general process. For example, Hampshire went to Princeton, Grice to Berke-
ley, Ninian Smart to Santa Barbara, Hare to Gainsville in Florida, Richard Wollheim to Davis, Co-
lumbia and Berkeley, and the same would happen in the following years with the younger genera-
tions. In fact, the process has still been going on in the more recent decades, as is evident in the 
following impressive, but largely incomplete, list of contemporary native British philosophers who 
work, or have spent a long period working, in American philosophy departments: Julia Annas (Ari-
zona), John Campbell (Berkeley), Jonathan Dancy (Texas), Kit Fine (NYU), Susan Haack (Miami), 
Richard Holton (MIT), Paul Horwich (CUNY), Philip Kitcher (Columbia), Rae Langton (MIT), John 
McDowell (Pittsburgh), Colin McGinn (Rutgers), Christopher Peacocke (Columbia), Mark Sainsbury 
(Texas), Galen Strawson (CUNY), and Michael Tye (Texas) (Leiter 2004). 
The various kinds of asymmetrical relationships between the core and the periphery have been 
widely investigated, not only in post-Keynesian macroeconomics (Minsky 1982, Frenkel and Rapetti 
2009) and in economic and social history, under the influence of both the Annales school and the 
  
 
Marxist tradition (Braudel 1979, Wallerstein 1974, Arrighi 1994), but also in the historical studies of 
culture, for example in the history of literature (Moretti 2013), and even in the sociology of philoso-
phy (Bourdieu 1999). Of course, there are many different ways to be a periphery: in the post-WWI 
period, for example, the former core (the United Kingdom), the main rival (Germany) and the devel-
oping countries were all somewhat peripheral with respect to the United States. Moreover, many 
different core-periphery models are available. For the purposes of the present book, however, the 
investigation will be heuristically guided by quite a simple model, according to which the interna-
tional circulation of ideas roughly works as follows: the hegemonic country, in this case the United 
States, has to a certain extent the role of determining the philosophical agenda, whereas the philo-
sophical development of the periphery, the United Kingdom, is at least in part subordinated to the 
constraints imposed by the core. 
There are independent grounds to rely on this simple model, for it seems to be, at least prima facie, 
by far the best confirmed and the most explanatory one. Consider briefly, for example, the history of 
literature. Franco Moretti famously attempted to apply Wallerstein’s world-system theory to the his-
torical development of world-literature, more precisely, to the comparative history of the novel in the 
period between the French Revolution and the first three decades of the twentieth century (Moretti 
2000/2013). Wallerstein’s tripartition of core, semi-periphery and periphery appealed to him “be-
cause it explained a number of empirical findings: … France continental centrality …; the peculiar 
productivity of the semi-periphery …; the unevenness of narrative markets … –– all these, and more, 
strongly corroborated Wallerstein’s model” (Moretti 2000/2013: 43). Furthermore, Wallerstein’s the-
ory explained the way in which national literatures developed, showing “the power of core literature 
to overdetermine, and in fact distort, the development of most national cultures” (Moretti 2000/2013: 
44). When considering Moretti’s attempt, one may wonder whether there are relevant differences in 
the structure of the literary system with respect to the economic system and, more generally, whether 
“world-system theory, with its strong emphasis on a rigid international division of labour, [is] a good 
model for the study of world literature” (Moretti 2003/2013:  111). After all, world literature seems 
to be more variegated and flexible than in the economic case: the core does not seem to have “a 
monopoly over the creation of forms that count”, and “themes and forms can move in several direc-
tions — from the centre to the periphery, from the periphery to the centre, from one periphery to 
another, while some original forms of consequence may not move much at all” (Kristal 2002: 73-74). 
All this is likely to be true, but Moretti’s comments on this objection can serve as a partial justification 
for the methodological choices made in the present book (namely, the application, for explanatory 
purposes, of the simple and more traditional core-periphery model):  
 
  
 
Yes, forms can move in several directions. But do they? This is the point, and 
a theory of literary history should reflect on the constraints on their move-
ments, and the reasons behind them. What I know about European novels, for 
instance, suggests that hardly any forms ‘of consequence’ do not move at all; 
that movement from one periphery to another (without passing through the 
centre) is almost unheard of; that movement from the periphery to the centre 
is less rare, but still quite unusual, while that from the centre to the periphery 
is by far the most frequent. (Moretti 2003/2013: 112) 
 
In a nutshell: the traditional model is more likely to occur. Moretti also acknowledged the claim 
according to which “literary and economic relationships run parallel may work in some cases, but not 
in others” (Kristal 2002: 69, 73). In other words: “Material and intellectual hegemony are indeed very 
close, but not quite identical” (Moretti 2003/2013: 114). For example, in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, “the long struggle for hegemony between Britain and France ended with Britain’s 
victory on all fronts — except one: in the world of narrative, the verdict was reversed, and French 
novels were both more successful and formally more significant than British ones” (Moretti 
2003/2013: 114). Another famous example is Petrarchism, “which reached its international zenith 
when its wealthy area of origin had already catastrophically declined” (Moretti 2003/2013: 114). 
These considerations invite us to be careful when applying the core-periphery model to the history 
of analytic philosophy and the later Wittgensteinian tradition, but arguably they do not provide 
grounds to abandon, at least at the beginning of the investigation, the traditional Wallerstein-inspired 
perspective, the same as Moretti himself adopted most of the time, namely, the view according to 
which the economic core is also culturally –– and, in our case, philosophically –– hegemonic, whereas 
the economic periphery or semi-periphery is, at least in the medium run, culturally –– and philosoph-
ically –– subordinate. Notice, after all, that the explanandum in the present book is the decline of a 
semi-peripheral philosophy, the later Wittgensteinian tradition and the rising of a core philosophy, 
American analytic philosophy. Notice also, and perhaps more importantly, that a traditional core-
periphery model –– in particular, the view according to which the brain drain process and, specularly, 
the widespread influence of American philosophy had strong effects on the development of philoso-
phy in the United Kingdom –– had often been assumed by those who followed the scene closely in 
the 1960s in Britain. Consider, for example, Bryan Magee’s 1971 preface to Modern British Philos-
ophy, the volume containing his well-known BBC conversations with thirteen eminent British phi-
losophers.xi Magee provided a clear description of a new state of affairs: due to “an unprecedented 
openness to influences from outside,” he explained, “the present volume could be misleading: it prob-
ably represents the last attempt that will be possible to discuss contemporary British philosophy solely 
  
 
in terms of British philosophers and their work. Even so,” he pointed out, “the living philosopher 
referred to by more contributors than any other in this volume is the American Chomsky. Another 
American, Quine, is described by Stuart Hampshire as ‘the most distinguished living systematic phi-
losopher’. Anthony Quinton discusses Australian materialism” (Magee 1971: 9). Magee went to the 
heart of the core-periphery issue: 
 
British philosophy is no longer autonomous in the way it once was –– indeed, 
it seems on the way to becoming the chief province in a territory whose cap-
ital is elsewhere. A chance but expressive fact is that when the first letters of 
invitation were sent to the contributors to this volume it was found that six of 
the thirteen were currently in North America. Not long ago this would not 
have been the case: today it is utterly unsurprising. Also, more and more of 
our philosophers are choosing to publish their most important papers in 
American journals. Mind may still be the leading philosophical journal in 
England but it is no longer the leading philosophical journal in English. 
(Magee 1971: 9) 
 
Magee’s remarks and, more generally, the considerations presented in the present chapter may be 
regarded as a preliminary and rough justification for the working hypothesis that to understand the 
story of the later Wittgensteinian tradition in the history of analytic philosophy one has first of all to 
look at the United States. Hopefully, the confirmation of this hypothesis will come at the end of the 
investigation. For example, as will become clear in chapter 6, in the mid-1970s philosophy in Oxford 
would “resemble philosophy everywhere else in the English-speaking world: broadly analytic in ori-
entation, but with no remaining trace of the Austin-Ryle emphasis on mining the subtleties of ordinary 
language for philosophical gold” (Forguson 2001: 341). 
By considering the American philosophical academia as a field of reception for the philosophy of 
Wittgenstein, the present book aims under some respects to be a contribution to the clarification of 
the peculiar “logic” of the international circulation of ideas, as described by Bourdieu (e.g., Bourdieu 
1999). One underlying assumption in this kind of investigation is the principle of symmetry formu-
lated by David Bloor in his strong programme for the sociology of scientific knowledge: the same 
kinds of explanations have to be applied for the success (or the failure) of both true and better justified 
theories and of false and less justified ones (Bloor 1976). It goes without saying that social and insti-
tutional conditions are among the relevant explanatory factors. Not only, as Bourdieu emphasised, is 
intellectual life “home to nationalism and imperialism, and intellectuals, like everyone else, con-
stantly peddle prejudices, stereotypes, received ideas, and hastily simplistic representations which 
  
 
fuelled by the chance happening of everyday life, like misunderstanding, general incomprehension, 
and wounded pride”, but also “international exchanges are subject to a certain number of structural 
factors which generate misunderstandings” (Bourdieu 1999: 220-221). A fundamental factor is that 
texts circulate without their context, that is, without the field of production whose product they are; 
this often generates every sort of misunderstanding, since the recipients are themselves in a different 
field of production, and they re-interpret the texts on the basis of the structure of the field of reception 
(Bourdieu 1999: 221). ‘Misunderstanding’ seems to be a keyword here. As Bourdieu puts it, both 
alliances and hostilities among authors and traditions are often based on mutual misunderstanding 
(Bourdieu 1999: 228). More in general, the sense and function of a foreign work is equally determined 
by the field of origin and the field of reception: not only are the sense and function of the original 
field often unknown in the new context, but also the process of transfer from a domestic field to a 
foreign one is made up of a series of social operations such as selection (“what is to be translated, 
what is to be published, who will be translated by, who will publish it”), labelling and classification 
by the publishers, choice of the series in which it is to be inserted and that of the translator and the 
writer of the preface, the reading process itself, and so forth (Bourdieu 1999: 223-224). Independently 
of any intention to manipulate information, the scholars involved in the reception process have their 
own profits, prejudices and passions: their interest in a foreign author or tradition, for example, can 
be assimilated to “a sort of affinity through the occupation of a similar or identical place in the dif-
ferent fields” (Bourdieu 1999: 222). 
The story of the reception of Wittgenstein in America is a good example of the kind of process 
described by Bourdieu: an interest-laden process, produced by the dialectic between the field of origin 
and the field of reception and characterised by partial misunderstanding; a process in which disagree-
ment was ultimately motivated by differences in style, cultural aims and preoccupations, and 
metaphilosophy, rather than by straightforward philosophical arguments. In the early reception of 
Wittgenstein, the main misunderstanding depended on a striking confusion between Wittgenstein and 
Carnap; the description and analysis of this confusion is the main aim of the next chapter. 
 
Notes 
xi The struggle between Ayer, on the one hand, and Ryle and Austin on the other hand, is part of the same story. Shortly 
after returning to Oxford at the end of the war, Ayer was appointed at the University of London, coming back to Oxford 
only in 1959 as the Wykeham Professor of Logic (Forguson 2001: 339). 
xi In Watkins’s obituary on the Independent Alan Musgrave wrote that “if Thomas Henry Huxley was Darwin's bulldog, 
then Watkins was Popper’s” (Musgrave 1999). 
xi See also Richman 1961; Donnellan 1967; Hanfling 2000; Marconi 2009. 
xi The above-mentioned articles are, more precisely, two versions of a single study. It may be worth underlying here that 
the conviction, according to which Uschanov provided a good answer to our main question or, at least, an answer pointing 
in the right direction was also shared by Hilary Putnam, one of the first-person protagonists of the story that the present 
book attempts to reconstruct (personal communication, 2005). 
  
 
xi According to Gellner, in its preference for the “simple unspoilt popular view against the reasoned subtleties of the 
ratiocinator, Linguistic Philosophy is a kind of Populism,” where the folk is the philosophical folk of North Oxford 
(Gellner 1959/1979: 239). 
xi Actually, Russell was the first to declare (in the preface) that he found the later, sociological chapters even more inter-
esting than the earlier, philosophical ones (Russell 1959b: 13). 
xi Notice also that from 1959, when it was published, to the 1980s, when the decline of Wittgenstein had already become 
apparent, Gellner’s book had only a handful of citations in articles published in most Anglo-American philosophic jour-
nals. A rapid search confirms this claim: there are less than ten citations of Words and Things in all the articles published 
in philosophical journals contained in J-STOR from 1959 to 1980. There are on the other hand many reviews, but they 
have not been included in the search, because they are analysed separately below. 
xi This, of course, is not to say that they entirely assumed Gellner’s perspective: they accepted neither Gellner’s quest for 
a sociological analysis of philosophy nor his critical attitude towards the ahistorical character of linguistic philosophy; in 
fact, under many respects analytic philosophy was just as ahistorical as its Oxonian antecedent, and it was a long time 
before people could glimpse a historical turn in analytic philosophy (Reck 2013; Beaney 2013). 
xi Perhaps the recent publication of “popular” works by leading analytic philosophers such as Williamson and Paul 
Boghossian is a first sign that the strictly academic nature of analytic philosophy is developing and may change in the 
future (Boghossian 2006 and Williamson 2015). 
xi This is what Searle told to Bruno Bara during an interview held in Turin in 2006. 
xi The interviewees were Gilbert Ryle, Alfred Jules Ayer, Peter Strawson, Alasdair MacIntyre, Geoffrey Warnock, Stuart 
Hampshire, Bernard Williams, Richard Wollheim, Alan Montefiore, Ninian Smart, David Pears, Anthony Quinton and 
Karl Popper (a naturalised British citizen). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
3. Carnapstein in America 
 
To get an approximate idea of the early reception of Wittgenstein in the United States, it seems 
reasonable to look at The Journal of Philosophy and The Philosophical Review, two of the most 
(arguably, the two most) authoritative and representative American philosophical journals during the 
period 1920 to 1950. The description and evaluation of the 1920s is no sooner said than done. Charles 
K. Ogden and Frank Ramsey’s English translation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
appeared in 1922, but throughout the 1920s the book had almost no impact on the American 
philosophical scene: there are only 5 articles published in The Journal of Philosophy and The 
Philosophical Review in this decade, in which the name ‘Wittgenstein’ occurs at least once in the full-
text (the 0.6% of the entire corpus), and none of them is directly devoted to the philosophy of 
Wittgenstein. 
 
3.1 The Thirties and the Forties: Some Data and Trends 
Things slightly changed during the 1930s, but the reception of Wittgenstein was then characterised 
by incomplete understanding. In the period from 1931 to 1940, the two above-mentioned journals 
contain the name ‘Wittgenstein’ in the full-text of 38 articles (4.5% of the overall corpus): 32 of them 
(84% of the Wittgenstein subcorpus) refer to the Tractatus, 5 to both the Tractatus and the so-called 
period of transition (i.e., Wittgenstein’s philosophical development in the 1930s).xi Only 2 articles 
were written by authors who were personally acquainted with Wittgenstein: one was Moritz Schlick, 
who met Wittgenstein several times in Vienna, together with Friedrich Waismann and (initially) other 
members of the Vienna Circle (Waismann 1979);  the other was Casimir Lewy, who attended some 
of the lectures delivered by Wittgenstein in Cambridge (Lewy 1940 and Schlick 1936; see also Hacker 
1996). Some authors regarded Wittgenstein as a logician or a philosopher of logic, naturally relating 
him to his mentor Russell. Other authors discussed Wittgenstein’s metaphysics and his critique of 
metaphysics. But the most striking data concerns the sheer confusion between Wittgensteinian 
philosophy and logical positivism: 14 articles (37% of the entire corpus) considered Wittgenstein a 
logical positivist tout court, without any qualification or doubt; a further 9 articles (24%) more 
correctly presented him as strictly related to logical positivism (more precisely, to Schlick, Carnap, 
Ayer, or to the entire movement). Most articles were written by American philosophers. 
For example, in their widely read ‘Logical Positivism: a New Movement in Philosophy,’ published 
in The Journal of Philosophy in 1931, Albert E. Blumberg and Herbert Feigl wrote that the “foremost 
philosophical exponents” of the new movement were “R. Carnap (Vienna), H. Reichenbach (Berlin), 
M. Schlick (Vienna), and L. Wittgenstein (Cambridge, England).” They also remarked that “recent 
American publications by P.W. Bridgman, Suzanne K. Langer, and C.I. Lewis exhibit[ed] related 
  
 
tendencies” (Blumberg and Feigl 1931: 281). Four years later, the psychologist Edward Tolman 
repeated that “logical positivists” were “such men as Wittgenstein, Schlick, Camap in Europe and 
Bridgman, C.I. Lewis, Feigl and Blumberg in this country [the US]” (Tolman 1935: 364). And even 
Ernest Nagel’s informative and impressively well-balanced ‘Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic 
Philosophy in Europe,’ published in 1936 in The Journal of Philosophy (when Nagel returned to New 
York after a sabbatical year in Cambridge, Vienna, Prague, Warsaw and Lwów), went in a similar 
direction. On the one hand, Nagel presented Carnap and Wittgenstein as the two most original voices 
in the new philosophical tendency, without highlighting the differences between them; on the other 
hand, it is evident from his article that Nagel was much more familiar with Carnap’s philosophy than 
with Wittgenstein’s (notice, in addition, that he was personally acquainted with Carnap, whereas he 
never met Wittgenstein). The resulting impression for a contemporary reader is that in Nagel’s work 
there was a sort of implicit overlapping of the two philosophical views, in which Wittgenstein turned 
out to be a somewhat more obscure and less scientific doppelgänger of Carnap (Nagel 1936). 
There may be several reasons why in the 1930s philosophers in America so often mistook 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy for logical positivism. One reason is that the picture of Wittgenstein as a 
logical positivist was drawn by assembling data gathered mainly from Britain, and even in Britain in 
that period the picture was somewhat confused. Consider for example the case of Susan Stebbing, 
one of the main representatives of the Cambridge school of analysis. She played a major role in 
introducing logical positivism into Britain, not only in her article on ‘Substances, Events, and Facts,’ 
published in The Journal of Philosophy in 1932, but also in her later contributions where she included 
the views of Wittgenstein in logical positivism, interpreting them through the lens of the writings of 
various members of the Vienna Circle, such as Schlick, Carnap, and Waismann, with whom she was 
acquainted (Beaney and Chapman 2017). Another reason is that American philosophers themselves 
were more familiar with logical positivism, the familiarity being, if not caused, at least much 
increased by the massive brain drain of European researchers into the United States, which occurred 
in the 1930s due to the rise of Nazism. As is well-known, together with people such as Einstein, 
Tarski, and Gödel, many logical positivists emigrated to the United States: Feigl in 1931, Menger, 
Frank, Carnap, Kaufmann, Hempel and Bergmann, to mention just some of them, between 1933 and 
1940. 
In the following decade, the 1940s, the incomplete understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
gave way to lack of interest. There are only 14 articles in The Journal of Philosophy and The 
Philosophical Review in which ‘Wittgenstein’ is mentioned in the full-text (1.5 % of all the articles): 
7 were devoted to the Tractatus, 2 to both the Tractatus and the transition, 6 to the developments of 
Wittgenstein’s thought. Only one author, namely Karl Britton, was personally acquainted with 
Wittgenstein (Britton 1947). Wittgenstein was normally seen as half logician, half metaphysician. 
  
 
The first quasi-exegetical papers appeared (e.g., Edwards 1949). There were 2 articles (13%) in which 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy was still barely assimilated within logical positivism, and 5 articles (33%) 
which emphasised the similarities (verificationism, above all) between Wittgenstein and the logical 
positivists (Carnap, in particular). A critical attitude towards Wittgenstein was also emerging, as for 
example in Roy Wood Sellars’s 1946 paper on ‘Materialism and Relativity: A Semantic Analysis,’ in 
which Sellars remembered “the period, when, surrounded by relativity enthusiasts, and the 
mystagogues of the Wittgenstein revelation I could only, like poor Galileo, murmur: ‘And yet there 
is a material universe and we are parts of it’” (Sellars 1946: 45). 
The lack of interest towards Wittgenstein in the United States in the 1940s, as well as the enduring 
misunderstanding of his thought, can arguably be explained by several factors. First, during the 1930s 
and 1940s, even in Europe it was not easy to understand what Wittgenstein was trying to do in his 
later work: many people just started to understand what was going on in the Tractatus, when he 
radically changed his philosophical methods and perspectives. In the United States, such 
understanding was further complicated by the linguistic divide –– Wittgenstein’s work was originally 
written in German –– and, more generally, by the larger cultural distance: Wittgenstein’s thought 
(both early and late) was deeply rooted in the Viennese mentality, culture and language. However, it 
took quite a long time before European scholars realised that Wittgenstein's intellectual character 
fully belonged to the fin-de-siècle and pre-war Vienna (Janik and Toulmin 1973, Schorske 1980): to 
quote just one example, it is worth noting that still in the late-1950s and early-1960s a philosopher 
such as Hans-Georg Gadamer who, as we know in retrospect, could have found a philosophical ally 
and a source of inspiration in the author of the Philosophical Investigations, avoided any serious 
discussion of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, which he kept on identifying, for a long time, with the 
“empiricist” and “positivist” position of the Vienna Circle (Gadamer 1960).xi In continental Europe 
things changed only in the 1960s, perhaps up until the day when, in 1970, Jürgen Habermas presented 
the later Wittgenstein’s work as positive, anti-positivist and anti-metaphysical (Habermas 1965; but 
see also Apel 1965). In the United States, a much greater linguistic and cultural distance made the 
process of understanding and assimilating Wittgenstein’s later ideas slower and more difficult than in 
continental Europe. 
 
3.2 Wittgenstein and Carnap: Similarities and Differences 
The most striking element of the early reception of Wittgenstein in America is no doubt the confusion 
with Carnap. This issue deserves further analysis. The first question is: was it complete and utter 
confusion, or was it somewhat legitimate? The answer is that it would be unfair to regard people such 
as Nagel, Blumberg, Feigl, Tolman and Stebbing –– who, among the others, somewhat assimilated 
Wittgenstein to Carnap –– as completely deceived and misled. As is well-known, in the first half of 
  
 
the 1930s Carnap’s philosophical development had a good deal in common with Wittgenstein’s, so 
that the differences between them were subtle and not easy to discern. First of all, both Wittgenstein 
and Carnap were suspicious towards the notions of meaning and reference; in particular, they both 
rejected any attempt to identify the former with the latter. Both pursued an alternative semantic 
agenda, in which semantic issues were interpreted as “formal” issues: they used to say that the 
meaning of a linguistic expression is determined by its grammar (Wittgenstein) or by its logical 
syntax (Carnap). They both used such words (‘grammar’, ‘syntax’) in partly idiosyncratic ways: 
grammar in Wittgenstein’s sense is the totality of the rules that govern linguistic uses; a (logical) 
syntax in Carnap’s sense includes formation rules (rules for constructing well-formed sentences by 
combining the basic symbols of a language), transformation rules (rules that specify when a sentence 
of a language L can be deduced from other sentences of L), and all the other formal properties of the 
language, which can be defined on the basis of such rules (first and foremost, analyticity) (Carnap 
1934: §§ 21-23). 
Moreover, in the 1930s both Wittgenstein and Carnap rejected the semantic uniformity thesis, that 
is, the idea –– defended for example by the picture theory of language presented by Wittgenstein in 
the Tractatus –– according to which any meaningful sentence is a descriptive assertion, i.e. a sentence 
which describes a state of affairs and says that it obtains, so that a sentence is true if the state of affairs 
obtains, and false otherwise (similarly, any word is a name, the meaning of a word is the named 
object, the primary and in fact unique semantic relation is naming or denoting). Such a rejection 
allowed Carnap and Wittgenstein to undermine realism or platonism in the philosophy of logic and 
the philosophy of mathematics (where platonism is the view according to which logic and 
mathematics are scientific theories similar to physics, for their sentences describe a Platonic realm of 
abstract entities, in a way similar to that in which the sentences of physics describe a physical realm 
of concrete, spatiotemporal entities). In their view, for example, it is a mistake –– actually: a senseless 
absurdity –– to say that a tautology such as ‘p or non-p’ is a necessarily true sentence, which correctly 
describes a necessary fact (the fact that p or non-p); and it is no less misleading to say that the 
necessary truth of the tautology derives from the meaning of its symbols (for example, from the 
meaning of the connectives that occur in it). Rather, tautologies have a status similar to that of 
grammatical/syntactic rules, which are (partially) constitutive of the meaning of some symbols or 
words (e.g., ‘or’ and ‘not’) occurring in them; qua rules, they are neither descriptive nor –– properly 
speaking –– true or false. Something similar holds for arithmetical propositions such as ‘2+2=4,’ as 
well as for geometrical theorems such as ‘The sum of the angles in a triangle is 180 degrees’: 
Wittgenstein regarded them as grammatical sentences, whilst Carnap saw them as analytic sentences, 
in the syntactic sense of the word ‘analytic’ (where a sentence is analytic just in case its validity is 
solely determined by the rules of logical syntax, rather than on how the world is). Such sentences are 
  
 
not descriptive assertions but rather –– to a certain extent –– constitutive rules, which partially 
determine the meaning of some symbols or words occurring in them. In other words: they declare 
that sentences such as, say, ‘2+2=5’ or ‘The sum of the angles in a triangle is 179 degrees’ are 
senseless. 
By regarding logical laws, arithmetical equations and geometrical axioms and theorems as 
belonging to grammar or to logical syntax (rather than as being factual or descriptive statements), 
Carnap and Wittgenstein found a novel explanation for their being knowable a priori: one knows 
such necessary propositions (the propositions expressed by the grammatical or analytic sentences) a 
priori because one’s assenting to them is constitutive of one’s semantic competence; in other terms, 
if one does not assent to, say, ‘p or not-p’, ‘2+2=4’ or ‘The sum of the angles in a triangle is 180 
degrees,’ then one does not fully understand one or more words occurring in such sentences (Coffa 
1991: chapter 14; see also Tripodi 2013a). 
Moreover, the “semantic revolution” allowed Wittgenstein and Carnap, among other things, to 
provide a novel account of the senselessness of metaphysics. Metaphysics is senseless because it 
systematically and inadvertently confuses a grammatical rule with a factual proposition, a syntactic 
rule with an empirical proposition; as Wittgenstein put it, it confuses “the hardness of a rule with the 
hardness of a material” (Wittgenstein 1956: III, 87). That is why the metaphysical disagreement 
between, say, realists and idealists is only apparent, and should be dissolved by showing that it 
depends entirely on the adoption of one grammar or syntax, rather than another one (Carnap 1928b).  
Behind Carnap’s and Wittgenstein’s common views on meaning, a priori knowledge, and 
metaphysics lay the last but perhaps most general, and therefore most significant, point of consonance 
between them, namely, their conception of philosophy as distinct from the natural sciences: they both 
agreed that natural science is a substantive theory, which aims to discover new facts, whereas 
philosophy –– conceived of as grammar or as logical syntax –– is a second-level activity, which 
operates a priori on the basis of the analysis of language and concepts, and aims to obtain a better 
insight and conceptual clarity of old truths, rather than to acquire more factual knowledge of new 
truths. 
On the other hand, however, besides the above-mentioned undeniable similarities, there were also 
deep, significant differences between Wittgenstein and Carnap, which should not be underestimated. 
Here is a brief, not exhaustive list of these differences. Firstly, Wittgenstein was of a very different 
temperament and ideology from Carnap. Carnap was a “calm man” who personified the values of 
tolerance, collective cooperation, scientific progress and socialism. His scientific model was the 
laboratory, where people cooperate to achieve knowledge (Coffa 1991: 408). As is well-known, in 
the 1920s he worked on the neo-Kantian project of justifying the objectivity of scientific knowledge 
by building a ‘system of constitution,’ and in 1928 he published  Der logische Aufbau der Welt, an 
  
 
epoch-making book which was the main expression of that project (Carnap 1928a; see also 
Richardson 1998). In the final title of the book he used the term ‘construction’ (‘Aufbau,’ first 
suggested by Schlick) rather than the more appropriate and technical Kantian term ‘constitution.’ He 
did so because in his intellectual world ‘Aufbau’ had become a keyword in the sense of Raymond 
Williams (1976), i.e. a word that to many of his contemporaries called to mind the political and social 
reconstruction of the German country from the ruins of the Great War, and the consequent advent of 
a new era, based on a scientifically oriented culture and education (Galison 1993, Carus 2007, 
Bouveresse 2012). Moreover, in 1929, as is even better known, he signed the manifesto of the Vienna 
Circle, The Scientific Conception of the World, whose general and widely shared views were a liberal, 
rational, non-dogmatic and even anti-religious spirit, the search for progress, the belief that all 
genuine problems are solvable scientifically, the commitment to oppose metaphysics, the attempt to 
find a sophisticated and reformed form of empiricism, and the desire to fuse together science with 
life (Carnap, Hahn, Neurath 1929). Wittgenstein, on the other hand, felt he was an alien in such a 
cultural and ideological climate. In the draft for a preface that he wrote in 1930 –– one year after the 
publication of the Viennese manifesto (to which he was, right from the beginning, very hostile) –– he 
famously stated his conflicting cultural values:  
 
This book is written for those who are in sympathy with the spirit in which it 
is written. This is not, I believe, the spirit of the main current of European and 
American civilization. The spirit of this civilization makes itself manifest in 
the industry, architecture and music of our time, in its fascism and socialism, 
and it is alien and uncongenial to the author. … I have no sympathy for the 
current of European civilization and do not understand its goals, if it has any. 
So I am really writing for friends who are scattered throughout the corners of 
the globe. It is all one to me whether or not the typical western scientist 
understands or appreciates my work, since he will not in any case understand 
the spirit in which I write. Our civilisation is characterised by the word 
‘progress.’ Progress is its form rather than making progress being one of its 
features. Typically it constructs. It is occupied with building an ever more 
complicated structure. And even clarity is sought only as a means to this end, 
not as an end in itself. For me, on the contrary, clarity, perspicuity are valuable 
in themselves. I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as 
having a perspicuous view of the foundations of possible buildings. So, I am 
aiming for something different than the scientists and my thoughts move 
differently than do theirs (Wittgenstein 1980a: 7-8) 
  
 
  
Wittgenstein’s humanistic and pessimistic Weltanschauung was more similar to writers such as Georg 
Christoph Lichtenberg and Karl Kraus, with whom he also shared the conviction according to which 
‘progress’ –– differing from related concepts such as change, growth and development –– distinctly 
expresses a value notion (von Wright 1993: 210-211). In 1909 Kraus published a famous article 
entitled Der Fortschritt (Progress), which, as Jacques Bouveresse pointed out, Wittgenstein may have 
read (Bouveresse 2011: 301-302). Kraus wrote: 
 
A newspaper phrase conveying a lively image has suggested itself to me. This 
is how it is worded: we are under the sign of progress. Only now do I 
recognise progress for what it is –– a mobile decoration. We stay ahead and 
keep walking in place. Progress is a standpoint (Standpunkt) and looks like 
movement. Only occasionally does something twist itself around in front of 
my eyes: it is a dragon guarding a hoard of gold. Or else it moves around 
through the streets at night: that is the street sweeper’s rolling broom that stirs 
up the dust of the day, so that it will settle somewhere else. Wherever I went, 
I could not help but run into it. If I went back, it came at me from the other 
side, and I recognised that a political program contrary to progress was 
useless, because progress is the unavoidable development of dust. Fate floats 
in a cloud, and progress, which catches up with you when you think you are 
getting away from it, comes from over there like the Deus ex machina. It slips 
through and reaches the fleeing foot and in the process takes as much dust out 
of your way as it is necessary to spread so that all lungs have their share in it, 
for the machine serves the great progressive idea of spreading dust. In the 
end, though, the full meaning of progress occurred to me while it was raining. 
It was raining unceasingly and humanity was thirsty for dust. There was none, 
and the street sweeper could not stir it up. But behind it, a water cart followed 
deliberately, not letting the rain deter it from preventing the dust that could 
not develop. That was progress. (Kraus 1909/1987: 197) 
 
In line with this view, Wittgenstein used a sentence by Johann Nestroy as the motto for the Investi-
gations: “It is in the nature of all progress that it looks much greater than it really is” (Wittgenstein 
1953; see also Stern 2002). His critical attitude towards progress and, more generally, the scientific 
image of man in the world was based not only on his cultural pessimism but also on what might be 
  
 
called his humanism: “Scientific questions may interest me,” he once wrote, “but they never really 
grip me. Only conceptual and aesthetic questions have that effect on me. Ultimately, whether scien-
tific problems are solved leaves me cold; but not those other questions” (Wittgenstein 1980a: 79). 
Moreover, his critical attitude also depended on his view of religious belief. He was convinced 
that there is a gulf between a believer such as Tolstoy –– whom he greatly admired –– and a non-
believer (Tripodi 2013b: 64-66; see also Tolstoy 1896; Monk 1990: 116). For example, the former, 
but not the latter, believes in the last judgement: they do not believe the same thing, yet they do not 
believe different things either (Wittgenstein 1966: 55). Their distance from one another is so great 
that there cannot be real disagreement between them. The gulf between them does not have a linguis-
tic nature. In his 1938 lectures on religious belief he came close to considering this possibility: “It is 
not a question of my [as a non-believer] being anywhere near him [the Tolstoy kind of believer], but 
on an entirely different plane, which you could express by saying: ‘You mean something altogether 
different, Wittgenstein’” (Wittgenstein 1966: 53). Then he immediately rejected that solution: “The 
difference might not show up at all in any explanation of meaning” (Wittgenstein 1966: 53). This 
entailed, of course, that the difference in question might not be a difference of meaning at all (Witt-
genstein 1958: 1). At the same time, Wittgenstein rejected the expressivist account of the gulf be-
tween believers and non-believers. During his lectures he once discussed the case in which “someone, 
before going to China, when he might never see me again, said to me: ‘We might see one another 
after death’”. At that point Casimir Lewy commented: “In this case, you might only mean that he 
expressed a certain attitude”. So that Wittgenstein replied: “I would say, ‘No, it isn’t the same as 
saying ‘I’m very fond of you’ –– and it may not be the same as saying anything else. It says what it 
says. Why should you be able to substitute anything else?” (Wittgenstein 1966, 70-1; see also Schroe-
der 2007: 446; Kusch 2011 and Tripodi 2013b).xi Moreover, there are grounds for attributing to Witt-
genstein an epistemological distinction between the evidence of the heart, which provides grounds 
for religious belief, and logical/rational and empirical evidence, which provides grounds for our or-
dinary, scientific and philosophical beliefs (Tripodi 2013b: 70, Coakley 2002: 140, Cottingham 2010: 
223; see also Pascal 1670/1976). Tolstoy’s religious beliefs, Wittgenstein tells us, are based “on evi-
dence which taken in one way would seem exceedingly flimsy” (Wittgenstein 1966: 57-8), where 
“taken in one way” seems to mean the same as “taken in the ordinary sense,” that is, as logical or 
empirical evidence. In his view, the controversies between a Tolstoy kind of believer and a non-
believer “look quite different from any normal controversies” because “reasons look entirely differ-
ent from normal reasons” (Wittgenstein 1966: 55-56, italics added). Summarising, he was arguably 
an epistemic relativist of a sort: in his (largely implicit) view, there are two alternative and incompat-
ible systems of beliefs, which are based on entirely different kinds of reasons, so that the gulf between 
  
 
the two systems is epistemological, rather than linguistic; moreover, non-believers cannot rationally 
persuade believers, and vice versa, though they understand each other, at least in part (Tripodi 2013b; 
see also Coliva 2010: 202-3). It goes without saying that this kind of epistemic relativism is utterly 
incompatible with any attempt to criticise religion scientifically or rationally, in the vein of the 
Viennese manifesto or, for that matter, of Russell. 
Besides the cultural, ideological and even religious dissonances, there were several characteristi-
cally philosophical differences between Wittgenstein and Carnap. First, they had different attitudes 
towards empiricism. Throughout the history of philosophy, mathematical knowledge has often been 
seen as a counterexample to the main empiricist thesis, according to which all knowledge stems from 
experience. Carnap did not accept the naïve view that such a counterexample could be met by assum-
ing a combination of the no-content theory of logic presented by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus (= 
logical truths are empty tautologies), and of Russell's logicism (= mathematics can be reduced to 
logic), since he was aware that many logical truths in Russell's Principia Mathematica were not tau-
tologies at all. Somewhat similarly, nonetheless, he thought that a combination of logicism with his 
syntactical notion of analyticity (a sentence is analytic just in case it is deducible from an empty set 
of premises) allowed him to save empiricism from the traditional counterexample of mathematics: if 
mathematical truths are analytic in the syntactic sense, then their truth depends exclusively on the 
rules of syntax, rather than on how the world is, and mathematical “knowledge” is not genuine 
knowledge. Wittgenstein never shared Carnap's empiricist motivations, but of course this was not 
because he was a rationalist. 
Secondly, like both Russell and Ramsey before him, Carnap did not share the showing-saying 
distinction drawn by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus (Russell 1922; Ramsey 1931): though he initially 
underestimated the significance of Hilbert's metamathematics, after his encounter with Gödel’s and 
Tarski’s metalogic (which provided evidence for the fact that one can obtain amazing logical results 
by using metalanguages) Carnap defended the view according to which we can in a metalanguage 
speak of the object language, in particular of its syntactic rules (Gödel 1931; Tarski 1933/1935). Since 
there are many, diverse object languages, and there are many, diverse possible axiomatic choices at 
the metalinguistic level, Carnap reached the conclusion that the choice of the rules of a language are 
arbitrary and conventional (Carnap 1934: § 86). Hence, in his famous principle of tolerance he stated 
that the choice of a language (or a system of logic) as a whole cannot depend on its truth or 
correctness, let alone on its being metaphysically well-grounded, but rather on external, pragmatic 
considerations (Carnap 1934: §§ 17, 78). Wittgenstein, on the contrary, was primarily interested in 
ordinary language (rather than in ideal, regimented languages), but in his view ordinary language –– 
though not incorrigible –– is not something we can arbitrarily establish by convention, but is rather a 
  
 
given fact that we can acknowledge and describe, a fact of our human nature (or, if you like, of our 
“form of life”), a fact determining the bounds of sense (that is, what can and what cannot be said 
meaningfully) (Stroud 1965).xi 
 
3.3 Wittgenstein and Carnap on Theories 
These considerations bring us to a further, and more important, difference between Wittgenstein and 
Carnap, a meta-theoretical difference in their attitude towards the role, the importance, and the claims 
of theories, both in philosophy and in science. What is a theory? Approximately, a theory is an 
organised set of declarative sentences endowed with the following properties. A theory is systematic 
and general: it organises a series of data, showing how to generalise in many directions, ideally until 
all data of the same kind is covered. It aims to be explanatory: its goal is not only to improve our 
understanding of a certain phenomenon, but also to increase our knowledge of it and of its causal 
story, and our ability to predict its behaviour. Sometimes one cannot generalise, systematise and 
explain unless one postulates the existence of unobservable entities. Both generalisation and 
theoretical postulation can lead to the discovery of new facts: in such cases the theory has epistemic 
value or, in other words, it is substantive. Wittgenstein and Carnap agreed that the natural sciences 
consist of substantive theories, aiming to discover previously unknown facts of the world, whereas 
philosophy is a second-level activity, aiming to obtain conceptual clarity (rather than factual 
knowledge) by means of conceptual and linguistic analysis (Wittgenstein 1922: prop. 4.112; 1953: 
§§ 119-24; Carnap 1950a: § 1). Thereafter, they went their separate ways. 
Wittgenstein considered the tendency of theories to generalise and systematise as something 
philosophically dangerous and culturally deplorable: a symptom of the intellectual hybris of 
contemporary times. He drew a demarcation line between good (scientific) theories and bad 
(philosophical and pseudoscientific) ones. The theories of the former kind aim to generalise and 
systematise, but only to the extent that they can, at least in principle, be subjected to empirical 
confirmation (or disconfirmation), typically by experiment, and to the extent that they can provide 
causal explanations: experimental physics, of which –– not least thanks to his past as a student of 
engineering –– he had a more than elementary knowledge, was in his view the typical example of 
that kind of scientific theory (Monk 1990: 36-42).xi The theories of the latter kind, on the contrary, 
are misleading and dogmatic: here Wittgenstein had in mind, on the one hand, traditional metaphysics 
and Freud's psychoanalysis (based on a confusion between factual and conceptual claims, and 
between the causes and reasons of actions, respectively), and, on the other hand, the Tractatus’s theory 
of language and even Darwin's theory of evolution (which overgeneralise from limited data, based on 
superficial analogies) (Wittgenstein 1953: §§ 251-2; 1967: § 458; 1979: 39-40; Drury 1984: 160-1; 
Bouveresse 1991). Such a distinction between good and bad theories had, in Wittgenstein’s view, two 
  
 
main consequences. In philosophy, one should give up not only any claim to discover facts but also 
any attempt to generalise and even explain something; on the contrary, one should recognise certain 
phenomena as something primitive, and be satisfied with a perspicuous description of ordinary 
linguistic facts that are not hidden but are rather always, as it were, under our noses; and one should 
never forget that, by virtue of the amazing variety of linguistic uses, it is impossible for such a 
description to be a well-balanced systematisation. Here are some of Wittgenstein’s most famous later 
meta-philosophical formulations: 
 
It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It was 
not of any possible interest to us to find out empirically ‘that, contrary to our 
preconceived ideas, it is possible to think such-and-such’ –– whatever that 
may mean. (The conception of thought as a gaseous medium.) And we may 
not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in 
our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description 
alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its 
purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical 
problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our 
language, and that in such a way as to make us recognise those workings: in 
spite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by 
giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. 
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means 
of language. (Wittgenstein 1953: § 109) 
 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything. — Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to 
explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. One might 
also give the name “philosophy” to what is possible before all new discoveries 
and inventions. (Wittgenstein 1953: § 126) 
 
The second consequence of the distinction between good and bad theories has to do with 
Wittgenstein’s conception of science, rather than of philosophy. The point is, in a nutshell, that his 
view of science sometimes appeared to be narrowly empiricist and verificationist, though this is not 
so easy to see, for several reasons. Wittgenstein never was, and never intended to be, a philosopher 
of science: he was above all interested in dividing science from philosophy from a methodological 
point of view. Moreover, he did not suggest, as a naïve empiricist, that science is a mere collection of 
  
 
observations: he clearly recognised –– as an ante litteram Kuhn, so to speakxi –– that in the logic of 
scientific discovery empirical investigations presuppose a conceptual or grammatical apparatus, some 
“postulates”, “norms of expression”, “forms of representation” that have, in turn, no empirical 
foundation (actually, they have no foundation at all) (Wittgenstein 1979: 15-6, 39-40, 70-1, 98; 
1933/1969: 23, 56-7; 1969: §§512-16; 1980a: §225; see also Glock 1996: 343). Finally, semantic 
verificationism (the view according to which the meaning of a sentence is the method of its 
verification) was nothing but a footnote in his philosophical history (a footnote dating back to the late 
1920s and the early 1930s).xi  Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to suggest that he sometimes 
assumed quite a narrow criterion of demarcation between science and pseudoscience: a criterion 
based on the idea that an investigation of a phenomenon X cannot be scientific unless it puts forward 
hypotheses that can in principle be empirically tested, increase our factual knowledge of X, provide 
causal explanations of X, and allow us to make new predictions. Scattered throughout Wittgenstein’s 
Nachlass, there is some evidence of this view. For example: 
 
One of the most important things about an explanation [in Physics R, T] is 
that it should work, that it should enable us to predict something [successfully 
– T]. Physics is connected with Engineering. The bridge must not fall down. 
(Wittgenstein 1966: 27) 
 
When we are studying psychology we may feel there is something 
unsatisfactory, some difficulty about the whole subject or study – because we 
are taking physics as our ideal science. We think of formulating laws as in 
physics. And then we find we cannot use the same sort of ‘metric,’ the same 
ideas of measurement as in physics. (Wittgenstein 1966: 42) 
 
Moreover, as Waismann, following Wittgenstein, put it: 
 
Hypotheses are the connecting link we insert between the actual experiences 
of the past and the actual experiences of the future. Indeed, to an astronomer 
it never really matters whether the law of gravity ‘is valid for all eternity’ –– 
this would be a question which we could never come any closer to answering 
... –– but whether it stands the test, whether he succeeds with this assumption. 
(Waismann 1977: 39-40) 
 
Wittgenstein shared Carnap’s idea that conventions play a central role with respect to scientific laws. 
  
 
However, he cautioned not to overestimate their importance. In this connection, for example he wrote:  
 
Now perhaps one thinks that it can make no great difference which concepts 
we employ. As, after all, it is possible to do physics in feet and inches as well 
as in metres and centimetres; the difference is merely one of convenience. But 
even this is not true if, for instance, calculations in some system of 
measurement demand more time and trouble than it is possible for us to give 
them. (Wittgenstein 1953: § 569) 
 
In his view, there was no room for “the prattle that physics nowadays no longer works with 
mechanical models but ‘only with symbols’” (Wittgenstein 1932/2005: 97e). 
Yet, Wittgenstein’s main aim in philosophy was not to provide an account of science itself. 
Therefore, a better way to understand his conception of science is to look not only at his remarks on 
the science-philosophy divide (such as the meta-philosophical remarks quoted above), but also on his 
remarks on pseudoscience. For example, though he always respected and even admired Freud, 
Wittgenstein had many concerns with psychoanalysis (Bouveresse 1991). In particular, he rejected 
the idea that psychoanalysis is scientific. Not only does psychoanalysis overgeneralise (e.g., from the 
reasonable idea that something, in dreams, can have meaning, it draws the conclusion that everything, 
in dreams, has meaning) and introduce mysterious and non-verifiable “explanatory” concepts and 
mechanisms, such as the unconscious, the repressed, the return of the repressed and so forth 
(MacIntyre 1958); but also, and more importantly, it demands discovering deep, hidden causes of 
jokes, lapses, missed deeds, and dreams, whereas in fact it provides only the reasons for the agents’ 
behaviour: the difference is crucial and straightforward, for the reason of an action is what the agent 
sincerely claims to be his reason, whereas we can only make fallible hypotheses about the causes of 
our behaviour (Wittgenstein 1958: 15; see also Schroeder 2010, Tripodi 2015, and chapter 5 below). 
Therefore, the way in which psychoanalysis operates resembles the way in which aesthetics (rather 
than science) works: it organises certain representations or facts in a certain way, with the aim of 
eliciting the reader’s or the hearer’s satisfaction and assent. 
Moreover, Wittgenstein extended to Darwin some of the doubts he raised about Freud. In the 
Tractatus he had written: “Darwin’s theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other 
hypothesis in natural science” (1922: prop. 4.1122). But later on he apparently changed his mind, 
criticising Darwin for philosophical reasons. In his 1938 lectures on aesthetics (one of his favourite 
terms of comparison in his remarks on psychoanalysis), he wrote about “the Darwin upheaval”:  
 
One circle of admirers who said: "Of course", and another circle [of enemies 
  
 
– R] who said: "Of course not". Why in the Hell should a man say 'of course'? 
(The idea was that of monocellular organisms becoming more and more 
complicated until they became mammals, men, etc.) Did anyone see this 
process happening? No. Has anyone seen it happening now? No. The 
evidence of breeding is just a drop in the bucket. But there were thousands of 
books in which this was said to be the obvious solution. People were certain 
on grounds which were extremely thin. Could there not have been an attitude 
which said: “I don't know. It is an interesting hypothesis which may 
eventually be well confirmed”? This shows how you can be persuaded of a 
certain thing. In the end you forget entirely every question of verification, you 
are just sure it must have been like that. (Wittgenstein 1966: 26-27) 
 
On this basis, during a walk in the zoological garden with his pupil Maurice O’Connor Drury, he 
criticised Darwin as if he were criticising a philosopher. After admiring the immense variety of 
flowers, shrubs and trees, and the similar multiplicity of birds, reptiles and other animals, he 
confessed: “I have always thought that Darwin was wrong: his theory does not account for all the 
varieties of species. It does not have the necessary multiplicity. Nowadays some people are fond of 
saying that at last evolution has produced a species that is able understand the whole process which 
gave it birth. Now that you cannot say”. And when Drury remarked, “You could say that now a strange 
animal that collects other animals and puts them in gardens has evolved. But you cannot bring the 
concepts of knowledge and understanding into this series. They are different categories entirely,” 
Wittgenstein seemed to agree: “Yes, you could put it that way” (Drury 1984: 160-1). 
These remarks highlight a further controversial aspect of Wittgenstein’s attitude towards science. 
His metaphilosophical commitments notwithstanding, it seems controversial that Wittgenstein, qua 
philosopher, really left everything in science as it is. For example, not only did he criticise the 
mathematicians’ realistic biases, but he also provided a philosophical attack on the overall discipline 
of set theory; and with psychology he did something similar, suggesting that,  
 
The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a “young science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for 
instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of 
mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods 
and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case conceptual confusion and 
methods of proof.) The existence of the experimental method makes us think 
we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem 
  
 
and method pass one another by (Wittgenstein 1953: II, § XIV, 232) 
 
It is true that, as has often been said, Wittgenstein’s philosophical or methodological target, as distinct 
from his ideological one, was scientism –– the imperialist tendency of scientific thinking which 
results from the idea that science is the measure of all things –– rather than science (Glock 1996: 
343). It should be added, however, that not only did Wittgenstein, as a full-blooded anti-
foundationalist, think that science had no better foundation than other human activities (hence, it had 
no special epistemological privilege either), but also that he was from time to time inclined to suggest 
that science should not cross the grammatical boundaries of sense, as they are traced in the grammar 
of ordinary language: for example, he sometimes seemed to think that psychologists should not 
consider understanding –– which is a certain kind of ability, or set of abilities –– as a mental process, 
for, as Ryle would put it, that would be nothing but a categorical mistake (the qualification “from 
time to time”, however, is required, for in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, especially in the remarks 
collected in On Certainty, there also seems to be a partly different tendency, based on the metaphor 
of “the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself”, which are such that 
“there is not a sharp division of the one from the other”) (Wittgenstein 1969: § 97). 
As already stressed above, in line with Wittgenstein’s meta-philosophical views, Carnap worked 
on the presupposition that there is a sharp divide between science (which aims to obtain substantive 
knowledge) and philosophy (which aims to achieve conceptual clarity). However, science always 
occupied a more central place in Carnap’s interests than in Wittgenstein’s. Just to mention a few 
episodes from Carnap’s intellectual biography: when he was a young student in Jena, he studied both 
philosophy and logic (under Bruno Bauch and Frege respectively) and theoretical physics (under Max 
Wien), and up to a certain point he was hesitant as to whether he should become a physicist or a 
philosopher (Carnap 1963a); in the 1920s, he took part in the debate on the epistemology of Einstein's 
metaphysics (Carnap 1922); in the last twenty years of his life he was mainly, if not exclusively, a 
philosopher of science, whose main concerns were the issues of confirmation and probability (Carnap 
1950a). Moreover, though from his very beginnings as a neo-Kantian he shared Wittgenstein's 
epistemological anti-foundationalism (Friedman 1987, 1992; Richardson 1998), throughout his 
career he ascribed to science a somewhat privileged epistemological position, considering it as a 
model of rigour and seriousness. Last, but not least, he rejected both Wittgenstein’s narrow 
conception of science (according to which empirical verifiability is the criterion of demarcation 
between sciences and pseudo-sciences), and Wittgenstein's radically a-theoretical (or even anti-
theoretical) conception of philosophy. The former point was part of Carnap’s famous (and, in the 
opinion of many, incomplete) attempt to liberalise empiricism (Hempel 1958, 1965, 1973). Not only 
in the Viennese debate over the so-called protocol sentences did Carnap take the side of Neurath’s 
  
 
fallibilism and anti-foundationalism against Schlick’s strict verificationism (Carnap 1932), but in 
Testability and Meaning, published in English in 1936 –– when Schlick was assassinated and Carnap 
was forced by the rise of Nazism to emigrate to the United States –– he also underlined that 
contemporary natural sciences have an important theoretical component, replacing the view that 
theoretical terms are nothing but useful abbreviations of observational terms with the view that the 
theoretical vocabulary is reducible to observational terms: the difference between an explicit 
definition and a reduction in Carnap’s sense was that a reduction sentence partially determines the 
meaning of the theoretical terms occurring in it (Carnap 1936); consequently, later on Carnap came 
to consider theoretical languages as only partially interpreted (Carnap 1939), up to the time when, in 
1956, he conceived of the relation between theoretical language and observational language as a more 
and more indirect, looser connection, suggesting for example that some theoretical terms are not 
reducible to observational terms, but they acquire their meaning by virtue of complex inferential 
relations with other theoretical terms (Carnap 1956). 
 
3.4 Quine and the Science-Philosophy Divide 
In the light of the similarities and differences between Carnap and Wittgenstein, the “identification 
error” made by many American philosophers is hopefully more understandable, if not justifiable. 
However, for the purposes of this book a second question needs now to be raised: What kind of 
consequences did the confusion between Wittgenstein and Carnap have for the early reception of the 
philosophy of Wittgenstein in America? The answer is: negative effects, first of all because, as is 
well-known, from the mid-1930s (when Carnap started to work at the University of Chicago) to the 
early 1950s (when, as we shall see in the next chapters, the later Wittgensteinian tradition ceased to 
be a widely unknown and mysterious object in the US), Carnap found himself under the (friendly) 
fire of Quine. Since Carnap was, as it were, the closest available approximation to Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy (the subtlest differences being invisible to most American philosophers), Wittgenstein 
ended up being an indirect victim of Quine’s attack on Carnap. The story of how, together with 
Goodman and other American philosophers, Quine “introduced” Carnap (under whom he had studied 
in Prague in 1933) to the American philosophical academia is well-known, so in what follows it will 
be only briefly outlined.  
In a nutshell: Carnap was presented as a great and influential philosopher, a master, but one who 
had made epochal mistakes. This applies to all the three main projects in which Carnap had taken 
part since the mid-1920s: the neo-Kantian, the syntactic and the semantic. In 1951 Goodman and 
Quine presented Carnap’s Aufbau as the most ambitious attempt in the history of empiricism and, at 
the same time, they declared its bankruptcy: in the course of a technical discussion, Goodman argued 
that the quasi-analysis method adopted by Carnap in his 1928 book could not in principle work 
  
 
(Goodman 1951); Quine highlighted that the Aufbau provided “no indication, not even the sketchiest, 
of how a statement of the form ‘Quality q is at point-instant x; y; z; t’ could ever be translated into 
Carnap’s initial language of sense data and logic”, for “the connective ‘is at’ remains an added 
undefined connective” (Quine 1951b). Despite the details, and even to some extent despite the overall 
plausibility of their arguments, Goodman and Quine spoiled the reputation of the Aufbau. As is now 
well-known, however, they partly misrepresented Carnap’s 1928 project (Richardson 1998): they 
described it as the “Russellian” attempt to translate any statement concerning the external world into 
another statement consisting exclusively of expressions that refer to sense-data, whereas Carnap 
intended, rather, to show and warrant the objectivity of scientific knowledge by translating, in a neo-
Kantian spirit, any scientific statement into a purely structural one (Leitgeb 2011). Goodman and 
Quine considered the Aufbau as an old empiricist work, as the “the culmination of the phenomenalism 
that evolved through Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume,” though the first three names never 
occurred in Carnap’s text,xi and the last one occurred just once (Quine 1995: 13). Finally, they 
represented it as a foundational enterprise, whereas since the mid-1920s Carnap had clearly stated 
that the choice of the basis of the constitution-system was a matter of linguistic convention (Carnap 
1928a). It is perhaps worth adding that, when Carnap arrived in the United States, he himself tended 
to remove emphasis from the “continental” (i.e., neo-Kantian and Husserlian) roots of this 
philosophical thinking (an element which almost no historian of early analytic philosophy would now 
continue to question): this is particularly clear in Carnap’s 1963 autobiographical reflections, where 
he presented himself as a 360-degree “analytic” philosopher, i.e., a disciple and follower of Frege, 
Russell and Wittgenstein (Carnap 1963a; see also Bonino and Tripodi forthcoming). He stated: 
 
While writing the present section, I looked at the old book for the first time 
in many years. I had the impression that the problems raised and the general 
features of the methods used are still fruitful, and perhaps also some of the 
answers I gave to particular problems. But it might chiefly be of interest to 
those who still prefer a phenomenalistic basis for the construction of the total 
system of concepts. (Carnap 1963a: 18-19) 
 
It is not easy to say, without further investigation, what the motivation of Carnap’s self-
reinterpretation was. A plausible conjecture is that he spoke to those analytic philosophers such as for 
example Goodman, who were still interested in constructing a system of scientific concepts on a 
phenomenal basis (Goodman 1951). More generally, it is likely that he felt that in his new working 
environment nobody was still interested in the neo-Kantian problems that had once motivated his 
“old book” (as he labelled it). Moreover, Carnap’s was not the only attempt at “autobiographical 
  
 
revision” by an author emigrating to the US from central Europe because of the rise of Nazism, in 
order to purify his philosophy from its neo-Kantian origins and vocabulary: think, for example, of 
the analogous cases of Hans Kelsen and Gustav Bergmann (Bonino and Damele 2018).  It is likely 
that his immigration mattered: not only was he grateful to the country that had taken him in, 
considering him a leading philosophical figure and welcoming him into the academia, at the 
Universities of Chicago and later at that of Los Angeles; but the emigration, the German past and the 
escape from Nazism could also have had the psychological effects of a sort of philosophical 
suppression.xi 
The Aufbau’s constitution-system was the first Carnapian project to be subjected to Quine’s 
criticism. As for the syntactic project elaborated in the Logical Syntax (1934), it was abandoned by 
Carnap himself shortly before leaving Europe. In the early 1930s, Carnap acknowledged the high 
value of Tarski’s work in logic. Initially he borrowed the distinction between object language and 
metalanguage, finding in it a (further) reason to accept the principle of tolerance and to distance 
himself from Wittgenstein’s showing-saying divide, according to which the semantic properties of 
linguistic expressions are among the things that show themselves but cannot be properly said. 
Initially, however, Carnap kept on thinking that discourse on meaning requires a syntactic paraphrase 
(in the so-called formal mode of speech), and, more generally, he shared Wittgenstein's and Neurath’s 
suspicion towards the notions of meaning and reference, considering them as a prelude to 
metaphysics, since they invite dealing with the world regardless of the conventional adoption of a 
language, and independently of the empirical limits of our epistemic resources (Carnap 1934). It was 
only around 1935 –– the year in which the German translation of Tarski’s essay on truth was published 
–– that he properly understood and appreciated Tarski's work on the notion of truth (Tarski 
1933/1935), so as to start to develop a truth-conditional semantic himself (Coffa 1991; Wagner 2009). 
Wearing the semantic glasses, Carnap turned his view upside down: he used to think that semantics 
violated verificationism and his anti-metaphysical ideals; now he became aware that, by accepting 
Tarski’s semantics and putting aside his verificationist idiosyncrasies (as suggested, incidentally, by 
his own principle of tolerance and his tendency to liberalise empiricism), it became possible to 
analyse not only the notion of logical truth (as he himself had attempted to do in the Syntax), but also 
–– in a simpler, more elegant and natural way –– the notion of truth simpliciter, now conceived of, in 
Tarski’s terms, as a property of sentences. Above all, as Carnap explicitly underscored, contra 
Neurath, during a conference held in Paris in 1935, Tarski's definition of truth was to be regarded as 
a technically fruitful and rigorous, but philosophically neutral tool, free from any embarrassing 
commitment to realism and platonism (Mormann 1999; Mancosu 2008; Coffa 1991: chapters 16-17; 
Reck 2013). So when, in 1936, Tarski put forward an analogous, satisfactory explication of the 
semantic notion of logical consequence, Carnap abandoned any hesitation and started to give his 
  
 
contribution to the semantic tradition of Bolzano, Frege and the Tractatus, which tried to specify the 
truth-conditions of, and the inferential relationships between, sentences belonging to more and more 
complex, richer languages (Coffa 1991; Tarski 1936). Carnap's main semantic project –– formulated 
in 1942 with the publication of the Introduction to Semantics and culminating in 1947 with Meaning 
and Necessity –– was to specify a formally rigorous notion of analyticity (indeed, a semantic rather 
than a syntactic notion), whose theoretical role was to account for both necessity and a priori 
knowledge of logical truths (Carnap 1942 and 1947). Such a project had its roots in Carnap’s never 
abandoned ideal of conceiving of scientific theories as systems made up of an empirical or synthetical 
component on the one hand, and a logical-mathematical or analytical component on the other hand. 
Carnap’s semantic turn was something of a surprise for some of those philosophers, such as for 
example Neurath and Bergmann, who had belonged to the same Viennese philosophical milieu 
(Bergmann 1944, Bergmann 1945). During the 1940s Carnap’s turn was widely criticised in the 
United States, for example by philosophers such as Everett Hall, Max Black, and Wilfrid Sellars (Hall 
1944, Black 1945, Sellars 1948; see also Hochberg 1994, Hochberg 2001: 2-10, Bonino 2007, Bonino 
and Tripodi 2018a). The crucial episode, however, occurred at the beginning of the 1940s, when 
Carnap’s semantic project was discussed and demolished by Nelson Goodman, Tarski himself (at that 
time Professor of Logic at Berkeley) and, above all, W.V.O. Quine. As is well-known, after Quine 
took his PhD in 1932 under the supervision of Whitehead, he went to study in Europe. When he was 
in Vienna, he wrote “a note to the great Wittgenstein,” with the aim of having “an audience with the 
prophet”. “It remains to be seen,” Quine wondered in a letter to his parents, “whether he will act on 
my request (for he doesn't know how nice I am)”. However, as Quine commented many years later, 
“of course he did not answer” (Quine 1985: 88). Symbolically, this anecdote could be seen as a 
suggestive turning-point in the history of analytic philosophy, not only because it is interesting to 
imagine what could have happened if on that occasion Quine had met Wittgenstein in Vienna, but 
also because, straight after that, Quine went to Prague instead, and became a pupil of Carnap. In 1936, 
he published ‘Truth by Convention,’ in which he criticised the idea that logical truths can be known 
a priori because they entirely depend on linguistic stipulations: according to Quine, if one does not 
presuppose logic, one cannot even derive logic (that is, the potentially infinite set of its truths) from 
a class of axioms introduced by stipulation (Quine 1936/1966). In the same year, he came back to the 
United States, and started to teach at Harvard, in a department in which there were professors such 
as Whitehead, the new realist Ralph Barton Perry, the logician and mathematician Henry Schiffer, 
and the pragmatist C.I. Lewis. In that period, Quine was still firmly anchored in three cornerstones 
of Carnap's conception of analyticity (Frost-Arnold 2013): he took for granted that logical and 
mathematical truths were analytic; in fact, he accepted an extensional treatment of analyticity, like 
that proposed by Carnap in the Syntax; and he was even willing to attribute scientific respectability 
  
 
to a peculiar semantic notion of logical or analytical truth (where a sentence is logically true if, and 
only if, it is true and remains true under all reinterpretations of its non-logical vocabulary, assuming 
one has preliminarily filled out a list of all logical words such as ‘every’, ‘none’, ‘if-then’, ‘not’, and 
so forth) (Quine 1936/1966). Within fifteen years, Quine would change his mind about almost all 
such issues, replacing the constructive criticism of ‘Truth by Convention’ with a much more radical 
set of objections, aiming to destroy the ground of Carnap’s semantic project. This radicalisation 
depended on three main factors. 
First, Quine noticed that logical truths are only a subclass of analytic truths: ‘Every bachelor is 
unmarried,’ for example, is analytic but not logically true, since there are reinterpretations of, say, 
‘bachelor,’ which make the sentence false (Quine 1943). Therefore, the 1936 respectable semantic 
notion of analyticity was not general enough. Carnap would answer that critique in 1952, maintaining 
that analyticity in the wide sense presupposes a number of meaning postulates, i.e., stipulations 
concerning the meaning of certain linguistic expressions (e.g., ‘For every x, if x is a bachelor, then x 
is unmarried’) (Carnap 1952). During the 1940s, on the contrary, Carnap was apparently not 
impressed by Quine's remark. Therefore, he kept on looking for a satisfactory explanation of the 
semantic notions such as logical truth and analyticity. Carnap’s semantics was based on the notions 
of extension and intension, which are to be seen as explications of Frege's notions of Bedeutung and 
Sinn (Frege 1892). The extension of a sentence is its truth value; the extension of a predicate is the 
class of objects to which the predicate applies; the extension of a singular term is the object it refers 
to. Two expressions have the same intension if, and only if, they have the same extension in all state 
descriptions, where a state description D is a set of sentences of a language L such that, for any atomic 
sentence p of L, it includes either p or not-p, but not both. Therefore, two sentences have the same 
intension (that is, they express the same proposition) just if they have the same truth value in any 
state description (or, which is the same, just if they hold in the same state descriptions); two predicates 
have the same intension (they express the same property) just if they refer to the same class in any 
state description; two singular terms have the same intension (they express the same individual 
concept) just if they refer to the same entity in any state description. By using such a conceptual 
apparatus, Carnap achieved two main goals. First, he constructed a rigorous explication of analyticity 
in terms of L-truth, where a sentence is L-true just if it holds in all state descriptions. Secondly, he 
applied the Tarski-style semantic analysis to modal discourse. Consider, for example, the sentence 
‘Necessarily 9>7,’ which is true: as Quine noticed, modal contexts are referentially opaque, for in 
such a sentence we cannot replace co-referring expressions (e.g., ‘9’ and ‘the number of planets,’ or 
‘9>7’ and ‘Torino is in Italy’) salva veritate (Quine 1943). From this, however, Carnap did not 
conclude, with Quine, “so much the worse for modal logic,” but he pointed out that his method of 
extension and intension allowed him to provide a compositional analysis of modal sentences, for the 
  
 
principle of substitutivity salva veritate of expressions having the same intension (for example, ‘9’ 
and ‘7+2’, or, respectively, ‘9>7’ and ‘2+2=4’) holds for modal sentences such as ‘Necessarily 9>7’.  
Carnap’s semantic treatment of modal contexts gave Quine the second reason to change his attitude 
from reformist to negative, not only because he considered intensional concepts as intrinsically 
flawed (in fact, assuming an old-style positivist pose, he declared to find them entirely 
unintelligible),xi but also for a more specific reason. It happened, indeed, that in two pioneering 
papers, appearing in 1946 and 1947, with the aim of investigating the interactions between quantifiers 
and modal operators, Ruth Barcan Marcus introduced the first axiomatic systems for quantified modal 
logic (Barcan Marcus 1946 and 1947; see also Williamson 2013: chapter 2). Two of Barcan’s 
achievements were subjected to harsh criticism by Quine. First, Barcan Marcus formulated, in Lewis 
and Langford’s S5, the axiom –– later called ‘Barcan formula’ –– according to which, if it is possible 
that something has a certain property, then there is something that possibly has that property: in 
Quine's view, such a formula (which is equivalent to “if everything necessarily has a certain property, 
it is necessarily the case that everything has that property”) was nothing but the expression of the link 
between quantified modal logic and an absurd, old-fashioned form of Aristotelian essentialism, the 
thesis that things intrinsically have necessary and essential properties. Secondly, Barcan proved a 
theorem according to which a true identity statement can never be contingent, that is, if it is true that 
a = b, then it is necessarily true that a = b: Quine and most of his contemporaries considered such a 
thesis as a reductio ad absurdum of quantified modal logic, taking for granted that, for example, if 
the universe had been different from how it actually is, Hesperus and Phosphorus would have been 
two different planets. In the academic year 1947-48, Barcan Marcus attended, as a post-doc, Carnap’s 
lectures at the University of Chicago. In that period, Carnap was himself constructing some systems 
of quantified modal logic, with the aim of providing for them a semantic treatment: consequently, it 
goes without saying, he was criticised by Quine. Quine noticed that de dicto modalities (e.g., 
‘Necessarily, every bachelor is unmarried’) could be considered, in the spirit of Carnap, as analytic 
or conceptual truths (assuming that, say, the concept bachelor is associated by definition to the 
concept unmarried), whereas, on the contrary, if one accepts a quantified modal logic as strong as 
S5, there is no way to prevent the proliferation of de re modalities (e.g., ‘Every bachelor is necessarily 
unmarried’), thus generating metaphysical monstrosities, such as the alleged existence, in every 
bachelor, of the necessary property of being unmarried. This objection amounted to a classical tu 
quoque argument, addressed to a philosopher such as Carnap who, twenty years earlier, passed into 
the annals of history as the one who declared the advent of a new form of empiricism and a scientific 
conception of the world (Quine 1947, 1953a). 
The third reason why Quine's attitude towards Carnap’s conception of analyticity (and its 
explication in terms of L-truth) became more and more exacerbated goes back to the academic year 
  
 
1940-41, when at Harvard there were at the same time Quine, Goodman (a doctoral student at that 
time), Russell, Hempel, Tarski and Carnap; during the seminar, Tarski presented his view of a 
nominalist (or, as they used to say, finitist) language for mathematics and the natural sciences (Frost-
Arnold 2013). Tarski maintained that a language cannot be intelligible and scientific, unless it is –– 
as we would say nowadays –– a first order language (in particular, a language containing only 
individual variables, and no variables for classes of individuals), a language having nothing but 
concrete spatiotemporal objects in its domain, a language that does not allow one to speak of infinite 
cardinalities. Tarski’s project was to provide a finitist account of arithmetic: an ambitious task, given 
that numbers are, at least prima facie, abstract entities belonging to infinite sets. In their 1947 article, 
‘Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism,’ Quine and Goodman took Tarski’s challenge very 
seriously (Goodman and Quine 1947). Moreover, Quine found in Tarski’s project the most radical 
reason to reject Carnap’s semantics, namely, the idea that even arithmetic can be synthetic, rather 
than analytic. Carnap’s reaction was one of surprise and even scorn, for it seemed to him that his 
interlocutors were simply coming back to Mill’s empiricism (Carnap 1963a). After all, it is likely that 
he had had a similar reaction in 1930, when, during a conversation in a Viennese café, Tarski kept on 
denying that tautologies do not tell us anything about the world, and that between tautologies and 
empirical sentences there is a difference in principle, rather than a mere difference in grade (Haller, 
1992; Mancosu, 2005).xi 
The synthesis of Quine’s criticism of Carnap was, as is well-known, the 1951 article on the ‘Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism,’ one of the most influential works in twentieth-century analytic philosophy 
(Hunter 1995: 305). Quine maintained that the notion of analyticity is impossible to clarify; in fact, 
it is not fully intelligible. Therefore, any scientific philosophy should do without it. Quine noticed 
that there is a cluster of concepts (such as synonymy, semantic rule and necessity), which are strictly 
connected with the concept of analyticity: the truth of an analytic statement such as ‘No bachelor is 
a married man’ seems to depend on a definition such as “‘Bachelor’ means unmarried man” (by the 
same token, a sentence belonging to an artificial language is true in virtue of semantic rules); and two 
synonymous expressions can be inter-substituted salva veritate not only in modal contexts, but also 
in the context of the operator ‘it is analytic that’. Quine’s verdict is well-known: all these notions 
(synonymy, necessity, analyticity, semantic rule) are intensional, and therefore obscure, and there is 
no chance of making them scientifically respectable. At any rate, Quine added that within a scientific 
theory one cannot draw a sharp divide between analytic statements (conceived of as the byproduct of 
the conventional choice of a language) and synthetic ones (regarded as factual descriptions of the 
world), since they are always intertwined with one another. To show this, he gave new life to Pierre 
Duhem’s epistemological holism, according to which no individual statement or hypothesis can be 
empirically confirmed (or disconfirmed), but only the theory as a whole (or as a subset of its 
  
 
statements) (Duhem 1906). Quine compared science to a “‘system,’ a ‘web,’ a ‘field of force’ whose 
boundary conditions are experience,” thus strengthening Tarski’s radically fallibilist perspective. He 
remarked: “any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments 
elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close to the periphery can be held true in the face of 
recalcitrant experience by pleading hallucination or by amending certain statements of the kind called 
logical laws”. On the other hand, he also stated: “By the same token, no statement is immune to 
revision. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed as a means of 
simplifying quantum mechanics; and what difference is there in principle between such a shift and 
the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle?” (Quine 
1951b: 40). It is likely that Quine knew that a fallibilist view similar to the so-called Duhem-Quine 
thesis had also been formulated by Neurath, Einstein, and even by Carnap himself (for example, in 
the Logical Syntax). Nonetheless, he thought that Carnap had not been able to draw the due 
consequences: in particular, Carnap took a pragmatic attitude towards the problem of choosing a form 
of language, or a scientific framework, but he kept on maintaining the analytic-synthetic distinction. 
Quine’s radical pragmatism, on the contrary, would have led to an undogmatic empiricist 
epistemology, in which there was no place for a scientifically legitimate notion of analyticity. 
Arguably, Quine’s arguments against analyticity were not fully sound: for example, Quine seemed 
to throw away our robust intuition of synonymy very quickly (Williamson 2007: 50; see chapter 6 
below for some considerations on this).xi Moreover, it is likely that his arguments were not entirely 
original either: around 1950 several analytic (or proto-analytic) philosophers beside him felt the need 
to criticise Carnap’s framework based on the semantic notion of analyticity (among them Goodman 
1949, Pap 1949, White 1950, Mates 1951, Martin 1952, Sellars 1953a and Bergmann 1955). 
However, Quine’s attack on Carnap was extremely successful, for at least two different reasons. First, 
it unmasked the (alleged) Achilles’s heel of Carnap’s philosophy (and, more generally, of any 
“linguistic” philosophy in a wide sense), namely, the claim that an attempt to do philosophy seriously 
or scientifically –– thus avoiding metaphysical absurdities –– is based on a (semantic, logical and 
epistemological) distinction between a conceptual (or analytic) component and a factual (or synthetic) 
component; according to many, this vulnerability of Carnap’s view would only become clearer about 
twenty years later (with Kripke 1972/1980), but Quine was one of the first to reveal it (Williamson, 
2007: 50-2). Secondly, Quine replaced the “failed” Carnapian semantic program with a new 
philosophical task: answering the simple question “What is there?” by providing an inventory of what 
exists, that is, the list of entities which, according to our best theories, populate the world (Quine, 
1948). To foster ontology –– a word and a kind of research he met in the early 1930s at the University 
of Warsaw (for example, in Leśniewski’s courses) –– Quine provided analytic philosophers with a 
motivation, a method and a tradition (Simons, 2013: 719). In his view, a study in ontology is guided 
  
 
by aesthetic preferences (such as his personal idiosyncrasy for densely populated lands) and by meta-
theoretic principles (such as his claim “no entity without identity”): based on these preferences and 
principles, Quine and Goodman rejected possibilia, universals, abstract entities, fictional, non-
existent, impossible objects (Goodman and Quine, 1947). A study in ontology requires three steps: 
taking into account our best –– i.e., most explanatory, general, simple, elegant –– scientific theories 
(typically, physical and mathematical theories); translating the language of the theory into a 
“canonical notation”; expressing perspicuously (by means of existential quantification) the 
ontological commitment of the theory. Thirdly, and lastly, based on such considerations, Quine 
pigeonholed ontology in the analytic tradition of ideal language, which was at its best exemplified by 
Russell’s 1905 treatment of definite descriptions (Russell 1905).  
In those years, nobody in the United States could equal Quine’s philosophical and academic 
achievements. He occupied the centre of the scene, setting up the agenda for a generation of analytic 
philosophers. As is well-known, Quine despised the history of science (let alone the history of 
philosophy), for he was convinced that “an advance in science resolves an obscurity, a tangle, a 
complexity, an inelegance, that the scientist then gratefully dismisses and forgets”, whereas “the 
historian of science tries to recapture the very tangles, confusions, and obscurities from which the 
scientist is so eager to free himself” (Quine 1985: 194). Nonetheless, he himself was a master in 
providing the rising analytic philosophy with a convincing self-narrative: one of the cornerstones of 
his rational reconstruction was the idea of a “return to Russell”; Russell as a philosopher of language 
(rather than as a linguistic philosopher such as Wittgenstein and Carnap), Russell as an ontologist, an 
anti-Meinongian philosopher who wanted to cut Plato’s beard by using mathematical logic as an 
Ockhamian razor (Quine 1948 and 1966). Carnap did not of course like this fascinating but unreliable 
story, because, among other reasons, he always considered Russell as a father of logical positivism. 
Moreover, he liked even less Quine’s charge of realism and platonism, based on the claim that his 
(Carnap’s) semantic theories were ontologically committed to the existence of abstract entities (Quine 
1948: 33). Carnap could not accept this charge, since throughout his life he shared Wittgenstein’s 
attempt to criticise and demystify platonism in the philosophy of mathematics. Therefore, as is well-
known, he responded vigorously. In 1950 he published ‘Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology,’ 
where he made it clear how liberal empiricists could overtake their nominalistic hesitations, thus 
adopting a language in which it is possible to refer to abstract entities without hypostatising them, 
that is, without assuming any realistic or Platonic metaphysics (Carnap, 1950b). Carnap gave new 
form to the deflationary (rather than conciliatory) philosophical attitude he always took with respect 
to the problem of ontological disagreement. In his 1922 dissertation, he attempted to dissolve the 
apparent disagreement between mathematicians, physicians and neo-Kantian philosophers; in the 
Aufbau and the Scheinprobleme (Carnap 1928a and 1928b), he drew a distinction between a 
  
 
metaphysical use and an empirical use of the term “real”; in the Syntax he formulated the principle 
of tolerance, so as to avoid metaphysics by bringing the contrast between rival theoretical systems 
back to the conventional choice of a language (Carnap 1934). Now, in 1950, he introduced the notion 
of linguistic framework: “If someone wishes to speak in his language about a new kind of entities, he 
has to introduce a system of new ways of speaking, subject to new rules; we shall call this procedure 
the construction of a linguistic framework for the new entities in question” (Carnap, 1950b: 631). 
When a linguistic framework has been introduced, it is possible to raise two kinds of questions of 
existence. Internal questions concern the existence of something within the framework: for example, 
within the logical framework of arithmetic, one can answer the internal question ‘Are there numbers?’ 
by applying purely logical or analytic methods (here the affirmative answer follows trivially from the 
analytic sentence ‘5 is a number’). External questions, on the contrary, even though they can be 
phonetically and syntactically indiscernible from internal ones (the very sentence ‘Are there 
numbers?’ provides an example of this kind of ambiguity), concern the existence of the systems of 
entities as a whole: if we interpret them as practical questions, i.e. questions concerning the pragmatic 
reasons to adopt or not to adopt a certain framework (such as the framework of natural numbers), 
they are fully legitimate; however, if considered as theoretical questions, that is, as questions intended 
to establish whether a certain class of entities (such as the class of natural numbers) exists regardless 
of the choice of a framework, they are illegitimate and, actually, nonsensical (Carnap 1950b). The 
internal-external divide allowed Carnap to turn the charge of (bad) metaphysics against Quine. 
Empiricists can employ the language of mathematics and, in particular, quantify over abstract entities 
without profanation, as long as they are aware of the fact that such entities exist only within a certain 
linguistic framework, which is somewhat useful to the scientific enterprise. The greater difficulties 
arise when empiricists (such as Quine) take ontological questions at face value, ending up advancing 
arguments which make no more sense than those formulated by the metaphysical realists. 
However, Quine replied in turn, criticising the new Carnapian distinction (Quine 1951a). First of 
all, he maintained that the internal-external distinction could be paraphrased in terms of the more 
fundamental distinction between subclass and category questions (where external questions = 
category questions, conceived of as proposals for the adoption of a given language, whereas internal 
questions = subclass questions + category questions, conceived of as questions raised within an 
already adopted language and answered by trivially analytic or contradictory statements) (Quine 
1951a: 201). For example, a question such as ‘Are there numbers?’ is a category question if it is raised 
in a language (such as the language of arithmetic) endowed with specific variables for numbers, and 
only for numbers, whereas it is a subclass question if it is formulated in a language (such as the 
language of Principia Mathematica or set theory) whose variables take not only numbers but also 
entities of a different kind (such as classes) as their values. Therefore the internal-external distinction 
  
 
simply depends, in a language, on a certain style of variables (Quine, 1951a). This amounts to a 
reductio of Carnap’s position, for according to Quine one can draw a distinction between internal and 
external questions only if one has adopted a certain kind of language, rather than another, in spite of 
the principle of tolerance. Moreover, Quine remarked that, in Carnap’s view, a genuine ontological 
question such as ‘Are there numbers?’ is (under a certain interpretation) a question which, given a 
language (or a linguistic framework), can be answered analytically. But since, as Quine argued, the 
notion of analytic-in-L is nothing but an irremediably flawed dogma of empiricism, so much the 
worse for the internal-external distinction (Quine 1960a).xi 
From a meta-philosophical point of view, Quine pushed philosophy towards methodological 
naturalism, the view according to which science and philosophy are continuous with each other, for 
any statement of the former can be relevant to the latter, and vice versa. This metaphilosophy was at 
least in part in accordance with the manifestos for naturalism presented, from 1944 to 1949, by 
philosophers such as John Dewey, Sidney Hook, John Randall, and Ernest Nagel, on the one hand, 
and R.W. Sellars, Marvin Farber e Vivian Jerauld McGill, on the other hand (Krikorian 1944; Sellars, 
McGill, Farber 1949; see also De Caro and Macarthur 2004). But what is most relevant for the present 
purposes is that Quine’s “continuist” theses were at odds with the metaphilosophical views shared 
not only by Carnap but also by Wittgenstein and the entire later Wittgensteinian tradition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Notes 
xi One occurrence of ‘Wittgenstein’ is too generic to understand which specific Wittgensteinian contribution to philosophy 
(if any) the author of the article had in mind. 
xi The same attitude and the same evaluation were also shared by, amongst others, Jan Patočka, one of the first continental 
critics of Wittgenstein (Sebestik 1990: 198). 
xi On a different occasion, Wittgenstein pointed out that by employing the sentence ‘God’s eye sees everything’ a believer 
associates a particular use with a picture. This provoked the reaction of Yorick Smythies, one of Wittgenstein’s catholic 
pupils, who was worried that Wittgenstein was proposing a reduction of the religious into non-religious terms. Then 
Wittgenstein, in turn, replied passionately: “Rubbish. I meant: what conclusions are you going to draw? etc. Are eyebrows 
going to be talked of, in connection with the Eye of God? ‘He could just as well have said so and so’— this [remark] is 
foreshadowed by the word ‘attitude’. He could just as well have said something else. If I say he used a picture, I do not 
want to say anything he himself would not say. I want to say that he draws these conclusions. Isn’t  it as important as 
anything else, what picture he does use as?” (Wittgenstein 1966: 71). 
xi Here it has been roughly assumed that Stroud (1965) was by and large right against Dummett’s (1959) interpretation of 
Wittgenstein as a full-blooded conventionalist. 
xi This is not to say that Wittgenstein was not acquainted with theoretical physics. There is some evidence, for example, 
that Einstein’s use of thought experiments had a lasting influence on his later way of doing philosophy (Penco 2010). Yet, 
it is fair to say that Wittgenstein never focused his attention on the epistemology of theoretical science, and, when he 
made a methodological comparison (perhaps better: a contrast) between science and philosophy, he seemed to have in 
mind the paradigm case of experimental physics. 
xi Actually, most historians now share the conviction that not only Wittgenstein, but also the pragmatists, the Neo-Kantians 
and some of the logical positivists (including Carnap) anticipated Kuhn’s anti-foundationalist views about the theory-
ladenness of science (Kuhn 1962). 
xi Yet, an important footnote, which ultimately led him to embrace semantic pluralism (roughly, from “there are many 
methods of verification” to “there are many language-games”). 
xi Moreover, the very presence of Hobbes in the list looks strange. 
xi  Consider, by analogy, Ronald Giere’s interesting conjecture concerning Hans Reichenbach’s famous 
discovery/justification distinction. According to Giere, from the point of view of the exiled philosophers of science 
seeking to establish home in the United States, the “distinction says: Don’t think about the fact that I am a German 
immigrant, or speak with an accent; just consider the validity of my ideas” (Giere 1996, 346; see also Howard 2003: 55). 
xi This attitude goes back to Quine (1934). 
xi In a 1935 letter to Neurath Heinrich Neider attributed to Tarski the following comment: “I have never uttered a sentence 
which I have not considered to be revisable” (Mancosu, 2005: 331). 
xi Notice, however, that the very notion of synonymy was criticised, in the same period, also by Goodman; see Goodman 
(1949). 
xi Quine’s attack on Carnap’s analytic-synthetic and internal-external distinctions were not isolated incidents but rather 
all part of the process of assimilating logical positivism into the American philosophical world. This process often took 
the form of a critique. There are plenty of possible examples in this respect, from Hempel to Kuhn to Sellars, to mention 
just a few of them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
5. Rigourism in the Humanities 
 
Wittgenstein died in 1951, the same year in which Quine published ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism.’ 
Looking at things in retrospect, one would suppose that the Wittgensteinians –– especially the pupils 
and followers of Wittgenstein in Oxford and Cambridge –– would have performed or at least prepared 
a reaction to Quine, challenging his arguments against the conceptual-factual divide and the resulting 
metaphilosophical picture based on methodological naturalism and the continuity thesis. Arguably, 
there were grounds to claim that Quine’s attack on Carnap could not and therefore should not be 
automatically applied to Wittgenstein. First of all, Quine’s main polemical target, that is, Carnap’s 
notion of an analytic sentence, did not coincide either extensionally or intensionally with 
Wittgenstein’s concept of a grammatical proposition (Schröder 2009). Analyticity is a property of 
types of statements, which depends on formal features, whereas grammaticality applies to tokens, 
i.e., to particular rules (Glock 1994: 198). Moreover, many grammatical propositions in the sense of 
Wittgenstein –– such as, for example, colour incompatibility statements (‘A surface cannot be entirely 
red and entirely green at the same time’), arithmetic equations, geometric theorems, and Moore’s so-
called truisms (‘Here is a hand’, ‘The Earth has existed for many years past’) –– are grammatical but 
not analytic (Wittgenstein 1956/1978: III, § 42; Moore 1939; Wittgenstein 1969: § 84).xi Even more 
crucially, grammatical propositions are neither true nor false: they are (disguised) norms that do not 
follow from the preexisting meaning of the linguistic expressions occurring in them but are rather 
(partly) constitutive of it. On the contrary, Carnap’s analytic assertions are (regarded as) necessarily 
true. 
Accordingly, the view of linguistic competence defended by Carnap and criticised by Quine held 
that knowledge of language is propositional knowledge, a form of knowing that, typically understood 
in terms of knowledge of meaning postulates (Carnap 1952). Wittgenstein, however, did not accept 
this view, but regarded linguistic competence as a practical ability, a form of knowing how, conceived 
of in terms of the capacity to understand and use words according to rules. Therefore, supposing that 
Quine’s arguments showed that there is no real distinction between linguistic competence qua 
propositional knowledge and general scientific knowledge, it was still open whether a practical ability 
could also be reduced into propositional terms (Marconi 2012: 179-180).xi By a similar token one can 
claim, following Quine, that scientific assertions and hypotheses are relevant to philosophical 
arguments only if one assumes that there are indeed philosophical arguments or, which is the same, 
that philosophy aims to establish theses; but this is exactly the view rejected by Wittgenstein, when 
he asserted: “In philosophy we do not draw conclusions”; “philosophy only states what everyone 
admits” (Wittgenstein 1953: § 599; see also Marconi 2012: 180). 
Moreover, two of Quine’s favourite epistemological views, namely, confirmation holism and the 
  
 
related radical fallibilism, were to a large extent shared not only by Duhem and Carnap (via Neurath) 
but also by Wittgenstein himself, who presented a functional conception of grammatical rules, 
according to which whether a sentence is a rule or an empirical statement depends on its role, i.e., on 
how it is used on a particular occasion (Glock 1994: 203). Wittgenstein famously distinguished 
between the criteria and the symptoms of something. The former are logical or internal evidences: 
for example, we say that it is raining on the basis of some visual impressions (water falling in drops 
from the sky). The latter are inductive or empirical evidences: for example, we say that it is raining 
if the barometer falls. However, Wittgenstein acknowledged that there can be something like “the 
fluctuation in grammar between criteria and symptoms” (Wittgenstein 1953: § 354), though he also 
warned us not to conclude that there is consequently nothing at all but symptoms. 
 
4.1 The Wittgensteinians in the Age of Quine 
The Wittgensteinians could have responded, in the attempt to save Wittgenstein from Quine’s attack 
on Carnap. However, with very few exceptions, they did not. This is clearly visible when considering 
Roland Hall’s ‘Analytic-Synthetic: a Bibliography,’ published in 1966 in The Philosophical 
Quarterly (Hall 1966). This bibliography contained 169 references from Kant to Quine and the post-
Quineans, but only a few of these articles belonged to the later Wittgensteinian tradition: a couple of 
articles on logical necessity published in 1940, written by Norman Malcolm and Casimir Lewy 
respectively; ‘A Defense of Synthetic Necessary Truths’ by Stephen Toulmin, Morris Lazerowitz’s 
discussion of the alleged meaninglessness of self-contradictory statements, and von Wright’s ‘Form 
and Content in Logic’ (all of them published in 1949);  the series of papers ‘Analytic-Synthetic’ by 
Waismann, published from 1949 to 1953; three articles by David Pears, about synthetic a priori truths 
(1950), the incongruity of counterparts (1952), and the problem of colour incompatibility (1953), 
respectively; ‘Necessary Statements and Rules’ by Max Black (1958a), and Erik Stenius’s article on 
the analyticity of numerical statements (1965).xi From a brief comparative analysis of these articles, 
two main considerations emerge. First, the Wittgensteinians seemed to take for granted that 
Wittgenstein’s views of logical necessity were altogether different from the logical positivist 
identification of necessary, analytic and a priori statements, as typically exemplified by the account 
provided by Ayer in his 1936 Language, Truth and Logic (Ayer 1936):xi for example, renovating not 
only the Kantian tradition but also Karl Britton’s 1934 focus on the relationship between experience 
and necessity, Lewy, Toulmin and Pears explicitly claimed that some necessary statements are 
synthetic a priori, and they seemed to be aware that it was at least controversial whether statements 
such as ‘7+5=12’ and ‘Nothing can be at the same time entirely red and entirely green’ could be 
labelled ‘analytic’ (Lewy 1940, Toulmin 1949; Pears 1950).  
Second, even after the publication of ‘Two Dogmas,’ the Wittgensteinians appeared not to be 
  
 
interested in Quine’s attack on analyticity or, at least, not to be entirely aware of its consequences.  
For example: in his 1949-1953 meticulous analysis of analytic statements, Waismann referred only 
to Quine’s ‘Truth by Convention,’ published in 1936; after his 1940 contribution on necessity, 
Malcolm, who was to become the most representative Wittgensteinian “activist” in the American 
academia, did not feel the need to discuss the analyticity issue any further; in his philosophical logic 
papers, von Wright never examined the Quine-Carnap controversy in depth, and in 1965 Stenius 
discussed von Wright’s views without focusing on Quine’s arguments. Only in 1972 would Douglas 
Gasking, an Australasian philosopher who had been influenced by Wittgenstein (even though he 
remained basically “Vienna Circle”; see Anonymous 1994) publish a paper entitled ‘The Analytic-
Synthetic Controversy,’ in which he presented an overview of Quine’s perspective on analyticity, 
without opposing, for that matter, Wittgenstein and Quine (Gasking 1972). 
The most interesting cases are probably those of Max Black and Peter Geach. In his 1948 ‘Logic 
and Semantics,’ the former had criticised Carnap for having attempted to reduce logic either to syntax 
or to semantics (Carnap 1934 and 1942). Six years later, a slightly revised version of this article was 
published with a slightly revised title (‘Carnap on Logic and Semantics’) in the collection of essays 
Problems of Analysis (Black 1954). In his 1960 review, Putnam significantly considered Black’s 
essay “the best criticism of Carnap’s work to appear to date” (Putnam 1960b: 38). In 1954 Black 
emphasised that the essay no longer adequately represented his views, and put Carnap’s semantic 
project into the post-Quinean context:  
 
Some of the high hopes that were held for the future of ‘semantics’ at the time 
this essay was written have since ‘evaporated,’ though some young 
philosophers, chiefly American, are still eloquent in metalanguages. But the 
views here examined have something more than historical importance, and I 
hope what I have written may help anybody who wishes or is compelled to 
work his way through the intricacies of these ambitious attempts to apply 
mathematical methods to philosophical problems. (Black 1954: 298) 
 
Then in a footnote Black acknowledged, even more eloquently: “The main conclusions of this essay 
have been advocated by a number of other writers,” and here he mentioned the functional and 
Cassirer-inspired views of the a priori advanced by Arthur Pap in ‘Are All Necessary Propositions 
Analytic?,’ published in The Philosophical Review in 1949 (Pap 1949; see also Stump 2011), as well 
as –– what is most interesting for the purposes of the present chapter –– Quine’s ‘Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism’ (with the qualification: “especially pp. 23-34,” namely, the pages devoted to challenging 
the first dogma) (Black 1954: 298-299; see also Quine 1951b). It seems quite clear that Black did not 
  
 
perceive Quine’s attack on analyticity as potentially dangerous for the later Wittgensteinian tradition 
(whereas he seemed to be aware that Quine had contributed to undermining Carnap’s semantic 
views): paradigmatically, in 1958, when he wrote the article ‘Necessary Statements and Rules,’ in 
which he explicitly focused on necessary statements that are also analytic, he discussed nothing but 
the intra-Wittgensteinian issues based on the analogy between necessary statements, grammatical 
rules and the rules of games (especially chess) (Black 1958a: 75-6).  
Among the Wittgensteinians, the case of Peter Geach was perhaps even more striking. He was 
personally acquainted with Quine: they used to discuss philosophy and logic, with a special focus on 
the problem of semantic reference. They had intense correspondence, showing reciprocal respect and 
mutual understanding, probably based on their common logical background. For example, Geach’s 
Reference and Generality was reviewed approvingly by Quine in 1964 (Quine 1964; see also Geach 
1962); and Geach took part to the 1954 symposium on Quine’s ‘On What There Is’ (Geach 1954; see 
also Quine 1948). In his 1957 book, Mental Acts, at a certain point Geach raised the question: What 
is the criterion of synonymy? And he succinctly invited the reader to rely on the authority of ‘Two 
Dogmas’: “On the obscurity of the term ‘synonymous’, see Quine” (Geach 1957: 90). At this point 
he briefly summarised one of Quine’s main arguments: 
 
Two expressions are equivalent to the extent to which they are 
intersubstitutable salva veritate; but we cannot define synonymy as a supreme 
degree of equivalence, intersubstitutability salva veritate in all contexts; for 
if occurrence in quotation is recognized, no two distinct (non-equiform) 
expressions are intersubstitutable salva veritate at all occurrences. (Geach 
1957: 91) 
 
Then he concluded, still following Quine: 
 
So no objection stated in terms of ‘synonymy’ is going to have much weight; 
an attempt to define ‘synonymy’ strictly is likely either to yield a relation that 
never holds between non-equiform expressions, or to involve a vicious circle 
when we try to apply it. (Geach 1957: 91)  
 
Geach added that non-technical ordinary expressions such as ‘equivalent’ and ‘tantamount to’ are 
better than ‘synonymous’ and, above all, than Carnap’s ‘intensional isomorphism,’ since “there is less 
danger that way of making a show of precision where precision is not attainable,” giving the 
illusionary “impression that scientific rigour has been achieved” (Geach 1957: 91). This move –– 
  
 
contrasting Carnap and Quine by criticising the former and approving of the latter –– would become 
typical of Geach, who in his later years once described his different attitudes towards Carnap and 
Quine in the following terms: “I battled … against the pedantry and bad reasoning of people like 
Carnap and R.M. Martin. I found Carnap’s view of Frege dramatically wrong, once and once again. 
On logic and philosophy of logic I almost always agreed with Quine”xi.  
So the history of analytic philosophy took its course under the influence of Quine, and the 
Wittgensteinians did not provide a commensurate response. But why? There may be plenty of 
conjectural answers to this question. Many of them are mutually intermingled, but it is likely that not 
all of them have the same explanatory relevance. Preliminarily, before briefly considering these 
possible answers in a row, it seems useful to stress that in that period there was (almost) no presence 
of “Carnapstein” (that is, of a confusion between Wittgenstein and Carnap) in the United Kingdom, 
since the differences among Carnap and Wittgenstein were much more visible there than in the United 
States. Arguably, partial exceptions to this state of affairs were cases of early reception of Wittgenstein 
in Britain, such as the case of Stebbing mentioned in the previous chapter, as well as the cases of 
philosophers who met Wittgenstein when they were already formed under the influence of logical 
positivism, such as for example von Wright.xi On the other hand, however, the generation that was 
born in Britain since around 1920 had a clear view of the main philosophical and metaphilosophical 
differences between Carnap and the later Wittgenstein. The paradigmatic case was that of Peter 
Strawson (born in 1919). Not only was Strawson entirely aware of Carnap’s rejection of 
Wittgenstein’s merely descriptive and therapeutic conception of philosophy, as well as of Carnap’s 
commitment to the view according to which philosophy — though oriented towards achieving 
conceptual clarity, rather than substantive knowledge — should be constructed as a rigorous 
axiomatic theory, but he was also particularly interested in defending Wittgenstein and criticising 
Carnap regarding this very metaphilosophical issue. All this manifested itself in a 1963 debate 
between Strawson and Carnap, published in the volume devoted to Carnap in the series The Library 
of Living Philosophers, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp (Schilpp 1963). The central issue was the 
normative conception of philosophy: How should we philosophise? One answer was: providing a 
rational reconstruction by means of constructed systems, i.e, what Carnap would later call 
‘explication’. An alternative answer was: describing ordinary language usages, such as in 
Wittgenstein’s ‘perspicuous presentation of grammar,’ Strawson's ‘connective analysis,’ as well as in 
Ryle’s ‘logical geography’ (Strawson 1963, Carnap 1947, 1950a and 1963b;  Ryle 1949). Carnap 
notoriously belonged to the ideal language tradition of Frege, Russell and Tarski, so he thought that 
ordinary language had many mistakes and defects (such as ambiguity, vagueness, category mistakes) 
that needed to be corrected. Consequently, the aim of Carnap’s explication was the transformation 
(or, better, the replacement) of an inexact concept, the explicandum, into (with) a formally more 
  
 
precise concept, the explicatum. Normally, the explicandum belongs to ordinary language, but it can 
also emerge from a less mature phase of scientific or philosophical development. The explicatum is 
introduced by providing explicit and rigorous rules for its use, typically by putting it into a formal 
system. Here is a list of scientific and philosophical explicanda and explicata in Carnap’s sense: the 
ordinary concept of heat (based on the subjective experience of heat and cold) and the quantitative 
notion of temperature (measured by a thermometer); the ordinary concept of fish (animal living in 
water, and so forth) and the zoological concept of piscis (a concept such that whales, qua mammals, 
do not belong to it);  salt and NaCl; true and Tarski’s true-in-L; Kant’s analytic and Carnap’s L-true; 
Frege’s sense and Carnap’s intension; informative and semantically contentful, in the sense provided 
by Carnap and Bar-Hillel in 1953 (Bar-Hillel and Carnap 1953). In line with his pragmatism and 
conventionalism, Carnap suggested that the solution to a problem of explication was, properly 
speaking, more or less satisfactory, rather than correct or true, the satisfactoriness depending on 
criteria such as resemblance with the explicatum, exactness, simplicity and fruitfulness (Carnap 
1950a: § 1). Fruitfulness, the last and the most explicitly pragmatic of Carnap’s desiderata, deserves 
a couple of additional remarks. In the natural sciences, an explicatum is fruitful if it allows more and 
more new true empirical generalisations (for example, there are generalisations that we can make 
only using the concept of piscis instead of the concept of fish). In the case of logical concepts, an 
explicatum is fruitful to the extent that it allows us to prove more and more (true) theorems (Carnap 
1950a: ch. 1). It is less clear, however, what the fruitfulness of an explication would amount to in the 
case of different kinds of concepts (assuming there are any).xi And it is even less clear how the 
construction of formal systems could solve the philosophical problem that consists in the 
misunderstanding (or in the lack of clarity concerning the use) of the explicandum. 
Speaking as a sort of Oxonian mouthpiece of the later Wittgensteinian tradition, Strawson 
maintained that the aim of achieving conceptual clarity –– an aim that was shared by Carnap himself 
–– requires nothing but connective analysis, which “consists in the attempt to describe the complex 
patterns of logical behaviour which the concepts of daily life exhibit” (Strawson 1963: 503). This, it 
goes without saying, was the same kind of work done by most Oxford and Cambridge 
Wittgensteinians in the 1950s and 1960s. In line with the later Wittgensteinian tradition, Strawson 
claimed that in philosophy “it is not a matter of prescribing the model conduct of model words, but 
of describing the actual conduct of actual words; not a matter of making rules, but of noting customs” 
(Strawson 1963: 503). Suppose the consideration of a given philosophical problem brings a certain 
concept into play. After having accurately and insightfully described the way in which that concept 
and the related notions are used, the philosophical problem is dissolved. Nothing more is required. 
Furthermore, in order to identify, as Carnap aims to, a satisfactory explicatum for a given 
explicandum, one should understand the very source of the philosophical problem. But if, as Strawson 
  
 
claims, connective analysis is sufficient for such an understanding, then Carnap's explication 
(especially its replacement of the explicandum with a more precise explicatum) is, to say the least, 
unnecessary and therefore redundant. The possible choice of performing an explication is not 
substantial, but rather a question of philosophical taste or style. Putting it in a nutshell, one can say 
that Strawson and Carnap shared the assumption, emphasised by Wittgenstein, that philosophical 
problems and perplexities result from “an inappropriate use of language” (Carnap 1963b), whereas 
their main point of disagreement concerned the role and the status of ordinary language in philosophy: 
Strawson, following Wittgenstein, seemed to think that “ordinary language is all right” (Wittgenstein 
1958: 28), and that philosophical problems arise from a misunderstanding or an abuse of language, 
typically by philosophers, whereas Carnap maintained that ordinary language itself is often inherently 
contradictory, mistaken and confused. They also diverged in their philosophical style, mainly because 
of the use –– or the lack of use –– of technically sophisticated tools. 
As is suggested by the Strawson-Carnap debate on metaphilosophy and philosophical style, 
philosophers in Oxford were rather hostile to logical positivism: in the 1950s Ayer was under the 
crossfire of Ryle, who held most academic power in Oxford, and Austin, who in his lectures spent a 
lot of time caricaturing and ultimately destroying his philosophical theories (Mehta 1963: 51-52; see 
also Rée 1993: 9). In particular, the above-mentioned negative attitude taken by Geach towards 
Carnap was the rule among the Wittgensteinians. As has been already emphasised above, Black 
criticised Carnap’s semantics in 1948. Geoffrey J. Warnock used to affirm: “I would like to say in 
very plain terms that I am not, nor is any philosopher of my acquaintance, a Logical Positivist” 
(Warnock 1956: 124; see also Rée 1993). And when in 1949 he reviewed Carnap’s Meaning and 
Necessity, Ryle stated that “both Frege’s and Carnap’s theories [of meaning] are either erroneous or 
worse,” accusing Carnap of being “guilty of hypostatisation,” because of his commitment to the 
mistaken ‘Fido’-Fido conception of meaning (i.e., the Augustinian conception of meaning, as 
Wittgenstein used to call it). Then Ryle concluded caustically: 
 
My chief impression of this book is that it is an astonishing blend of technical 
sophistication with philosophical naïveté. Its theories belong to the age that 
waxed with Mill and began to wane soon after the Principles of Mathematics. 
The muddled terminology of extension and intension which belonged to the 
muddled and obsolete doctrine of terms is disinterred in order to help 
construct a two-dimensional relational theory of meaning, at a time when it 
ought to be notorious that relational theories of meaning will not do.  
Carnap’s influence on philosophers and logicians is very strong. The 
importance of semantic problems in philosophy and logic cannot be 
  
 
overestimated. It is because I fear that the solutions of these problems may be 
impeded by the dissemination of his mistakes that I have reviewed so 
scoldingly the treatise of a thinker whose views are beginning to be regarded 
as authoritative. (Ryle 1949/2009: 243) 
 
Therefore, a first possible answer to the question –– Why did the Wittgensteinians not provide a 
commensurate response to Quine’s attack on analyticity? –– is that they were rather hostile to Carnap 
and somewhat naïvely applied the maxim: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend”. 
A related but partly different conjecture is that the Wittgensteinians noticed some undeniable 
affinities between Wittgenstein and Quine: the conception of meaning as use; the related rejection of 
semantic platonism (Quine’s “myth of the museum” and Wittgenstein myth of meaning as  
Bedeutungskörper); epistemological anti-foundationalism and the criticism of “cosmic exile”; the  
view of language acquisition as based on activity and training; semantic and epistemological holism; 
the rejection of de re necessity (Hacker 1996: 189-93; see also Quine 1960b; Wittgenstein 1953: §§ 
138, 559).xi In this regard, it is worth noting that Quine himself sometimes adopted an attitude 
towards linguistic philosophy in which emphasis was placed on areas of agreement, rather than of 
disagreement, especially when he had to draw a line between Anglo-American analytic philosophy 
on the one hand, and “continental” philosophy on the other hand. Consider, for example, the general 
discussion at the 1958 Colloque de Royaumont, in which he took part together with Oxford 
philosophers such as Ryle, Austin, Strawson, Hare, Williams, and Urmson. In front of Chaïm 
Perelman, who chaired the discussion, and several French and Belgian philosophers such as Jean 
Wahl, Marc-André Béra, Ferdinand Alquié, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Herman Van Breda and Lucien 
Goldmann, Quine uttered rather conciliatory words towards Oxford linguistic philosophy:  
 
I have been asked whether I agree with Ryle and Austin. I certainly agree with 
them to a very large extent, and in particular regarding everything that one 
could refer to as method. In what I do or try to do, I am perhaps not so close 
to them and their group or what has been called the Oxford School, even 
though we have common views on some points. In any case, I believe that a 
common trait unites us: that our activities are focused on language. I believe 
that one of the main reasons that we prefer to focus on language is that if we 
deal directly with the problems of the foundations of reality, we are in danger 
of introducing a set of presuppositions that touch underlying conceptual 
schemes relating to the most deeply rooted habits of thinking and feeling, so 
that none of the participants can oppose their own point of view to that of the 
  
 
others without seemingly being guilty of a petition of principle. (Royaumont 
1958/2018: 226) 
 
Then he emphasised the common use of the method of semantic ascent: in other words, the main 
common ground seemed to be the rejection of metaphysics, understood as “the direct discussion of 
the fundamental features of reality”: 
 
Now, here is the trick: transposing the ontological discussion to a discussion 
of language in such a way as to insist no longer on this or that presumed 
irreducible ontological fact, but more on the methodological assets or goals 
that favour this or that discursive ontological theory. The trick is to avoid a 
direct discussion of the fundamental features of reality, so as to turn, rather, 
to the discussion of the pragmatic virtues of theories about reality.  
 The usefulness of such an approach that prompts us to retreat from the 
conceptual to the semantic level, and focus on the way we speak about things 
instead of focusing on things spoken of, remains, even if one thinks, as I 
continue to think, that the fundamental problems regarding conceptual 
schemes are of the same kind as the fundamental problems of physical science 
or of mathematical logic. (Royaumont 1958/2018: 226) 
 
The last remark alluded to the continuity between science and philosophy, i.e., the main consequence 
of Quine’s rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction. But Quine just passed through it very 
quickly, focusing instead on “the common views,” “in particular regarding everything that one could 
refer to as method.” Seen in retrospect, Quine’s description and evaluation were quite misleading. 
First, we now know that the main point of disagreement between Quine and linguistic philosophers 
was a metaphilosophical and methodological one. Second, as Mathieu Marion recently noticed, “it is 
telling … –– and the discussion [at Royaumont] makes it clear –– that analytic philosophers felt under 
the pressure to provide reasons for their rejection of metaphysics,” but “no one discussed Quine’s 
critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, which re-opened the door to metaphysics. The critique 
loomed large in the background, given that the debate often revolves, throughout the meeting, around 
the ‘two kinds of knowledge’ thesis. Lack of preparation is the culprit here” (Marion 2018: 205). 
Yet another reason why most Wittgensteinians avoided facing the Quinean issue of analyticity 
might be that they assumed or took for granted that the job had already been done successfully by 
Grice and Strawson in their article ‘In Defense of a Dogma,’ published in 1956 in The Philosophical 
Review. In agreement with Carnap’s reply to Quine (Carnap 1963b), Grice and Strawson summarised 
  
 
the main theme of Quine’s article as follows:  
 
There is a certain circle or family of expressions, of which ‘analytic’ is one, 
such that if any one member of the circle could be taken to be satisfactorily 
understood or explained, then other members of the circle could be verbally, 
and hence satisfactorily, explained in terms of it… Unfortunately each 
member of the family is in as great need of explanation as any other. (Grice 
and Strawson 1956: 147) 
 
They noticed that the existence of borderline or dubious cases is not a real worry, considering that 
there are indeed clear cases as well (in fact, the existence of the former, disputable cases presupposes 
the existence of the latter, uncontroversial ones), and also that the philosophical community often 
applied the analytic-synthetic distinction to an open class of cases (Glock 2003b: 73). Moreover, 
supposing it is controversial whether the sentence ‘What is coloured is extended’ really is analytic, it 
is no less controversial whether this very sentence is true (Grice and Strawson 1956: 1953-4; see also 
Carnap 1963b). More generally, they pointed out that Quine adopted too strict a conception of 
satisfactory explanation, a conception that “should take the form of a pretty strict definition but should 
not make use of any member of a group of interdefinable terms to which the expression belongs” 
(Grice and Strawson 1956: 148). According to Grice and Strawson, it is dubious whether any such 
explanation, any ‘reductive analysis’ of this kind, can ever be given, not only for intensional notions 
but even for extensional ones (Grice and Strawson 1956: 148). On the other hand, they stressed that 
conceptual explanation often takes the form of a connective, non-reductive analysis, in which 
conceptual circularity is illuminating rather than vicious. 
A further conjecture one could formulate in order to understand the later Wittgensteinians’ (too) 
tepid reaction towards Quine’s attack on Carnap has to do with the core-periphery relationship 
between the US and the UK briefly outlined in chapter 2 above, as well as with the social conditions 
of academic philosophy in Britain during the 1950s. Britain was not just a periphery or, for that 
matter, a semi-periphery:xi it was a very special periphery, namely, the former core, and it took a while 
for British philosophers to become aware of the “downgrade”. Moreover, most linguistic 
philosophers in Oxford were patently upper class,xi having received an élite education either in 
Oxford or, to a lesser extent, in Cambridge. The social context of Oxford linguistic philosophy, 
characterised by the presence of upper-class philosophers in a special periphery, which not many 
decades earlier used to be the geopolitical and philosophical core, was something that Gellner had 
noticed and emphasised sooner and probably better than anyone else, linking it to the 
metaphilosophical ideal based on the slogan “Philosophy leaves everything as it is”. In an interview 
  
 
with Ved Mehta, he summarised the sociological analysis he provided in Words and Things in the 
following terms: 
 
Philosophers in the past were proud of changing the world and providing a 
guide for political life. Around the turn of the century, Oxford was a nursery 
for running an empire; now it is a nursery for leaving the world exactly as it 
is. The linguistic philosophers have their job cut out for them — to rationalise 
the loss of English power. This is the sociological background which is 
absolutely crucial to the understanding of linguistic philosophers. 
(Mehta 1963: 37–38)xi 
 
As Jonathan Rée rightly stressed, Gellner’s sociology of academia was rather plausible: an inspection 
of Who’s Who shows that all (except one) of Oxford’s leading philosophers in the 1950s came from 
a high-bourgeois family, and all of them were undergraduates at Oxford (except one, who went to 
Cambridge instead).xi  Their social basis was extremely narrow, even by the standards of other 
disciplines in Oxford, and it had several features in common with that of the Bloomsbury 
intellectuals: “Certainly they spoke with the same accents; they liked to make use of French phrases; 
and –– as Russell observed –- they were ‘gentlemanly’ in their aversion from taking things too 
seriously (Rée 1993: 16). 
One of the consequences of this social climate was that professors of philosophy in Oxford used 
to regard their philosophical preferences and interests as ultimately self-justified. In particular, they 
did not feel the need to justify their work to the external public, understood in a broad sense, so as to 
include non-professional readers, non-Oxonian people and non-philosophical disciplines. It is likely 
that Ryle was the best candidate to personify this attitude. Consider for example his reluctance to 
justify his conception of philosophy during a conversation with Bryan Magee in 1971. The 
conversation deserves to be quoted at some length, not only because –– as Austin famously put  it –
– “le style, c’est Ryle” (Austin 1950), but also because the word choice and the overall verbal pose 
seem to be relevant indicators of an attitude expressing a sense of intellectual and social sophistication 
and superiority.xi When required to acknowledge and justify, rather than simply ignore, well-known 
theories such as for example Freud’s psychoanalysis, with which the main thesis defended in The 
Concept of Mind seemed to be incompatible, Ryle replied: 
 
Well, I don’t feel very penitent. I’d never studied any psychology, and I felt 
as unwilling to stick my neck out on technical questions of, oh, for example, 
radar, astronomy, or chemistry. I don’t know the ground so I don’t want to 
  
 
step on it. (Magee 1971: 131) 
 
When, later on, Magee mentioned Russell’s criticism, according to which “it was pointless to write 
about matters like sensations and perception if you weren’t thoroughly familiar with what 
neurologists, opticians, psychologists and other empirical observers had said about them,” Ryle just 
remarked: 
 
It’s a pretty familiar kind of criticism… Russell thought one ought to know a 
lot about, say, the rods and the cones in the eye, and I don’t pretend to know 
anything about them, and, if I may speak a bit rudely, I don’t want to. (Magee 
1971: 132) 
 
Neither was he impressed by the possible doubts of “the intelligent layman” –– a further figure 
introduced by Magee during the conversation –– “who doesn’t know much philosophy” but “may 
genuinely wonder how it is that you can deal with perceptual questions if you don’t know about the 
rods and cones in the eye” (Magee 1971: 132). 
Arguably, Quine’s attack on analyticity could ultimately be regarded as a request for justification 
addressed to any linguistic or conceptual philosophy. This was something unacceptable from the 
standpoint of Ryle’s and other linguistic philosophers’ self-justifying attitude. Therefore indifference 
and nonchalance, rather than explicit response, turned out to be a natural –– though, in retrospect, 
weak –– response. 
All this has to do with what is arguably the most important reason why the Wittgensteinians did 
not make the attempt to nip the Quinean revolution in the bud. It seems reasonable to conjecture that  
at that time most of them lacked the historical awareness to realise fully that the Quine-Carnap debate 
on analyticity (and the related issues) was not just a discussion among a rising philosopher (who 
apparently shared some philosophical views and attitudes with the later Wittgenstein) and his 
authoritative, but in a certain sense declining, teacher (whom, incidentally, many of them did not like 
at all); rather, that debate was part –– more precisely, it was both effect and expression –– of a much 
wider process taking place after the second world war, not only in philosophy but more generally in 
the humanities, especially in the United States. All this suggests that though it may be interesting to 
ask why the Wittgensteinians behaved as if the philosophical tradition to which they belonged were 
not challenged philosophically and metaphilosophically by Quine’s epoch-making attack on Carnap, 
nonetheless, the really interesting question is: What objective conditions made Quine’s attack so 
successful and epoch-making, so as to indirectly demolish, or at least weaken, the Wittgensteinian 
tradition, which was not his direct polemical target? The following will provide a brief description of 
  
 
this objective context. 
4.2 A Scientifically Oriented Culture. Philosophy, Economics, and the Humanities 
As briefly recalled in chapter 2 above, the 1950s and 1960s were a time of exponential expansion and 
deep transformation for higher education in the United States. At the time of the first world war, 
scientific research had been exclusively contracted to military scientists. During the second world 
war things changed and events such as for example the Manhattan project, which was dedicated to 
producing the first nuclear weapons, employed hundreds of thousands of people and billions of US 
dollars. In 1945 a crucial innovation was introduced by Vannevar Bush, the former Vice President 
and Dean of Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and later on the director of the 
government Office of Scientific Research and Development during the second world war (Menand 
2010: 124): Bush delivered an influential report to the US President, in which he argued that the 
federal government should be committed to providing conspicuous funding for fundamental 
knowledge and basic scientific research, not only in the context of applied research and technological 
development directly linked to immediate social and military concerns. Arguing that without basic, 
unconstrained research, industrial development would stagnate in the long run, he fostered a new type 
of collaboration between American universities and the national government (Schauz and Kaldewey 
2018: 1-3; Elzinga 2012: 419; see also Menand 2010: 125). Soon afterwards, economists such as 
Gary Becker and Theodore Schultz introduced the concept of human capital, thus stressing a related 
point and providing a further reason for government investments in higher education: educated 
citizens were to be regarded as a strategic resource for the nation (Menand 2010: 127-128). 
Not only did the huge expansion of higher education take place during the post-war baby boom, 
in a period of relatively high domestic economic growth (Menand 2010: 121), but, as is well-known, 
the cold war also acted as a major driver of investments in scientific research (Elzinga 2012: 418): 
the investments kept on increasing, since the connection between science and national defence 
became tighter, so as to put American universities systematically at the service of government-related 
scientific research. Events such as the Sputnik launch by the Soviet Union in 1957 fostered the 
international competition and the advent of so-called “big science,” based on large-scale projects 
funded by huge public investments. These projects were, as Aant Elzinga put it, clearly a 
“continuation of politics by other means” (Elzinga 2012: 416). Besides the Department of Defence, 
other sources of funding, such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National 
Science Foundation, and the National Institutes of Health acquired a relevant role (Menand 2010: 
127). 
From the point of view of the present investigation, one of the developments fostered by the 
expansion of American higher education outlined above is particularly relevant, namely, the 
widespread dominance of a scientific model in academic research, including research in humanities 
  
 
and social sciences (Menand 2010: 137-138; see also Steinmetz 2005). Humanities were 
methodologically modelled on natural sciences: this process, which occurred in the American 
academia from the mid-1940s to the late-1960s, has been insightfully described as a “new rigourism 
in the human sciences” (Schorske 1998), whereas the epistemological tradition and intellectual 
culture relating to this methodological transformation have been called the “scientific philosophy” 
paradigm in human sciences (Isaac 2012: 6 and 28). The latter label explicitly evokes the title of a 
1945 influential book, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, which was written by Hans Reichenbach 
after his emigration to the United States with the “intention of showing that philosophy has proceeded 
from speculation to science” (Reichenbach 1945: vii). This science-oriented epistemological and 
methodological attitude or spirit concerned several disciplines, from economics to linguistics, from 
English literature to sociology, from social and institutional history to psychology, from political 
science to philosophy (Bender and Schorske 1998).xi The new disciplinary order in the humanities 
was not created in the form of a single, unifying research project, but rather in the form of a plurality 
of different projects connected by a web of resemblances: among them, rational choice theory, 
structural-functional sociology, information theory, behaviourism, operational research, systems 
engineering, modernisation theory and cognitive science (Isaac 2012: 9). Something like a common 
pattern is discernible in most of these projects (Schorske 1998: 309):xi the emergence of a new 
scientific style based on the demand for rigour, clarity and precision; the construction of general and 
systematic theories and the adoption of a certain conception of causal explanation; an ahistorical spirit 
and the rejection of the old narrative style; mathematisation, formalism, and technical specialisation; 
a quest for objectivity, including ethical and political neutrality and value-free methodology;xi the 
claim that in the social sciences the individual, “conceived of as a culturally programmed human 
agent,” is the basic explanatory factor (on the last point, see Isaac 2012: 9). 
Harvard University is a particularly revealing place to gain insight into the process outlined above. 
As shown by Joel Isaac, in the Harvard complex’s “interstitial academy”, i.e. in “the realms of 
intellectual engagement that existed [in Harvard] between more established or specialised discipline-
based departments or schools” (2012: 23), new humanistic disciplines arose and old scientific 
disciplines were deeply transformed: sociology, anthropology, social psychology, management 
science, history, sociology and philosophy of science, and, what is most relevant for the present 
purposes, analytic philosophy. Both faculty members and students became acquainted with the 
scientific spirit of the new rigourism in the human sciences by meeting their peers in clubs, societies 
and seminars such as “the Royce Club, the Pareto circle, the Society of Fellows, Alfred North 
Whitehead’s Cambridge salon, the Science of Science Discussion group, the Inter-Science Discussion 
Group, the Institute for the Unity of Science in Boston, the Department of Social Relations and the 
General Education Program of James Bryant Conant” (Isaac 2012: 23). 
  
 
Among these new humanistic projects, which flourished at the extra-professional crossroads of 
the interstitial academia, there were for example Percy Williams Bridgman’s operationalism (then 
brought to the humanities by Stanley Stevens), Burrhus Frederic Skinner’s behaviourism, Talcott 
Parsons’s general theory of action and Robert Merton’s sociology of science (Isaac 2012: 24; see also 
Hands 2007: 9).xi Yet another example is, of course, the rise of analytic philosophy in America. In the 
1950s and 1960s, not least thanks to the interdisciplinary and extradisciplinary exchanges in Harvard, 
Quine started to forge analytic philosophy in America; his attack on Carnap’s analyticity was a crucial 
part, perhaps the most important component of the initial part, of the forging process. As witnessed 
by Putnam, in that period analytic philosophy started to adopt the scientific rather than humanistic 
self-image, which is still one of its hallmarks (Putnam 1997: 201).xi One step in this process was the 
adoption of Quine’s methodological naturalism, based on the claim of the continuity between 
philosophy and the natural sciences, which was in turn a consequence, it goes without saying, of his 
rejecting Carnap’s two dogmas. Another feature of the same process was the ahistorical or even 
antihistorical biases of analytic philosophy, typically epitomised by Quine in his autobiography: 
 
Science and the history of science appeal to very different tempers. An 
advance in science resolves an obscurity, a tangle, a complexity, an 
inelegance, that the scientist then gratefully dismisses and forgets. The 
historian of science tries to recapture the very tangles, confusions and 
obscurities from which the scientist is so eager to free himself. (Quine 1985: 
194) 
 
Yet another aspect of the process described here is the end of eclecticism: as recently shown by Katzav 
and Vaesen in their quasi-quantitative review of the articles published in The Philosophical Review 
from the 1930s to the 1960s, the main feature of Anglo-American philosophy prior to the 1960s was 
“philosophical pluralism and a widespread commitment to addressing meta-philosophical issues 
related to such pluralism” (Katzav and Vaesen 2017, 774). The pluralistic attitude was later 
abandoned, mainly because of a change in the journal’s editorial policy. Something similar happened 
in other philosophical journals too, so that the transformation of (a significant part of) American 
philosophy into analytic philosophy was also the result of the exclusion, at the institutional level, of 
the pluralistic approach (see also Katzav 2018). The end of pluralism went hand in hand with 
specialisation and the launch of specifically philosophical research programmes: to mention but a 
few of them, Quine-inspired ontological studies and Carnap’s twenty-year focus on probability, 
induction and confirmation were early, pioneering examples (Carnap 1950a; Quine 1960b), whereas 
later examples were Richard Montague’s and Donald Davidson’s programmes in semantics, as well 
  
 
as the great variety of epistemological programs, regarded as possible responses to the problem posed 
by Edmund Gettier (Montague 1970, Davidson 1984b, Gettier 1963).xi 
The specialisation process was also connected with the use of more technical tools such as logical 
formalism. This caused, among other things, the sudden disappearance, in the 1960s, of an old and 
until then authoritative philosophical world, a world that was in previous decades still alive on the 
Anglo-American philosophical scene: the world in which it was natural to refer to different logical 
traditions, based on non-mathematical kinds of logic, and connected to the names of philosophers 
such as Bradley, Hegel and above all Dewey (Bonino, Maffezioli, Tripodi, unpublished manuscript).xi 
Moreover, in the age of the cold war and McCarthyism, and, in addition, as a consequence of the 
huge quantity of federal money poured into the universities, analytic philosophy grew under the 
influence of the “end of ideology” ideology (Bell 1962; Vaesen and Katzav 2019; Menand 2010: 140; 
see also Amadae 2003). One may conjecture that even the great success of Reichenbach’s distinction 
between the context of discovery and the context of justification could be explained by referring to 
the cold war climate: internal, philosophical arguments were preferred, whereas external, socio-
economic explanations of philosophy were avoided.xi 
Professionalisation and homogenisation of analytic philosophy in the 1950s and 1960s were also 
fostered by organisations such as the RAND Corporation, whose Mathematics Division attracted 
some logicians and analytic philosophers (Rescher 2005). These analytic philosophers –– Quine, 
Tarski (one of Quine’s logical and philosophic polestars)xi and Nicholas Rescher amongst them ––
were usually involved in projects concerning game theory and related topics. In the heyday of the 
debate with Carnap on analyticity, at RAND Quine produced five contributions: ‘Commutative 
Boolean Functions’ (1949); ‘On Functions of Relations with Special Reference to Social Welfare’ 
(1949); ‘A Theorem on Parametric Boolean Functions’ (1949); ‘A Simplification of Games in 
Extensive Form’ (1951) (https://www.rand.org). 
At RAND, as well as in the Harvard academic complex, extra-philosophical influences were very 
important in shaping Quine’s philosophy. As is well-known, his main aim in ontology was to fill out 
the complete inventory of the universe, on the basis of the ontological commitment of the best 
scientific theories available. The best theories in question belonged no doubt to physics. It is not 
surprising that the leading science advisers who influenced the research policy discourse were often, 
indeed, physicists. As Elzinga insightfully emphasised, these scientists “tended to define the 
boundary between science and society in terms of concepts that portrayed themselves as ‘truth 
speaking to power’. This is a tradition that continued in new forms when in the next generation 
molecular biologists and environmental scientists successively entered the policy advisory arena” 
(2012: 419). As is even better-known, Quine was also influenced, especially in the study of language, 
by the behaviourist perspective defended by his Harvard colleague Fred Skinner in his Verbal 
  
 
Behavior (Quine 1960b and Skinner 1957; see also Føllesdal 2011). Moreover, he was significantly 
conditioned by the Pareto circle in Harvard: for example, scholars have recently come to agree, both 
on the basis of a qualitative analysis (Isaac 2012: 70) and on the basis of quantitative, data-driven 
research (Betti, van den Berg et al. 2019), that Quine acquired the fundamental notion of ‘conceptual 
scheme’ from the legacy of Vilfredo Pareto via the mediation of the biochemist Lawrence Joseph 
Henderson, the founder of the Pareto circle.xi 
One of the most interesting issues in the broad area of post-war intellectual history in the United 
States is the relationship and, in particular, the similarity between economics and analytic 
philosophy.xi As a consequence of the work of economists such as John Hicks, Franco Modigliani, 
Robert Solow, James Tobin and Paul Samuelson, in the mid-1950s a consensus view in 
macroeconomics emerged in the United States, lasting for at least twenty years (Blanchard 2008). It 
was labelled ‘neoclassical synthesis’ by Samuelson in 1955, in the third edition of his Economics: An 
Introductory Analysis, originally published in 1948 and arguably the single most influential economic 
textbook of the second half of the twentieth century (Samuelson 1955: 212).xi The synthesis was 
based on the attempt to combine or perhaps absorb some insights derived from the theory of 
employment presented by Keynes in his 1936 General Theory with the older marginalist tradition of 
Alfred Marshall, Stanley Jevons, Léon Walras and others (Roncaglia 2005: 282; see also Keynes 
1936 and Marshall 1890).xi From a methodological point of view, the synthesis was characterised by 
the search for a unified theoretical framework based on the mathematisation of economics, in 
particular on the development of mathematical models for economics. In 1947, in his most influential 
research work, Foundations of Economic Analysis, Samuelson wrote: 
 
The existence of analogies between central features of various theories 
implies the existence of a general theory which underlies the particular 
theories and unifies them with respect to those central features. This 
fundamental principle of generalisation by abstraction was enunciated by the 
eminent American mathematician E.H. Moore more than thirty years ago. It 
is the purpose of the pages that follow to work out its implications for 
theoretical and applied economics. (Samuelson 1947: 3; see also Moore 1915) 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the neoclassical synthesis relied on the attempt to found 
macroeconomics on microeconomics, and this in turn presupposed the faith in the Homo oeconomicus 
model of rationality, according to which economic individual agents are largely rational and tend to 
maximise utility as consumers as well as producers. As Modigliani clearly put it in the introduction 
to his collected papers: 
  
 
 
[One of the] basic themes that has dominated my scientific concern [has been 
to integrate] the main building blocks of the General Theory with the more 
established methodology of economics, which rests on the basic postulate of 
rational maximizing behaviour on the part of economic agents. (Modigliani 
1980: xi) 
 
A brief focus on the figure of Paul Samuelson seems to be promising if one aims to compare 
economics and analytic philosophy during les trente glorieuses, 1945-1975 (Fourastié 1979; 
Hobsbawm 1994). Samuelson and Quine were personally acquainted and often discussed together 
(Samuelson 1998: 1377; Weintraub 1991: 64). Both of them worked at Cambridge, MA: at Harvard 
at the beginning, whereas since the 1940 Samuelson had moved to the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. Both of them attended the Pareto circle and the Science of Science Discussion Group 
organised by Stevens, whose participants included, among others, Quine’s and Samuelson’s teachers, 
that is, respectively, Rudolf Carnap and Joseph Schumpeter (Hands 2007: 9; Hardcastle 1995; see 
also Samuelson 1951). Both of them were involved in RAND corporation in the same years 
(www.rand.org). Moreover, there were also many intellectual and philosophical similarities and 
connections among them. In a nutshell, Samuelson was, as it were, the Quine of economics:xi the 
most influential American author in the first thirty years after the Second World War in his discipline, 
and one of the founders of the new mainstream; one of the few, perhaps the only one, who could be 
regarded as the incarnation of the scientific establishment; a “natural” systematiser, a skilful 
disseminator and a “populariser”; the one mainly responsible for the mathematisation of the discipline 
(on this latter point see Barnett 2004: 519). But the similarities also go beyond the general. As a motto 
on the opening page of his Foundations, Samuelson wrote, following his mathematical mentor J. 
Willard Gibbs: “Mathematics is a language” (Samuelson 1947);xi as is well-known, Quine made the 
very distinction between language and theory disappear or collapse (Hylton 2007: 74). Both 
Samuelson and Quine promoted the naturalisation of their disciplines, and both regarded physics as 
the science par excellence, and the model to imitate methodologically and epistemologically; as 
Samuelson Quineanly put it: “If we enumerate one by one the alleged differences between the social 
sciences and other sciences, we find no differences in kind” (1952: 61).xi Moreover, Samuelson’s 
neoclassical synthesis was based on two main methodological norms: to face and solve an economic 
problem, “(1) reduce the number of variables, and keep only a minimum set of simple economic 
relations; and (2) if possible, rewrite it as a constrained optimisation problem” (Barnett 2004: 521). 
There seem to be loose but structural analogies with Quine’s ontological procedure: (1) translate the 
theories into a canonical notation, so as to make explicit their ontological commitment; (2) avoid the 
  
 
overpopulated ontological jungles, favouring desert landscapes instead (Quine 1948).  
A last point concerns methodological individualism, a term introduced by Schumpeter in 1908 to 
denote a reductionist view earlier expounded by Menger in the 1880s, and later accepted and 
defended by Hayek, Popper, Watkins, and by Samuelson himself, a view according to which 
“explanations of social phenomena should appeal only to facts about individual people” (Currie 2001: 
9755; see also Heath 2015): arguably, the most important milestone of every rational choice-based 
economics. There seems to be a historically interesting relationship between methodological 
individualism and Quine’s philosophy. First, methodological individualism is loosely linked with 
Quine’s ontological nominalism (conceived of in terms of the rejection of abstract entities; see 
Goodman and Quine 1947): given that, properly speaking, the two theses are very different from each 
other, in this context it would be pedantic to discuss to what extent and under what specific conditions 
(if any) the two theses would be logically or theoretically connected, since, as Martin Kusch made 
explicit at the end of his book on psychologism, philosophical controversies and debates are fuzzy 
and “often the members of the camps that disagreed can be identified only with hindsight”; moreover, 
they “are followed by a wider audience of scholars in other fields and by the public at large, and 
philosophers have no qualms about strengthening their position in the eyes of these larger audiences 
by linking their opponents’ views to unreason and moral defect” (Kusch 1995: 270);xi transposed into 
the present context, this means that Samuelson’s methodological individualism and Quine’s 
ontological nominalism could have looked like compatible or even allied doctrines to many, from a 
distant and unspecialised perspective, simply because both theories were committed to the existence 
of, and attributed a primary explanatory role to, spatiotemporal individuals (things or persons called 
‘individuals’). Secondly, and less conjecturally, at RAND Quine himself worked within the social 
science paradigm of methodological individualism, especially when he discussed Kenneth Arrows’s 
theorems on individual preferences (Salles 2017). 
 
4.3 Grammar, Anthropology, and the Autonomy of Humanistic Understanding 
From the point of view adopted in the present book, there are some morals to draw from the  story 
told so far. The issue of the “two cultures,” as C.P. Snow described it in his influential Rede Lecture 
delivered in 1959, was widely discussed both in Britain and in the United States (Snow 1959/2001; 
see also Leavis 1962/2013 and Collini 2013). But in the older faculties, in which the science-oriented 
transformation of the humanities was more difficult to understand and accept, the age of new 
rigourism was interpreted in terms of a crisis. Crisis in the Humanities is the title of a representative 
and then successful book edited by the Cambridge historian John H. Plumb and published in 1964. 
The book focused on the crisis of the classics, history, divinity studies, literary education, fine arts, 
sociology and economics in the new historical and cultural context; the chapter devoted to philosophy 
  
 
was assigned to Gellner (Plumb 1964; Gellner 1964). In a period of economic expansion, the use of 
the term ‘crisis’ did not mean that the “old” humanists were expelled from the universities; quite the 
opposite was true, in fact (however, notice that that kind of process, that kind of crisis in the 
humanities, would start later, during the economic recession in the mid-1970s, and will be briefly 
dealt with in chapter 7 below). In the 1950s and 1960s the crisis of the humanities concerned at the 
same time the identity of the human sciences, their institutional place and their overall social 
consideration. In the introduction to the volume, Plumb described the process quite well from his 
viewpoint (a British viewpoint, as is worth noticing):xi 
 
A hundred, fifty, even twenty years ago, a tradition of culture, based on the 
Classics, on Scripture, on History and Literature, bound the governing classes 
together and projected the image of a gentleman. It was a curious mixture of 
humanistic principles and national pride. 
… These subjects – History, Classics, Literature, and Divinity – were, with 
Mathematics, the core of the educational system and were believed to have 
peculiar virtues in producing politicians, civil servants, Imperial 
administrators and legislators. 
… Alas, the rising tide of industrial societies, combined with the battering of 
two World Wars, has shattered the confidence of humanists in their capacity 
to lead or to instruct. Uncertain of their social function their practitioners have 
taken refuge in two desperate courses – both suicidal. Either they blindly cling 
to their traditional attitudes and pretend their function is what it was and that 
all will be well so long as change is repelled, or they retreat into their own 
private professional world and deny any social function to their subject. And 
so the humanities are at the cross-roads, at a crisis in their existence: they 
must either change the image that they present, adapt themselves to the needs 
of a society dominated by science and technology, or retreat into social 
triviality. (Plumb 1964: 7-8) 
 
The former solution, that of riding the tide and adapting the humanities and their self-image to the 
changing world and culture, was chosen, for example, by Samuelson in economics and Quine in 
philosophy. The latter solution was adopted in Oxford, in the milieu in which not only Ryle but most 
linguistic philosophers did not feel the need to provide any justification for their philosophical work 
and interests. That was a classist and classicist world, which Gellner described in Veblenesque terms 
(i.e., in terms of conspicuous triviality) because of its upper-class character and its connection with 
  
 
the view of philosophy as an ostentatiously pure, humanistic and “useless” activity, a perfect case of 
“art pour l’art” (Gellner 1959/1979: 37). At that time undergraduates who studied philosophy in 
Oxford could follow either the older and highly respected “Greats” course (Honour School of Literae 
Humaniores), which included a lot of Greek and Latin classics, or “Modern Greats” (Honour School 
of Philosophy, Politics and Economics), introduced in about 1920 for students lacking a background 
in classical languages (Forguson 2001: 328). As H.H. Price clearly explained in a note on ‘The Study 
of Philosophy at Oxford,’ published in 1953 in the context of an international Unesco enquiry on The 
Teaching of Philosophy: “For many years the school of Literae Humaniores enjoyed great prestige in 
this country, and indeed in other English-speaking countries, and it retains very considerable prestige 
to this day” (Price 1953: 129). Of course, this is not to suggest that, say, the Harvard and MIT science-
oriented philosophical world was not classist; it is very likely that it was so, though in a different way. 
However, as should be clear enough at this point, the above-described American intellectual and 
academic world was also, or was becoming much more quickly, less classicist. 
Last, but not least, Wittgenstein was a strenuous advocate of the autonomy of humanistic 
understanding, and the later Wittgensteinian tradition fully and stubbornly belonged to humanism in 
the old, non-rigourist and non-scientific-oriented sense of the term (Hacker 2001, von Wright 
1979/1993; see also Williams 2000 and Read 2012). Some aspects of this issue have been already 
discussed in chapter 3 above, in the context of the outlined comparison between Wittgenstein’s and 
Carnap’s Weltanschauungen. However, a few more specific comments may be useful here. First of 
all, arguably Wittgenstein would not have objected to the application to the realm of mathematics of 
E.H. Moore’s principle of generalisation by abstraction quoted approvingly by Samuelson (“The 
existence of analogies between central features of various theories implies the existence of a more 
fundamental general theory embracing the special theories as particular instances and unifying them 
as to those central features”) (see for example Wittgenstein 1953: § 71). However, he 
straightforwardly rejected its application to philosophy and to Geisteswissenschaften such as 
psychology (including psychoanalysis) and anthropology (e.g., Wittgenstein 1966, 1967/1979 and 
1980b). According to Wittgenstein, in these areas the perspicuous description of the family 
resemblances among concepts, rather than the generalisation by abstraction, is a much more 
appropriate approach.  
Secondly, Wittgenstein did not accept the conception of man, shared by economists such as Arrow 
and Samuelson, according to which people are simply preference calculators. Wittgenstein did not 
focus directly on economics but, as is well known, soon after he returned to Cambridge in 1929 the 
Cambridge “Circus” –– the circle of economists strictly associated with John Maynard Keynes at the 
time when he was preparing his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) –– was 
formed. There were several personal and intellectual connections between Wittgenstein and these 
  
 
Keynesians (Richard Kahn, James Meade, Joan Robinson, Austin Robinson, and Piero Sraffa among 
them). Notice, preliminarily, that Keynes himself, as essentially a Bloomsbury man and a member of 
the intellectual aristocracy, fully belonged to the humanist tradition (Andrews 2010; see also Chabtree 
and Thirlwall 1980). In the words of Robert Skidelsky: “His was the last generation which claimed 
to direct human affairs in the name of culture rather than expertise. He addressed the world as a priest, 
not as a technician” (Skidelsky 2003: 456). He seemed to be opposed to specialisation in economics 
on principled grounds; for example, in his Essays in Biography, drawing a portrait of his teacher 
Marshall, he famously wrote: 
 
The master-economist must possess a rare combination of gifts... He must be 
mathematician, historian, statesman, philosopher — in some degree. He must 
understand symbols and speak in words. He must contemplate the particular, 
in terms of the general, and touch abstract and concrete in the same flight of 
thought. He must study the present in the light of the past for the purposes of 
the future. No part of man’s nature or his institutions must be entirely outside 
his regard. He must be purposeful and disinterested in a simultaneous mood, 
as aloof and incorruptible as an artist, yet sometimes as near to earth as a 
politician. (Keynes 1933: 170) 
 
More generally, and also more importantly, Keynes took economics to be a non-naturalised social 
science (Marchionatti and Cedrini 2016). As for the role of mathematics in economics, once again it 
is worth quoting a passage from Skidelsky’s biography: “Keynes believed that mathematics was 
useful as a check to one’s thoughts; he did not think his thoughts mathematically. He allowed his 
mathematics to rust away because, unlike Edgeworth, he was not interested in ‘mathematicising’ the 
social sciences” (Skidelsky 2003: 456). More generally, in line with Wittgenstein-inspired 
philosophers of the social sciences such as Winch, Keynes used to take the Aristotelian attitude “to 
look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits” (Aristotle 
1999, I. 3, 1094b; see also Winch 1958). Moreover, as insightfully noticed by John Coates, in an early 
draft of the General Theory written in the 1930s Keynes criticised the use of formal methods in 
economics in quasi-Wittgensteinian terms (Coates 1996: 83): “Much economic theorising today 
suffers, I think, because it attempts to apply highly precise and mathematical methods to material 
which is itself much too vague to support such treatment” (Keynes 1978, vol. XIV: 379).xi Among 
other things (the most important of which was perhaps the presence of irrational aspects in human 
behaviour), the vague nature of economic reality provided Keynes with the grounds to reject the 
Homo oeconomicus model as a reasonable explanatory factor in macroeconomics.  
  
 
As is well-known, in that period a central figure in this Cambridge plot was that of Piero Sraffa, 
whom Wittgenstein credited for providing him with the main stimulus for the most original and 
consequential ideas expressed in the Investigations (Wittgenstein 1953: viii). Sraffa had been 
influenced by Antonio Gramsci’s critique of modern culture. For example, in one of his letters from 
prison, dated 1929, Gramsci had written: “There was an abstraction determined by metaphysical 
intoxication, and there exists an abstraction determined by mathematical intoxication” (Gramsci 
1947/1994: 242; see also Sen 2003). On the basis of the adoption of Ricardian, Marxian and 
Gramscian tools, Sraffa strongly criticised the marginalist tradition in economics: its subjectivism, 
its abstract character, its overgeneralisation (what Wittgenstein would have called its dogmatism), its 
unrealistic Homo oeconomicus model, which forgets the concrete, socio-anthropological aspects of 
human life, those depending on passions, needs and, above all, class struggle (Sraffa 1926):xi it is 
worth noticing, in particular, that Wittgenstein told Rush Rhees in conversation that the most 
important thing he gained from his discussions with Sraffa was an ‘anthropological’ standpoint in 
philosophy or, more precisely, an ‘anthropological’ way of looking at things (Monk 1990: 261; see 
also Gebauer 2017); as many interpreters have observed, Wittgenstein’s move, in the 1930s, from 
“dogmatic” theories (the logically crystalline and atomistic theory of the Tractatus, as well as the 
“phenomenological” theory presented in the late 1920s) to an anti-reductionist and anti-
foundationalist philosophical anthropology had structural analogies with Sraffa’s rejection of 
marginalist economics.xi 
“Philosophical anthropology” is a keyword in the present context. As is well-know, James Frazer’s 
anthropology was one of the main and most interesting “case-studies,” which Wittgenstein himself 
took into account to criticise the application to the humanities of a model of analysis based on means-
end rationality (Bouveresse 2007: 360).xi As Wittgenstein once told Drury, the most misleading aspect 
of Frazer’s The Golden Bough was the conviction “that primitive rituals were in the nature of 
scientific errors,” rather than “expressions of deeply felt emotions, or religious awe” (Drury 1984: 
119). But this misunderstanding was not a consequence of a bad or false explanation of such rituals 
and ceremonies; the source of the mistake was the very attempt to provide an explanation 
(Bouveresse 2007: 361; see Frazer 1890 and Wittgenstein 1967/1979). Frazer’s understanding was 
prevented by his constantly asking the scientific ‘why’; in this respect he was, as Wittgenstein wrote 
in a remark from 1941, “like tourists, who stand in front of a building reading Baedeker, & through 
reading about the history of the building’s construction etc etc are prevented from seeing it” 
(Wittgenstein 1980a: 40). 
‘Philosophical anthropology’ is a well-suited term to indicate the kind of grammatical 
investigations that the Wittgensteinians kept on presenting, in the spirit of Wittgenstein, in the years 
during which, seen in retrospect, they could (or perhaps should) have considered Quine’s attack on 
  
 
analyticity with due gravity, thus preparing a defensive and responsive overall strategy. These 
investigations were descriptions of the “grammar” of philosophically relevant concepts, taken from 
ordinary language, the humanities and the social sciences, especially in the broad area they sometimes 
called ‘philosophical psychology’, even though a more appropriate label would have been that once 
suggested by Peter Hacker, i.e., indeed, ‘philosophical anthropology,’ interpreted in terms of the study 
of linguistic and non-linguistic human behaviour and practices, with a peculiar focus on the 
conceptual web of actions, norms and reasons (Hacker 2001).xi Besides books such as Anscombe’s 
Intention (Basil Blackwell, 1957) and Herbert Hart’s The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 
1961), most of these works were published by Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, in the series 
Studies in Philosophical Psychology edited by Roy Frazer Holland: among them, the above-
mentioned Mental Acts by Geach (1957) and The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to 
Philosophy by Peter Winch (1958), but also The Psychology of Perception by David H. Hamlyn 
(1957), The Concept of Motivation by Richard Stanley Peters (1958), The Unconscious: A Conceptual 
Study by Alasdair MacIntyre (1958), Dreaming by Malcolm (1959), The Varieties of Goodness by 
von Wright (1963), Free Action by Abraham Melden (1961), and Action, Emotion, and Will by 
Anthony Kenny (1963).xi All of them were descriptions of the logical or conceptual behaviour of a 
notion and its inferential web, presented with the aim of dissolving or demystifying philosophical 
problems in the area of philosophical anthropology. In the view of the Wittgensteinians, these 
problems often originated from bad intellectual habits such as the misunderstanding of language and 
its surface grammar (with the resulting category mistakes), the tendency to overgeneralise from few, 
scattered data, and above all the confusion between aims, methods and categories characteristic of 
the natural sciences and those which are appropriate to philosophy and the humanities. These 
grammatical investigations often provided the criteria for the investigated phenomena, and often did 
so by illustrating the paradigm-case method criticised by Watkins and Gellner, i.e., by providing 
examples that a semantically competent speaker is compelled to accept as correct applications of a 
given concept; otherwise he does not fully understand that concept. 
Arguably, a single place where the tension between the later Wittgensteinian tradition and the new 
rigourism in the human and social sciences is condensed is Winch’s book The Idea of a Social 
Science. Winch was aware that a later Wittgensteinian defence of the science-philosophy divide, 
together with the attempt to clarify the grammar of concepts belonging to the human and social 
sciences ran the risk of being “ranked with those reactionary anti-scientific movements, aiming to 
put the clock back, which have appeared and flourished in certain quarters since science began” 
(Winch 1958: 1-2). Equally, however, he did not retreat because of that risk: 
 
Philosophy must be on its guard against the extra-scientific pretensions of 
  
 
science. Since science is one of the chief shibboleths of the present age this 
is bound to make the philosopher unpopular; he is likely to meet a similar 
reaction to that met by someone who criticizes the monarchy. But the day 
when philosophy becomes a popular subject is the day for the philosopher to 
consider where he took the wrong turning. (Winch 1958: 2) 
 
He was also aware that linguistic philosophy was “a reaction against the ‘master-scientist’ view of 
the philosopher, according to which philosophy is in direct competition with science and aims to 
construct or refute scientific theories by purely a priori reasoning” (Winch 1958: 7). And he himself 
claimed: “Philosophical issues do, to a large extent, turn on the correct use of certain linguistic 
expressions; the elucidation of a concept is, to a large extent, the clearing up of linguistic confusions.” 
Nevertheless, at the same time he pointed out:  
 
The philosopher’s concern is not with correct usage as such and not all linguistic 
confusions are equally relevant to philosophy. They are relevant only in so far as 
the discussion of them is designed  to throw light on the question of how far reality 
is intelligible and what difference the fact that he    could have a grasp of reality 
would make to the life of man. (Winch 1958: 11) 
 
In this way, he connected the destructive element of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, namely, the 
linguistic analysis of philosophically misleading theories, with its constructive element, namely, its 
providing tools and a philosophical perspective to gain a humanistic understanding of man, culture 
and social life or, as Hacker once put it, “the guidelines for a kind of philosophical anthropology and 
hence the foundations of a philosophical understanding of humanistic studies” (Hacker 2001: 39). 
For example, Winch wrote as follows:  
 
The central problem of sociology, that of giving an account of the nature of 
social phenomena in general, itself belongs to philosophy. In fact, not to put 
too fine a point on it, this part of sociology is really misbegotten 
epistemology. I say ‘misbegotten’ because its problems have been largely 
misconstrued, and therefore mishandled, as a species of scientific problem” 
(Winch 1958: 43). 
 
In so doing Winch explicitly linked the later Wittgensteinian account of reasons (and motives) and 
rules (and habits) to the debate which originated with Dilthey in 1883, concerning the differences 
  
 
between Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften, with the more recent philosophy of history 
of Robin George Collingwood (Winch 1958: 90; see also Dilthey 1883)xi, and also with Max Weber’s 
analysis of meaningful behaviour (Winch 1958: 45). Echoing Samuelson, but the other way around, 
Winch clearly stated that the difference between the natural sciences and the social sciences are 
“differences in kind,” rather than “differences in degree” (Winch 1958: 71). Moreover, he sometimes 
took economics and economic behaviour as relevant case-studies (e.g., Winch 1958: 48-9 and 89) 
and, what is most significant, he explicitly proposed an alliance between Wittgenstein and Michael 
Oakeshott in rejecting the “‘rationalistic’ misconception of the nature of human intelligence and 
rationality” according to which “the rationality of human behaviour comes to it from without: from 
intellectual functions which operate according to laws of their own and are, in principle, quite 
independent of the particular forms of activity to which they may nevertheless be applied” (1958: 
54). He compared this misconception to a “mechanical model” (Winch 1958: 76), which forgets 
passions, emotions, and in general most practical, non-intellectual aspects of life; for example, he 
asked:  
 
Would it be intelligent to try to explain how Romeo’s love for Juliet enters 
into his behaviour in the same terms as we might want to apply to the rat 
whose sexual excitement makes him run across an electrically charged grid 
to reach his mate? Does not Shakespeare do this much better? (Winch 1958: 
77) 
 
Winch’s work was relatively widely read outside philosophy (Shook 2005: 2626).xi However, in the 
context we are focusing on in this book, namely, that of the rise of analytic philosophy in 
the United States, it did not enjoy a high reputation. Consider, as a perhaps flimsy but 
significant indication of this, the episode that occurred to Winch at the Creighton Club Meeting in 
New York in 1961. Winch gave a talk on the possibility of understanding systems of thinking very 
alien to our own. As Winch himself once recalled, the paper “was received at the conference almost 
universally with either derision or anger. Norman [Malcolm] was about the only person there who 
seemed to me to understand what I was saying –– but that was perhaps because he [Malcolm] was 
the only one who offered me any support” (Winch 1992: 223). It is not surprising that Malcolm was 
also one of the very few who some years later, in the 1980s, would undertake the transatlantic travel 
the other way around, in order to spend his last years in London. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
xi It is of course a matter of interpretation if Wittgenstein really takes Moore’s truisms as playing in our life a role similar 
to that of grammatical rules. Here I am following a reading similar to that provided by Annalisa Coliva, according to 
which in On Certainty Wittgenstein criticises Moore for considering such truisms as empirical sentences, whereas 
  
 
they are special in their being normative and, in fact, constitutive of our rationality (Coliva 2010). 
xi The very existence of the recent debate on this issue, starting from Stanley and Williamson (2001), can be a sign 
(though of course not proof) that the issue was still not resolved in the 1950s. 
xi Malcolm (1940), Lewy (1940), Toulmin (1949), Lazerowitz (1949), von Wright (1949/1957), Waismann (1949, 1950, 
1951, 1952, 1953), Pears (1950, 1952, 1953), Black (1958a), and Stenius (1965). 
xi Under this respect their understanding of Wittgenstein’s views, as well as their philosophical self-understanding, 
seems not to agree with the interpretation provided by Scott Soames, according to which “it is hard not to see the 
double identification of the philosophical with (a subset of) the necessary and the apriori, and of these with the analytic, 
as central to the problem [for Wittgenstein’s philosophy]. Like so many other analytic philosophers in the twentieth 
century, Wittgenstein comes to grief over assumptions about these different modalities that he takes to be obvious” 
(Soames 2003: 30; see also 2003: 60). 
xi Personal communication, 2005. 
xi The case of von Wright is particularly interesting. As a young man, he received a Carnapian philosophical education 
from his teacher Eino Kaila in Helsinki. Later on, as is well-known, he became a pupil and a friend of Wittgenstein in 
Cambridge, and eventually one of his literary executors. As he himself emphasised in his 1989 Intellectual 
Autobiography, his philosophy is a peculiar mix of Carnapian methods and Wittgensteinian insights: in a nutshell, he 
often constructed formal systems in the style of Carnap in order to express Wittgenstein-inspired philosophical 
“remarks;” think, for example, of von Wright’s numerous contributions to what he called “philosophical logic,” from 
alethic modal logic to deontic logic and the logic of preferences (von Wright 1989: 45; see also Tripodi 2002). 
xi This might not be a marginal point, if one thinks for example of concepts employed in the humanities and the social 
sciences. 
xi For a detailed comparison between Quine and ordinary language philosophy, see also Verhaegh (2018: chapter 7.2). 
xi Here, as well as in chapter 2 above, the core-periphery model is used in a loose sense, adapting it for the purposes of 
the present investigation from the work of Immanuel Wallerstein (e.g., 1974, 1976). Actually, according to the criteria 
governing Wallerstein’s effective world-system, the United Kingdom is a core country. 
xi Most linguistic philosophers were, of course, perfectly aware of their being part of a social and intellectual élite. Here 
is for example Strawson recalling his lectures in Sarajevo: “I was only allowed to give one of my two scheduled 
lectures and had minimal contact with fellow academics; one perhaps time-serving young man in my audience 
suggested that my lecture revealed an essentially bourgeois outlook. I replied ‘But I am bourgeois — an elitist liberal 
bourgeois’. My interpreter commented, sotto voce, ‘They envy you’” (Strawson 1998: 14). 
xi This is not to say that Gellner was right even when he suggested that linguistic philosophy (in particular, Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy) was politically conservative. This issue –– highly controversial and difficult to resolve –– goes 
beyond the purposes of the present book (see, e.g., Bloor 2000). However, some facts that have been insightfully 
noticed by Uschanov are worth mentioning here: (i) There is some evidence that Wittgenstein assigned philosophy 
the task of improving our “thinking about the important questions of everyday life,” including political questions, 
broadly conceived  (Malcolm 1958/2001: 93); (ii) there is biographical data which is not easily consistent with 
Wittgenstein’s alleged conservatism (Crary and Read 2000: 142; see also Monk 1990); (iii) many Marxists and other 
political radicals such as Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, K.T. Fann, David Rubinstein and Gavin Kitching had a positive 
attitude towards Wittgenstein; it is likely that also Pierre Bourdieu should be added to the list provided by Uschanov; 
(iv) perhaps most importantly, among Oxford linguistic philosophers political opinions, as well as religious attitudes, 
were extremely diverse; for example, Hampshire was a political leftist, Strawson a centrist and Flew a rightist; Flew 
and Ryle were radical anti-clericalists, Anscombe, Geach and Dummett were practicing Christians (Uschanov 2000). 
xi Rée provided the following list (Rée 1993, footnote 124): Elizabeth Anscombe, Sydenham High and St. Hugh's; J.L. 
Austin, Shrewsbury and Balliol; Isaiah Berlin, St Paul's and Corpus; Michael Dummett, Winchester and Christ 
Church; AG.N. Flew, Kingswood and St. John's; Phillipa Foot, privately and Somerville; Stuart Hampshire, Repton 
and Balliol; R.M. Hare, Rugby and Balliol; H.L.A Hart, Cheltenham College, Bradford Grammar School, New; Iris 
Murdoch, Badminton and Somerville; P.H. Nowell-Smith, Winchester and New; David Pears, Westminster and 
Balliol; Anthony Quinton, Stowe and Christchurch; Gilbert Ryle, Brighton College and Queen's; P.F. Strawson, 
Christ's College Finchley and St John's; Stephen Toulmin, Oundle and King's, Cambridge; J.O. Urmson, Kingswood 
and Corpus; G.J. Warnock, Winchester and New; Mary Warnock, St Swithun's Winchester and Lady Margaret Hall; 
Bernard Williams, Chigwell and Balliol. 
xi On Ryle’s style see also the conversation with Magee, where Ryle himself reveals that in The Concept of Mind one 
can find echoes of Oscar Wilde’s and Saki’s literary style (Magee 1971: 131). 
xi In the just-mentioned volume see, in particular, the contributions by Robert Solow (on economics), David Easton (on 
political science) and Hilary Putnam (on philosophy). 
xi Isaac characterised this web of similarities in terms of a common “mood” or “spirit,” noticing also that a neologism  
was introduced to capture it quite well: “behavioural science” (Isaac 2012: 9). He also plausibly refers to a “web of 
family resemblances,” rather than to a common pattern: this is just a way to specify that not all the listed features are 
shared by all the scientific projects or sub-disciplines. 
xi In the examined context, perhaps the best-known example of the politically and morally neutral attitude of the social 
  
 
sciences is expressed by the so-called CUDO group of norms introduced by Robert K. Merton in 1942: “four sets of 
institutional imperatives taken to comprise the ethos of modern science... communism, universalism, 
disinterestedness, and organized scepticism” (Merton 1942). 
xi The classical works related to the just mentioned projects are Bridgman (1928), Stevens (1939), Skinner (1957), 
Parsons (1951), and Merton (1942). 
xi In the same context Putnam also underlined that it is a “stereotype” and a “subtle falsification” to claim that in the 
1940s logical positivism was already dominant, since in fact Carnap, Reichenbach, Feigl and the others were 
extremely few, largely isolated and ignored (Putnam 1997: 178). This important remark, however, is compatible with 
the claim that is here defended, according to which Quine’s critique of Carnap and its effects in the 1950s and 1960s 
had a constitutive role in the rise of analytic philosophy in America. Moreover, it is also worth noticing that some 
seminal elements of the above-outlined scientific and rigourist paradigm in the human sciences were explicitly 
recognised and, in fact, appreciated by the logical positivists themselves, when they arrived in the United States. For 
example, in his Intellectual Autobiography Carnap wrote: “I was very happy to remain permanently in America and, 
in 1944, I became a citizen of the United States. I was not only relieved to escape the stifling political and cultural 
atmosphere and the danger of war in Europe, but was also very gratified to see that in the United States there was a 
considerable interest, especially among the younger philosophers, in the scientific method of philosophy, based on 
modern logic, and that this interest was growing from year to year” (Carnap 1963a: 35). 
xi For an overview of the three programs see, respectively, Janssen (2017), Speaks (2018), and Ichikawa and Steup 
(2018). 
xi Bonino, Maffezioli and Tripodi also reported the results of a full-text search on JSTOR regarding the term ‘Dewey’:  
this term occurs in 305 articles published in The Journal of Philosophy from 1941 to 1960 (as is well-known, the 
journal was published, and still is, at Columbia University, where Dewey used to work). This is a significant result, if 
compared to the occurrences of ‘Russell’: 199, ‘Whitehead’: 155, ‘Carnap’: 95 and ‘Wittgenstein’: 66. On the other 
hand, ’Dewey’ has only 140 occurrences from 1961 to 2010. In The Philosophical Review it has 89 occurrences in the 
period 1940-1960 and only 9 in the latter period (Bonino, Maffezioli, Tripodi, unpublished manuscript). 
xi On the general issue, which at any rate goes beyond the purposes of this book, of the relationship between that political 
context and the rise of analytic philosophy, see for example Howard (2003) and Reisch (2005). It is worth emphasising, 
however, that the point here seems to concern analytic philosophy as an academic professional tradition and a 
philosophical style, rather than the political preferences of single individuals belonging to that tradition (for example, 
both Putnam and Davidson were notoriously left wing, Quine was politically conservative). 
xi  On the relationships between Quine, Tarski, and Carnap, see Frost-Arnold 2013. 
xi As is well-known, this very Hendersonian notion of a conceptual scheme would later be famously criticised by 
Davidson as a third dogma of empiricism (Davidson 1974). 
xi See for example Hands (2007), which focuses on the “uncanny similarities” between economics and philosophy of 
science (rather than analytic philosophy in general) in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. 
xi Samuelson is also the author of the most important single research document of the new synthesis, namely, 
Foundations of Economic Analysis (Samuelson 1947). 
xi It is worth noticing here that the very term ‘neoclassical’ was introduced by Veblen in 1900 to refer to two or three 
main schools of economic theory, among them the marginalist tradition and the Austrian school (Veblen 1900: 261). 
xi Taking a general and balanced historical perspective, it would perhaps be more appropriate to speak of Quine as the 
Samuelson of philosophy in America. However, in the context of a history of analytic philosophy book, it seems 
reasonable or at least excusable to adopt this somewhat misleading philosophy-centred viewpoint. 
xi  For more details on Samuelson’s view of the role of mathematics in economics see also the interesting reflections 
presented in Samuelson (1952), as well as the late interview in which he considered the issue from a more concrete, 
practical point of view: “Although I’ve had an acquaintanceship with scores of leading world mathematicians and 
physicists, I’ve been surprised at how little help I’ve been able to garner from presenting orally some unsolved puzzles 
to them. I should not have been surprised. It is not that a Birkhoff, or Quine, or Ulam, or Levinson, or Kac, or Gleason 
was incapable of clearing up my open questions. Rather, it is the case that a busy mathematician has no motivation to 
waste his (or her) time getting intuitively briefed on someone else’s models in the idiosyncratic field of mathematical 
economics” (Barnett 2004: 530). On the issue of mathematisation and on the passage from political economy to 
economic science see also Boulding (1948), Debreu (1991), Mirowski (2012), Weintrub (2002). 
xi  It is not surprising that Samuelson’s Foundations are full of physics metaphors  (Samuelson 1947: see, e.g., 3 and 8). 
xi In the age of contemporary specialisation, maybe Kusch’s remarks –– originally referred to processes taking place in 
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century –– require some caveats. However, they seem to be still applicable, 
with the due caution, to philosophy after the second world war. A further remark by Kusch is illuminating for the issue 
on which the present chapter focuses: “Like controversies in the natural sciences, philosophical controversies are often 
cases of boundary work. Controversies in philosophy are often triggered when parts or the whole of the philosophical 
community feel endangered by the success and appeal of one or several antidisciplines. In such cases, philosophers 
then start to search for hidden tendencies in each other’s work, tendencies that allegedly provide an insufficient 
defence against usurpation” (Kusch 1995: 269-270). 
  
 
xi Snow, for example, famously criticised the British educational system for having over-rewarded the old, traditional 
humanities at the expense of scientific and technical education (Snow 1959/2001). 
xi Coates compares Keynes’s above-quoted remarks with a passage from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Remarks: “The 
moment we try to apply exact concepts of measurement to immediate experience, we come up against a peculiar 
vagueness in this experience. But that only means a vagueness relative to these concepts of measurement. And, now, 
it seems to me that this vagueness is not something provisional, to be eliminated later on by more precise knowledge, 
but that this is a characteristic logical peculiarity” (Wittgenstein 1964/1975: 263; see also Coates 1996).  
xi Gunter Gebauer refers to the very interesting possibility that Wittgenstein and Sraffa discussed a short text by Karl 
Marx, ‘Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy’ (1857), in which Marx outlined his basic ideas about social 
production, consumption and circulation (Gebauer 2017: 145). 
xi  On the Sraffa-Wittgenstein connection see, for example, Roncaglia (1978), Arena (2015), Davis (2002), McLachlan 
and Swales (1998) on the economic side, and Marion (2005), McGuinness (2008), Venturinha (2013) on the 
philosophical side. Notice also, incidentally, that the Keynesians and the Wittgensteinians had the same “opponents” 
in Britain: the defenders of methodological individualism at the London School of Economics, namely, Hayek, Popper 
and Watkins. In the US things went on somewhat differently, for Milton Friedman and the Chicago School became 
very influential only later, in the 1970s. Notice also, even more incidentally, that (economic and philosophic) 
anthropology has always been, and still is, the bête noire of neoclassical economics, from Polanyi (1944) to Graeber 
(2011). For a general discussion see Marchionatti and Cedrini (2017). 
xi  The reference is, of course, to Frazer (1890) and Wittgenstein (1967/1979). 
xi  The similar term, ‘grammatical anthropology,’ has been suggested by Tomasini Bassols (2010: 56). See also Hacker 
2010. 
xi The complete list included also David M. Armstrong, Bodily Sensations (1962); P. Alexander, Sensationalism and 
Scientific Explanation (1963); Jonathan Bennett, Rationality (1964); Julius Kovessi, Moral Notions (1967); Herbert 
Fingarette, Self-Deception (1969); Terence Penelhum, Survival and Disembodied Existence (1970); Ilham Dilman and 
D.Z. Phillips, Sense and Delusion (1971); Maurice Drury, The Danger of Words(1973), Jenny Teichman, The Mind 
and the Soul (1974); K.V. Wilkes, Physicalism (1978); R. Bambrough, Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge 
(1979); R.W. Newell, Objectivity, Empiricism and Truth (1986). As as been noticed by Constantine Sandis, the main 
exception was of course that of Armstrong, “whose sympathies were far removed from those of the others” (Sandis 
2015: 372). 
xi Winch wrote, for example: “[A] historian or sociologist of religion must have some religious feeling if he is to make 
sense of the religious movement he is studying” (Winch 1958: 88). 
xi According to Scopus, the 30% of the about 80 documents in ‘Peter Winch’ occurs in the period 1961-2015 belong to 
the area ‘Social sciences’ (www.scopus.com). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
5. Science, Philosophy, and the Mind 
 
The development of philosophy in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s was characterised, 
among other things, by a relatively growing interest in Wittgenstein’s thought. First, more balanced 
and well-informed comparisons between Wittgenstein and Carnap were offered. Second, a greater 
awareness was achieved as to the peculiarities of Wittgenstein’s later philosophical views. The former 
tendency was epitomised by Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989), who studied and then lectured in Europe, 
including Britain, was well-acquainted with Carnap and started to use competently both the early and 
the later Wittgenstein for his philosophical purposes. The latter tendency was well represented by 
Stanley Cavell (1926-2018), who studied at Berkeley and Harvard, was heavily influenced by Austin, 
Wittgenstein, and Oxford linguistic philosophy, and then taught temporarily at Berkeley and for the 
rest of his life at Harvard. 
 
5.1 Wittgenstein in the United States: Sellars and Cavell 
Consider Sellars first. There were many points of philosophical agreement between Sellars and the 
later Wittgenstein. Anti-foundationalism in epistemology: both Wittgenstein and Sellars thought that 
there is no ultimate and self-justified belief, on which our knowledge is grounded. Anti-Cartesianism 
in the philosophy of mind: both of them argued that we do not have direct, privileged and absolutely 
certain knowledge of our own beliefs and sensations (Sellars 1956). Moreover, a form of normative 
anti-reductionism: they shared the view according to which logical, epistemological and moral 
normativity cannot be reduced into naturalistic terms. And also a non-continuist metaphilosophy: 
according to both of them, philosophy and science ultimately have different aims and operate on 
different levels (Sellars 1962). But let us now briefly consider, as a particularly interesting case-study, 
Sellars’s discussion of (and comparison between) Carnap’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions of 
semantics.xi 
When, in the late 1940s and early 1950s –– more precisely, from 1947 and 1948, when 
‘Epistemology and the New Way of Words’ and ‘Realism and the New Way of Words’ were published 
respectively, to 1953, the year of ‘Inference and Meaning’ –– he presented a rudimentary version of 
his inferential or functional-role semantics, Sellars’s aim was to discuss and amend Carnap’s and 
Tarski’s semantic views, especially in the form presented by Carnap in 1942 in his influential and 
much discussed Introduction to Semantics (Carnap 1942; Sellars 1947, 1948, 1953a; but see also 
Sellars 1962, and 1968). Sellars focused on semantic statements such as “‘Rouge’ in French means 
red,” as they were typically formulated in a Carnap-style semantics. According to Sellars, that 
formulation was misleading, for it conveyed the idea that the meaning of ‘rouge’ is an abstract entity 
(a quality, a property). As is well-known, Sellars corrected Carnap’s account by using his dot quoting 
  
 
device, that is, by translating the above-mentioned semantic statement as “‘Rouge’ in French means 
·red·,” which in turn is equivalent to “‘Rouge’ in French plays the same role that ‘red’ plays in 
English” (or, as he would put it later, “in the linguistic economy of English-speaking peoples”) 
(Sellars 1956, § 31). In this way, the platonic reading of semantic statements was explained away, 
and semantics turned out to be an entirely intra-linguistic, inferential affair.xi  
Around 1953 and especially in 1954, when the article ‘Some Reflections on Language Games’ 
was published, Sellars started to present his inferential semantics by using the later Wittgenstein’s 
vocabulary, i.e., by employing concepts such as game, language game, system of rules, grammar, 
use, rule-governed activity and so forth (Sellars 1954a; see also Bonino and Tripodi 2018a: 221). 
Moreover in 1956, in ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,’ Sellars made it clear that there is a 
tight, clear connection between the myth of the given (its main polemical target), and the platonic 
conception of meaning he associated to Carnap-style semantics. To borrow, for the sake of brevity, 
de Vries’s and Triplett’s concise formulation, the myth of the given was the idea according to which 
any possible knowledge is ultimately based on non-inferential, immediate knowledge of basic, self-
justified and epistemically independent elements (de Vries and Triplett 2000: 186). Sellars pointed 
out that the myth of the given is avoided if one accepts what he called “psychological nominalism,” 
the view according to which “all awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short, all awareness 
of abstract entities — indeed, all awareness even of particulars — is a linguistic affair” (Sellars 1956: 
§ 29). Conversely, a special form of the myth of the given is the rejection of psychological 
nominalism, that is, in other words, the conviction that at least some awareness of abstract entities, 
or of particulars, is prelinguistic. In particular, Sellars connected the foundationalist myth with a 
thesis concerning language acquisition, namely, with the view according to which “there is awareness 
of logical space prior to, or independent of, the acquisition of a language” (Sellars 1956: § 31). At 
this point Sellars explicitly referred to Wittgenstein. Not only did he evoke the “carrier of slabs” of § 
2 of the Investigations, but he also stressed that the above-mentioned mistaken view of language –– 
which he now understood as a relational conception of means, according to which meaning is a 
relation of association between a word and a nonverbal entity –– was nothing but the so-called 
Augustinian picture of language criticised by Wittgenstein at the beginning of the Investigations: 
every word has a meaning, which is the object for which it stands, so that the essential function of 
words is naming (Wittgenstein 1953: §1). In a similar vein, he described the Augustinian view of 
language acquisition in the following terms: “The process of teaching a child to use a language is that 
of teaching it to discriminate elements within a logical space of particulars, universals, facts, etc., of 
which it is already undiscriminatingly aware, and to associate these discriminated elements with 
verbal symbols” (Sellars 1956, § 30). Sellars argued that the Augustinian conceptions of meaning and 
language acquisition entail the myth of the given: a particularly dangerous form of the myth, since 
  
 
even nominalists, who believe that there are only particulars, can fall prey to it. As Sellars noticed, 
what H.H. Price called ‘thinking in presence,’ as opposed to ‘thinking in absence,’ is a form of the 
Augustinian model, in which the named object, the Augustinian meaning of the word, is so to speak 
there, before the language user (Sellars 1956: § 30; Price 1953). After ‘Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind,’ Sellars often associated his functional role semantics to Wittgenstein’s later 
view of meaning as use. He did so, for example, in the following well-known passage, which 
frequently recurs in his works: 
 
According to this analysis, meaning is not a relation for the very simple 
reason that ‘means’ is a specialized form of the copula. Again, the meaning of 
an expression is its ‘use’ (in the sense of function), in that to say what an 
expression means is to classify it by means of an illustrating functional sortal. 
(Sellars 1969/1974, 116; 1974, 431; 1980, 78; see also 1970, 158, 1962/1963, 
203) 
 
Let us now come to Cavell. In an article published in The Journal of Philosophy in 1962 with the title 
‘The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy,’ Cavell complained that Anglo-American 
philosophers had since then achieved a very poor understanding of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy 
(Cavell 1958/1976, 1962/1976). To show this, he focused on the first monograph devoted to it, David 
Pole's The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Pole 1958), commenting: 
 
What I find most remarkable about this book is not the modesty of its 
understanding nor the pretentiousness and condescension of its criticism, but 
the pervasive absence of any worry that some remark of Wittgenstein's may 
not be utterly obvious in its meaning and implications. (Cavell 1962/1976: 
45) 
 
Cavell’s main interpretive claims were the following. First, Wittgenstein’s philosophical inquiry had 
some structural similarities with Kant’s transcendental work (Cavell 1958/1976, 1962/1976).  
Second, a correct understanding of Wittgenstein’s later investigations depended on the analysis of 
Wittgenstein’s reliance on ordinary language uses in philosophy, on the basis of the claim that “What 
we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” (Wittgenstein 1953: § 
116). Some years before, in his seminal paper ‘Must We Mean What We Say?,’ published in Inquiry 
in 1958, Cavell had already dealt with this issue (Cavell 1958/1976). These two articles and, more 
generally, the collection of essays in which they were included, published in 1969 with the same title, 
  
 
Must We Mean What We Say?, represented an important step in the story reconstructed in the present 
book (Cavell 1969). As Sandra Laugier has recently observed, Cavell was perfectly aware that  
 
He was upsetting a well-established American philosophical tradition, which 
had emerged out of the arrival of Vienna Circle philosophers, epistemologists 
and logicians fleeing Nazism onto the American philosophical scene. In Must 
We Mean What We Say? analytic philosophy was called into question for the 
first time in America, where it had become dominant over the course of the 
twentieth century, and the book proceeds from one of analytic philosophy’s 
unassimilable, even repressed, elements: ordinary language philosophy, as 
represented by Austin and Wittgenstein. (Laugier 2011: 629) 
 
Against Benson Mates, who had regarded the claims based on ordinary language usage as having an 
empirical nature (Mates 1958), Cavell pointed out that those claims are normative: they are not 
descriptions of what people do say, but they are grammatical remarks about what people may say, or 
ought to say, within the bounds of sense (not surprisingly, a quasi-Kantian notion) (Cavell 
1958/1976). In Cavell’s view the philosopher, as a competent speaker, is at least as qualified as any 
other member of the linguistic community to make claims about what is ordinarily said and meant. 
As we will see in what follows, Cavell’s articles well represent the process during which a more 
adequate picture of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was eventually presented to the eyes of the 
analytic philosophers in the United States.  
Yet another philosophical topos, which is worth mentioning for the present purposes, is the way in 
which analytic philosophers reacted to Cavell’s early work on Wittgenstein: they formulated an 
uncompromising criticism of it. In their article ‘The Availability of What We Say,’ published in The 
Philosophical Review in 1963, Jerry Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz were rather explicit: 
 
The position Cavell advocates in M [‘Must We Mean What We Say?’] and A 
[‘The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy’] seems to us … to be 
mistaken in every significant respect and to be pernicious both for an 
adequate understanding of ordinary language philosophy and for an adequate 
understanding of ordinary language. (Fodor and  Katz 1963: 58) 
 
It is perhaps no coincidence that the two authors were both philosophers at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology and, above all, that the former was also a psychologist, and the latter was also a 
professional linguist. 
  
 
 
5.2 The Fifties and the Sixties: Some Data and Trends 
Resuming the train of thought interrupted in chapter 3, the early interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy as a dead ringer for Carnap’s had had negative effects on its reception in the United States, 
because, among other reasons, meanwhile a conviction had been spreading that some of Carnap’s 
philosophical milestones –– analyticity, above all –– had been demolished by Quine. Later on, well 
into the 1950s, thanks to well-informed philosophers such as Sellars the differences and even the 
contrasts between Wittgenstein and Carnap were highlighted. More generally, a more accurate, 
Carnap-independent and Oxford-influenced picture of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was at last 
brought into the American philosophical context by a number of authors such as for example Cavell. 
All this is apparent in the articles published in The Journal of Philosophy and The Philosophical 
Review from 1951 to 1960. There are 91 articles in which the name ‘Wittgenstein’ is mentioned in 
the full text: 9.2% of the entire corpus (990 articles).xi Roughly 30% of these articles were entirely 
devoted to Wittgenstein or, at least, Wittgenstein played a central role in them, often a methodological 
one. The large majority of these 30 or so “Wittgensteinian” articles focused on some aspects of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. The leading position was occupied by the Wittgensteinians who 
worked in the department of philosophy of Cornell University: the corpus contains 5 articles by 
Malcolm and 3 articles by Black. Generally speaking, looking at the list one gets the impression that 
in the 1950s the pupils, followers and admirers of Wittgenstein (broadly conceived) had the first real 
opportunity to present Wittgenstein’s later thought to the American philosophical academia: not only 
Malcolm and Black, but also philosophers such as Ambrose, Geach, Dummett, MacDonald, Toulmin 
and von Wright.xi It is also worth noting that, besides Malcolm, there were by then several American 
philosophers who proved to be well-acquainted with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy: Sellars, of 
course, as has been shown above, but also Abraham Melden, Hilary Putnam, Leonard Linsky, Morton 
White, Rogers Albritton and Keith Lehrer.xi 
In the following decade, 1961-1970, the trend kept persisting to a certain extent, though there were 
also some differences with respect to the earlier period. Considering again The Journal of Philosophy 
and The Philosophical Review, ‘Wittgenstein’ was mentioned even more frequently: there were 134 
articles in which it occurred at least once, 14.3% of the entire corpus. A little under 30% of these 
articles were really devoted to Wittgenstein: most of the articles just mentioned Wittgenstein 
passingly, while focusing on an entirely different topic, and there seemed to be no prevalence of the 
later, as opposed to the early, Wittgenstein. Other features of the 1950s corpus remained unchanged 
in the 1960s. The presence among the authors of linguistic philosophers belonging to the Oxford 
linguistic philosophy and/or to the later Wittgensteinian tradition, broadly conceived: Black, O.K. 
Bouswma, J.N. Findlay, Malcolm, Rush Rhees, Dummett, Geach, Stenius, Strawson, Urmson, von 
  
 
Wright, Waismann and McGuinness. xi  The emergence of further American philosophers, or 
philosophers permanently working in the United States, who were endowed with an adequate 
expertise in Wittgensteinian issues: besides the recently mentioned Bouwsma, Malcolm, Sellars, 
Putnam, and Cavell –– and besides critics such as Fodor, Katz, Feigl and Maxwell –– the list also 
included Richard Rorty, Arthur Danto, Sydney Morgenbesser, Newton Garver, Donald Davidson, 
Jaakko Hintikka and Barry Stroud.xi The name of Burton Dreben was not included in the list but it 
should ideally be added, since in the same years his teaching at Harvard provided an original, 
influential and accurate picture of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, in which peculiar emphasis was placed 
on the crucial metaphilosophical claim that there are no philosophical theories (Floyd and Shieh 2001; 
see especially John Rawls’s ‘Afterword’ on pages 419-422). 
Considering the whole corpus from 1951 to 1970, it becomes apparent that the seeds of several 
different stories were planted in that period. Perhaps the most important single episode relating to the 
history of Wittgenstein studies is the discussion that originated with Dummett’s 1959 article on 
‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics,’ according to which Wittgenstein was a full-blooded 
conventionalist, and above all with Stroud’s influential reply, ‘Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity,’ 
published in 1965, in which Wittgenstein’s aim was described as that of showing, by inventing 
imaginary cases, that our grammar, including for example the rules we employ in mathematics, is 
ultimately based or grounded on extremely general and contingent facts of our natural history (where 
the terms ‘based’ and ‘grounded’ are to be interpreted in the genetic sense of ‘being caused’ rather 
than in the epistemological sense of ‘being justified’) (Dummett 1959; Stroud 1965). This exegetical 
debate is, in a certain sense, still going on nowadays, not least thanks to the recent widespread interest 
in the so-called “third” Wittgenstein, the author of On Certainty (Moyal-Sharrock 2004). 
Another visible tendency –– represented in the considered “Wittgensteinian” corpus by five 
articles written by Paul Feyerabend, Norwood Russell Hanson and Stephen Toulmin, respectivelyxi –
– concerned the rise of the so-called new philosophy of science. This, as is well-known, was an epoch-
making phenomenon in the history of Anglo-American philosophy, in which the publication in 1962 
of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions played a major role (Kuhn 1962). Kuhn 
was introduced to the works of Wittgenstein precisely by Cavell, who –– before being recruited in 
Harvard –– was in a certain period a colleague of his at Berkeley (Bird 2018). Several later 
Wittgensteinian ideas were at work in Kuhn’s famous book: the concept of family resemblance; the 
conceptions of meaning and reference; the reflections on conceptual relativism; the remarks on the 
presence and roles in science of ‘forms of representation’ and ‘norms of expression’; the notion of 
‘seeing as’ (Kuhn 1962).xi 
Despite their unquestionable centrality, however, the exegetical discussion stemming from the 
Dummett-Stroud debate and even the emergence of Kuhn’s Wittgenstein-inspired philosophy of 
  
 
science were somewhat out (or perhaps, more precisely, they were at the margin) of the main line of 
discourse of the present book, namely, the emergence of “core” analytic philosophy and its effects on 
the later Wittgensteinian tradition, especially in the United States.xi Focusing on this main line, from 
the analysis of the articles published in The Journal of Philosophy and The Philosophical Review 
from 1951 to 1970, three major topics emerge (incidentally, they confirm the correctness and accuracy 
of the critical evaluation provided by Cavell in the two articles mentioned above). One topic is the 
tenability (or, depending on the viewpoint, the untenability) of the distinction drawn by Wittgenstein 
between criteria and symptoms, and more generally the debate over Wittgenstein’s views of the 
relationship between ordinary language and scientific language.xi Another topic is Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of action, with particular focus on his conception of reasons as opposed to causes.xi Yet 
another had to do with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind, but it will be discussed below, at the end 
of the present chapter.xi 
Let us now focus on the distinctions between criteria and symptoms, and between reasons and 
causes. They were two of the ways by means of which the later Wittgenstein used to draw the science-
philosophy divide. The other two ways –– the grammatical-factual distinction and the distinction 
between meaning-constitutive linguistic uses and non-constitutive or application uses –– had already 
been discussed earlier: the former had been weakened, to put it mildly, by its confusion with Carnap’s 
analytic-synthetic distinction, which had in turn been Quine’s main polemical target; the latter had 
been criticised by Watkins and Gellner in the context of the polemic against paradigm-case arguments 
(see chapter 2 above). In the new context was now that of the new rigourism in the humanities 
described in chapter 4 –– a process in which the rise of analytic philosophy was just an instance –– it 
is not surprising to ascertain that analytic philosophers reacted with hostility towards the advent of 
the later Wittgensteinian tradition in the United States, with its doubts concerning the appropriateness 
of applying natural science methods and perspectives to the psychological, social and normative 
world, and its humanistic and even hermeneutical conception of the rationality of human beings. 
Since the use of explicit arguments was, as still is, a constitutive totem of analytic philosophy, 
hostility assumed the form of explicit anti-Wittgensteinian arguments: arguments aimed to defend a 
continuist metaphilosophy –– a fortiori, a scientifically oriented philosophical style –– by destroying 
the Wittgensteinian distinctions between criteria and symptoms, and between reasons and causes. 
 
5.3 Criteria and Symptoms 
The first episode had two main characters: Malcolm, the “voice” of Wittgenstein in America,  and 
Putnam. In 1959 Malcolm published Dreaming, and three years later Putnam provided an influential 
critique of it (Malcolm 1959; Putnam 1962/1975). The origin of Malcolm’s interest in this topic went 
back to his decision in 1938 to leave Harvard, where he was a graduate student, to reach Cambridge 
  
 
in Britain, where he intended to be supervised by G.E. Moore.xi At that time, Moore was involved in 
the attempt to refute scepticism, challenging in particular the Cartesian dream argument, according 
to which one cannot prove with absolute certainty that one is awake (Moore 1939; Malcolm 1956). 
However, in Cambridge Malcolm met Wittgenstein and attended his 1939 lectures on the foundations 
of mathematics, thus becoming his devoted disciple and friend. At this point, his Moore-inspired 
focus on dreaming became intertwined with Wittgenstein’s scattered reflections on this issue, such as 
for example the following: 
 
People on waking tell us of certain incidents (that they have been in such-
and-such places, etc.). Then we teach them the expression “I dreamt,” which 
precedes the narrative. Afterwards I sometimes ask them “Did you dream 
anything last night?” and am answered yes or no, sometimes with an account 
of a dream, sometimes not… 
Now must I make some assumption about whether people are deceived by 
their memories or not; whether they really had these images while they slept, 
or whether it merely seems so to them on waking. And what meaning has this 
question?—And what interest? Do we ever ask ourselves this when someone 
is telling us his dream? And if not—is it because we are sure his memory has 
not deceived him? (And suppose it were a man with a quite specially bad 
memory?—) (Wittgenstein  1953, Part 2: § VII). 
 
More importantly, in Dreaming Malcolm ended with providing a Wittgenstein-inspired grammatical 
investigation of the concept of dreaming and the notions inferentially related to it. Malcolm started 
by providing two criteria, or sets of criteria, for sleeping. One was behavioural: the body is relaxed, 
the eyes are closed, the breath is regular, the sleeper tends not to respond when addressed and, in 
general, not to react to external stimuli (Malcolm 1959: 11). Another one was the sleeper’s testimony 
after he awakened, a criterion which cannot be applied to animals and infants (Malcolm 1959: 22). 
According to Malcolm, these are the criteria of deep sleep, whereas hypnotic trance, violent 
nightmare and somnambulism are “natural extensions” of the meaning of the term ‘sleep’ (Malcolm 
1959: 27-28). On the other hand, there is only one criterion for dreaming, namely, the sleepers’ later 
reports of their dreams (Malcolm 1959: 49). Therefore, in Malcolm’s account, there is a logical, 
necessary relation between our dreams and the impressions we tell of after we wake up (Malcolm 
1959: 60). The description of the grammar of ‘sleep’ and ‘dreaming’ allowed Malcolm to challenge 
Cartesian scepticism. The criteria for sleep and dreaming –– he noticed –– clearly show that it is 
impossible to assert something during sleep; at most, one can dream of asserting something. 
  
 
Scepticism cannot be asserted without denying itself. It is senseless, rather than false, for it depends 
on a twofold misleading myth or illusion: first, the belief that dreams are inner and private mental 
states or processes; second, the supposition that people acquire the concept of dreaming by 
introspection, that is, by noticing these inner states or processes (Malcolm 1959: 54). 
Malcolm’s grammatical investigation on dreaming gave rise to two main claims. First, the 
temporal occurrence of dreams during sleep –– when dreams occur during sleep –– is not something 
empirical but is determined by the grammar of ‘dreaming,’ that is, by our rule-governed applications 
of terms such as ‘dreaming’ and ‘sleep’ in paradigmatic circumstances (Schroeder 1997). Second, the 
grammar of ‘dreaming’ does not determine any specific time interval during which dreaming occurs: 
the criterion of dreaming, i.e., the dreamer’s report after awakening from sleep, tells us that dreaming 
occurs during sleep, but it does not allow us to establish its exact duration; in fact, the very notion of 
exact duration is not applicable in this context. Malcolm was led by these two claims to criticise not 
only Cartesian scepticism, but also contemporary scientific studies of dreaming, such as those 
presented in 1957 by the physiologists Nathaniel Kleitman and his student William Dement (Dement 
and Kleitman 1957; Malcolm 1959: 74). Dement and Kleitman’s pioneering aim was that of 
correlating rapid eye movements occurring during sleep with dreaming or, more precisely, the REM 
phase during sleep with the length (i.e., the number of words) of the dreamer’s report after sleeping, 
and the vertical and horizontal eye movements during sleep with the presence of vertical and 
horizontal “actions” and “movements” in the dreaming report. According to Malcolm, this correlation 
is impossible and, actually, even unintelligible, since it ultimately originates from a conceptual 
confusion, namely, the misleading assumption that the ordinary grammar of ‘dreaming’ establishes 
the exact duration of dreaming during sleep (on the other hand, it goes without saying, Malcolm 
acknowledged that the physiologists were perfectly able to measure the exact duration of the REM 
phase). In Malcolm’s view, when they attempted to correlate rapid eye movements with what they 
called ‘dreaming,’ the physiologists were thereby stipulating a new meaning for the term ‘dreaming,’ 
a meaning by virtue of which dreaming occurs in a determined and measurable timespan. For 
example, the sentence ‘He is halfway through his dream’ has no normal use in our language; it has 
perhaps a new use, hence a new meaning, introduced by convention by the physiologists employing 
rapid eye movements as a new criterion for dreaming (Malcolm 1959: 74). Malcolm’s argument was 
similar to that of his Cornell colleague Black against Feigl’s mind-brain identity theory, according to 
whom not only is the sentence ‘Pain is identical to the stimulation of C-fibres’ semantically deviant 
(for it cannot be used to state something in a normal context), but that sentence can never become 
normal, unless one stipulates by convention a new meaning for at least one word occurring in it; 
typically, the word ‘pain,’ which is in ordinary language governed by behavioural criteria (Putnam 
1960a: 28). 
  
 
Three years later, in 1962, Putnam criticised Malcom in an article entitled ‘Dreaming and “Depth 
Grammar”.’ Putnam was fully aware that, to a certain extent, the real target behind his attack on 
Malcolm was Wittgenstein himself. At the beginning of the article he wrote: 
 
In this paper I wish to examine certain general doctrines having to do with 
language which are employed by Norman Malcolm in his book Dreaming 
(Malcolm, 1959). I say ‘employed,’ not ‘stated,’ because Malcolm never does 
fully state these doctrines. Yet his arguments turn not on the linguistic 
properties of individual words, but on these almost formal principles, 
involving such notions as ‘concept,’ ‘sense,’ ‘logical independence,’ 
‘stipulation,’ ‘giving a use,’ ‘being unverifiable in principle,’ ‘criterion,’ 
‘indication’ and ‘inference’. 
His arguments are also of interest in that they can be read as simple versions 
of some famous arguments of Wittgenstein’s as he is interpreted by Malcolm. 
If this interpretation of Malcolm's is faithful to what Wittgenstein had in mind, 
then these famous arguments are bad arguments and prove nothing. (Putnam 
1962/1975: 304) 
  
Putnam attributed to Malcolm two main mistakes, both concerning the view of how scientific theories 
work. The first was a verificationist view of how scientific terms refer and how scientific theories are 
confirmed or falsified. The second was a conventionalist view of how scientific concepts change 
(Putnam 1962/1975). As to the former point, he wrote: 
Malcolm’s is the sharpest statement of Verificationism in the 1950s. If Mal-
colm is right, then the ‘naive’ way of understanding our language and our 
knowledge is wrong. Thus, in Malcolm's view, it is impossible to refer to a 
thing (or kind of thing) if in no case do we have better than indications of its 
presence or absence. If this it right, then for everything in the world we can 
presently name there is at least one case in which we can settle with certainty 
whether it is present or absent. But, on the ‘naive’ view –– i.e. in the view of 
present scientific theory, taken more or less literally, more or less without 
philosophical interpretation –– there are many things for whose presence or 
absence we never have better than probabilistic indicators. (Putnam 
1962/1975: 306) 
  
 
As Putnam stressed, the linguistic intelligibility of a scientific discourse does not depend on the pos-
sibility of verifying it with absolute certainty, but on its “ability to occur in coherent and appropriate 
discourses, on paraphrasability” (Putnam 1962/1975: 309). Typically, such an appropriate and coher-
ent discourse takes the form of a general and explanatory theory, based on models and justified by 
whatever evidence is available, as in so-called inferences to the best explanation, which Putnam as-
similated to the inverse-deductive method elaborated by Mill (Putnam 1962/1975; Mill 1843). Put-
nam wrote: 
If someone constructed a plausible physiological model for sleep, for visual 
experiences, and for dreaming (considered as visual experiences, etc., during 
sleep) and some theory based on this model suggested the correlations be-
tween, say, rapid eye movements and rapid ‘dream movements’, the confir-
mation of those correlations would be enormously increased. Yet theories 
based on this type of model building are not conclusively verifiable, as has 
been known since the appearance of the late chapters of Mill’s Logic (1848) 
at least. (Putnam 1962/1975: 317) 
More generally, as Putnam remarked in the article ‘What Theories Are Not,’ published the same year, 
“justification in science does not proceed ‘down’ in the direction of observation terms. In fact, justi-
fication in science proceeds in any direction that may be handy –– more observational assertions 
sometimes being justified with the aid of more theoretical ones, and vice versa” (Putnam 1962: 241). 
Putnam’s perspective was soon accepted and developed by different authors, such as for example 
Fodor and Charles Chihara, who accused Malcolm of presenting a misleading conception of the na-
ture of scientific confirmation, which –– as they made clear –– does not depend on the conclusive 
verification based on the application of criteria, but rather “on appeals to the simplicity, plausibility, 
and predictive adequacy of an explanatory system as a whole” (Chihara and Fodor, 1965/1977: 197). 
These “holistic” considerations were also relevant for Putnam’s latter objection to Malcolm, 
namely, his conception of how scientific terms change over time. Putnam presented several historical 
case-studies. For example, having studied philosophy of physics under Reichenbach at UCLA, he 
emphasised that Einstein rejected a “criterial definition” such as e = 1⁄2 mv2 not by arbitrarily and 
conventionally modifying the meaning of ‘e’ (‘kinetic energy’), but rather by introducing an alterna-
tive, more general and explanatory theory, to be tested as a whole; in this way, in a sense, he provided 
the old concept with a new sense (Putnam 1962/1975). However, Putnam shared Malcolm’s interest 
in the relationship between ordinary and scientific language. In particular, he wanted to “protect” the 
possibility of scientific progress by showing that, when scientific concepts change, no change of 
  
 
meaning by stipulation occurs; rather, concepts acquire a use, a new use given the new context (on 
this see also Putnam 1960a). Even more importantly, when scientists change the criteria for applying 
a scientific term, this simply reflects the fact that their knowledge of the investigated phenomenon 
has increased. For example, Putnam considered the history of the term ‘acid’ in chemistry. In the 
eighteenth century, chemists used to apply the term ‘acid’ to a substance on the basis of two or three 
criteria: being soluble in water; tasting sour in water solutions; turning litmus paper red. Today they 
accept a different theoretical definition, according to which something is an acid just in case it is a 
“proton-donor”. “Yet –– as Putnam put it –– I feel sure that any chemist would want to say that he is 
talking about the same chemical substances that the eighteenth century chemist called ‘acids’” (Put-
nam 1962/1975: 311). According to Putnam, there are no reasons for rejecting this “naive” view, 
which is able to account for the intelligence of eighteenth-century chemists: he took it to be very 
likely that such chemists “knew perfectly well that their criteria were crude ways of detecting a ‘nat-
ural kind’ of chemical; they would have thought it unlikely that their criteria exactly ‘caught’ the 
boundaries of that kind” (Putnam 1962/1975: 312). 
Putnam’s critique of Malcolm did much harm to the later Wittgensteinian tradition. Verification-
ism became an indelible black mark against it, whereas scientific realism was a growing tendency in 
the philosophy of science. Scientific realism was shared by many of those who felt the need to over-
come positivism without falling into a Kuhnian form of relativism which –– as Putnam would put it 
much later –– made it “unintelligible that one can so much as understand earlier scientific theories” 
(Putnam 1997: 183). One of these realist philosophers was for example J.J.C. Smart, who had recently 
been converted from Wittgensteinian-Rylean behaviourism by the lesson of Ullin T. Place (Smart 
1959; Place 1956). Smart was a friend of Putnam and in the academic year 1957-1958 he visited 
Princeton, at the time in which Putnam was assistant professor in that department.xi Another one was 
Sellars, who was on the contrary –– as shown at the beginning of the present chapter –– very sympa-
thetic to Wittgenstein’s later ideas; however, qua scientific realist (an attitude he shared with  Herbert 
Feigl, his friend and colleague at Iowa and Minnesota), he was also critical of them (Feigl 1958).xi In 
his remarkable lecture on ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,’ delivered in 1960 at the 
University of Pittsburgh and then published in 1962, he famously introduced two ideal types labelled 
‘manifest image’ and ‘scientific image’ (Sellars 1962). Both of them are philosophical images of man 
and the world: the former understands men as persons who suffer, act intentionally and justify what 
they say and do by providing reasons; the latter, at the present stage, describes the world as a swirl of 
physical particles, forces and fields (Sellars 1962: 20). According to Sellars, Wittgenstein’s later work 
provided the best philosophical analysis of the manifest image. In Sellars’s words: 
  
 
I think it correct to say that the so-called 'analytic' tradition in recent British 
and American philosophy, particularly under the influence of the later Witt-
genstein, has done increasing justice to the manifest image, and has increas-
ingly succeeded in isolating it in something like its pure form, and has made 
clear the folly of attempting to replace it piecemeal by fragments of the sci-
entific image. (Sellars 1962: 15) 
The impossibility of replacing the manifest image piecemeal by fragments of the scientific image 
depended in particular on the impossibility of reducing normativity in naturalistic terms (O’Shea 
2007). This point too seemed to fit well with Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations (Wittgen-
stein 1953: §§ 138-242). The two images, however, are also scientific images, since they provide 
disciplined and critical descriptions and explanations of events and states of affairs: the main meth-
odological difference between them is that the manifest image allows only inductive correlation, 
whereas the scientific image typically introduces by postulation theoretical, unobservable entities and 
builds explanatory models (Sellars 1962: 7).xi Though the two images are somewhat continuous with 
one another, the methodological innovation introduced by the scientific image has significant conse-
quences: 
It [the scientific image] purports to be a complete image, i.e. to define a 
framework which could be the whole truth about that which belongs to the 
image. Thus although it is methodologically a development within the mani-
fest image, the scientific image presents itself as a rival image. From its point 
of view the manifest image on which it rests is an 'inadequate' but pragmati-
cally useful likeness of a reality which first finds its adequate (in principle) 
likeness in the scientific image. I say, 'in principle', because the scientific im-
age is still in the process of coming into being—a point to which I shall return 
at the conclusion of this chapter. (Sellars 1962: 20; see also Ackerman 1973 
and Aune 1990) 
Here is where Sellars departed from Wittgenstein. First, as emerged in the early 1930s from the com-
parison and contrast with Carnap’s philosophy of science and science-oriented Weltanschauung, 
Wittgenstein (at least sometimes) drew a poor picture of the natural sciences, in which confirmation 
was ultimately based on observation and experiment, whereas the role of models and the postulation 
of theoretical entities was underestimated (see chapter 3 above). Second, the predominance of the 
scientific image was and still is simply a fact or an objective process of our times; independently of 
any evaluation, in order to modify such objective processes, as Wittgenstein  himself once put it, 
  
 
“quite different artillery” would be needed from anything a philosopher like him was “in a position 
to muster” (Wittgenstein 1980a: 62); accordingly, Sellars assigned to contemporary philosophy the 
task to account for, rather than criticise or disapprove, the clash of the two images (famously, his 
solution was to provide a synoptic view) (Sellars 1962: 15, 18, 19, 26). 
Besides its ability to put the finger on the weak points of the later Wittgensteinian tradition,  Putnam’s 
attack on Malcolm also fell prey to possible misunderstandings. First, Putnam seemed not to realise 
that Malcolm’s grammatical description of the concept of dreaming had several shortcomings, which 
should be ascribed to Malcolm himself, rather than to the very idea of a grammatical investigation: 
in particular, Malcolm’s purpose to refute scepticism brought him –– somewhat paradoxically for a 
philosopher so devoted to ordinary language –– to limit his inquiry to the “technical” case of dreaming 
occurring during deep sleep, thus arbitrarily ruling out for example the behavioural evidence charac-
teristic of violent nightmares, which provided further indications of the exact timespan during which 
dreaming takes place. Second, Putnam proposed the analogy between dreams and acids: arguably, 
that was an overreaction to Malcolm’s alleged mistakes, since it is controversial (to say the least) 
whether mental experiences –– granting, pace Malcolm, that dreams are indeed mental experiences 
–– are substances or natural kinds. Arguably, the success of Putnam’s indirect criticism of Wittgen-
stein depended on external factors relating to the general philosophical atmosphere and the wider 
intellectual context: in a nutshell, Putnam was in agreement with the rising science-oriented philo-
sophical attitude, and with scientific realism in particular.  
 
5.4 Reasons and Causes 
However, the episode involving Putnam and Malcolm is not the best place to look at if one wants to 
realise how, as sometimes or perhaps often happens in the history of philosophy, misunderstandings 
can be more effective than philosophical arguments. A clearer case was that occurring in 1963, when 
Donald Davidson, after a period in which he had mainly been working on decision theory (Davidson 
and Suppes 1957), published in The Journal of Philosophy his seminal paper ‘Actions, Reasons and 
Causes,’ where he famously criticised Wittgenstein’s well-known view that reasons are not and, in 
fact, cannot in principle be the causes of the actions they explain and justify (Davidson 1963).xi In 
recent years, that view had been renovated by Wittgenstein-inspired grammatical investigations such 
as those of Anscombe, Winch, Kenny and von Wright. In 1957, Anscombe’s Intention set the stage: 
the aim of grammatical investigation is to clarify the meaning of ‘intentional action.’ An agent acts 
intentionally when she responds to the question ‘Why are you doing so and so?’ by providing the 
reasons or motives for her action (Anscombe 1957: §§ 23-26). Following Wittgenstein, Anscombe 
  
 
and her Wittgensteinian colleagues criticised the causal views of action and action explanation, ac-
cording to which intentional actions are bodily movements caused by mental states or events (e.g., 
the agent’s beliefs and desires), so that the occurrence of such mental states or events causally ex-
plains the occurrence of the bodily movement (Anscombe 1957: §§ 9-11). 
Wittgenstein’s main anticausalist argument was that agents have first person authority about their 
reasons for acting (that is, something is a reason for an action just in case agents sincerely claim it is 
their reason), whereas we formulate fallible hypotheses or conjectures about causes, from a third-
person perspective (Wittgenstein 1958: 15; see also Schröder 2010 and Tripodi 2015b). As Wittgen-
stein once put it: 
Let us suppose a train driver sees a red signal flashing and brings the train to 
a stop. In response to the question: ‘Why did you stop?’, he answers perhaps: 
‘Because there is the signal “Stop!”’ One wrongly regards this statement as 
the statement of a cause, whereas it is the statement of a reason. The cause 
may have been that he was long accustomed to reacting to the red signal in 
such and such a way or that in his nervous system permanent connections of 
pathways developed so that the action follows the stimulus in the manner of 
a reflex, or yet something else. The cause need not be known to him. By 
contrast, the reason is what he states it is. (Baker 2003: 110-12) 
 
The Wittgensteinians presented a similar view by providing further arguments. Melden, for example, 
challenged the causalist conception by defending the so-called logical connection argument: 
 
If... the motive were some event either concurrent with or antecedent to the 
action of raising the arm, there would need to be a logically necessary 
connection between two distinct events, the alleged motive and the action, 
however it is described. This is impossible if the sequence motive → action 
is a causal relation. (Melden 1961: 88) 
 
Melden added as a qualification: 
 
It is equally impossible if the motive is some interior mental event distinct 
from that event that is the action of raising the arm. Hence, if the motive 
explains what was done, the explanation is not and cannot be the type of 
explanation exhibited in the explanation of natural phenomena, whether these 
  
 
be the excitation of muscles, the movements of limbs, the explosion of petrol 
vapours or the behaviour of falling bodies. (Melden 1961: 89)  
 
In Explanation and Understanding Von Wright provided a similar argument, based on the notion of 
“Humean” causation, according to which a cause must be logically independent from its effect, (i.e., 
the former can be described independently of the latter, and vice versa). But since, as von Wright 
noticed, an action and the reasons for which one acts are logically connected, it follows that reasons 
cannot be causes of action (in the Humean sense) (von Wright 1971). In further works, von Wright 
partly modified the argument, coming to deny that having reasons implies acting in accordance with 
them, even when nothing prevents the agent from acting. He supposed:  
 
A man firmly resolved to assassinate the tyrant. He has access to his room, 
aims at him with a loaded revolver, but cannot bring himself to pull the 
trigger. Nothing which we later find out about him would make us think that 
he had changed his intention or come to a different opinion about the things 
required of him to make it effective. (von Wright 1976: 422) 
 
From this conceivable and logically consistent case von Wright concluded that the logical connection 
between reasons and action obtains only “ex post actu” (von Wright 1971). 
A further argument presented by von Wright to the effect that rational explanations of intentional 
actions are not, and cannot be, causal relies on the notion of nomicity. That a causal relation between 
two events is nomic means that a causal statement (i.e., a statement asserting that a causal relation 
holds between the two events) requires laws governing some descriptions of the events involved. 
However, rational explanations –– i.e., explanations of actions in terms of reasons for acting –– do 
not involve causal laws, basically because the motivational mechanism is teleological rather than 
causal.xi 
Yet another Wittgensteinian anti-causalist argument is based on the distinction between 
explanatory mental states (or events) and justificatory contents of mental states (or events). Suppose 
the occurrence of a thought that p may cause a person to act. Nonetheless, the reason that person 
would invoke to justify her action is the content, rather than the occurrence of the thought (Schroeder 
2010). In short: the reason of the action is just that p. Similar considerations hold for propositional 
mental states of a different kind. For example, here is Waismann’s formulation of  Wittgenstein’s 
dictations:  
 
The attending to the rule can indeed be the cause for the rule being followed... 
  
 
[But] the cause of an action can never be referred to, to justify the action. I 
may justify a calculation by appealing to the laws of arithmetic, but not by 
appealing to my attending to these laws. The one is a justification, the other a 
causal explanation. (Waismann 1965a: 123)  
 
A somewhat similar argument was presented by Anscombe in Intention. Preliminarily, she defined 
mental causes as “what went on in my mind and issued in the action” (Anscombe 1957: § 11): for 
example, a mental cause is the sudden vision of something, which makes me jump. Mental causes 
can in Anscombe’s sense cause intentional actions and be known by the agent “without observation.” 
As she would put it some years later: “The effect of an intention may even be an action in execution 
of that intention” (Anscombe 1983: 179).xi However, mental causes are not reasons for acting: an 
action is intentional not because it is caused by a mental cause, to which one refers in explaining 
one’s action. In Anscombe’s view “to think that the relation of being done in execution of a certain 
intention, or being done intentionally, is a causal relation between act and intention” is a grammatical 
mistake (Anscombe 1983: 179): intentions can be causes, but in the explanations of actions in terms 
of reasons they are not invoked in a causal capacity (Tripodi 2015b: 143). In Intention §§ 13-16 
Anscombe came to this conclusion by arguing as follows. The presence of mental causes is not a 
sufficient condition for an intentional action: one can do something unintentionally, but as the effect 
of a mental cause; this happens for example when I knock the cup over because I suddenly see a 
frightening face. However, having mental causes is not a necessary condition either: we often act 
intentionally and then explain and justify our action without referring to any mental cause; this 
happens for example when we answer to the special question ‘Why?’ by referring to a “backward 
looking motive”. Anscombe had in mind cases of revenge and gratitude, pity or remorse, in which 
“something that has happened ... is given as the ground of an action... that is good or bad for the 
person... at whom it is aimed” (Anscombe 1957: § 13). For example, you ask me why I killed X, and 
I give you the reason for my action: “Because he killed my brother”. The reason for my action is 
something that has happened: that he killed my brother (Anscombe 1957: § 14). That he killed my 
brother is a “fact” (or a “proposition”), in the idiom shared by many philosophers in the analytic 
tradition (though not by Anscombe herself). The point, however, is substantial rather than 
terminological: such a fact (or proposition) is not a mental cause, simply because it is not mental at 
all. Anscombe also pointed out that if one could show a posteriori “that either the action for which he 
has revenged himself, or that in which he has revenged himself, was quite harmless or was beneficial, 
he ceases to offer a reason” (Anscombe 1957: § 14, 22). But nothing similar happens if we deal with 
mental causes: if the action for which he has revenged himself came out differently –– if, for example, 
he had not killed my brother (it was just an accident, in which X did not play a relevant role) –– the 
  
 
revenge would cease to have the reasons it appeared to have, and in fact, it would no longer be a 
revenge; the agent would cease to offer a reason, because the fact would not obtain.xi 
After Quine’s 1951 attack on the conceptual-factual distinction (it did not matter if the grammatical 
was different from the analytic both intensionally and extensionally); after Watkins’s 1957 critique of 
the distinction between linguistic uses that are constitutive and uses that are not constitutive of 
linguistic competence; after Putnam’s 1962 arguments against the difference between criteria and 
symptoms: after all this happened, it was natural to expect the last and arguably most famous among 
the Wittgensteinian conceptual distinctions relating to the science/philosophy divide, i.e. the 
distinction between reasons and causes, being put into doubt or even demolished by an analytic 
philosopher. And this happened too, without further ado. Or, more precisely, this was the largely 
prevailing interpretation of what was going on in Davidson’s 1963 famous paper. Actually, this 
interpretation was supported by Davidson himself. First, in a footnote Davidson provided a list of his 
polemical targets, mentioning many of the Wittgensteinian “small red books” belonging to the series 
edited by Holland (Davidson 1963: footnote 1; see also chapter 3 above). Notice that Davidson was 
personally acquainted with some of these Wittgensteinians, having invited them to Stanford during 
the 1950s. Second, Davidson explicitly criticised the logical connection argument: he was familiar 
with Melden’s 1961 version, rather than with von Wright’s later and more sophisticated argument; 
yet, Davidson wrote and argued under the assumption that the logical connection argument was 
widely accepted within the entire later Wittgensteinian community. He reformulated it in the 
following terms: since a reason makes an action intelligible by redescribing it, we do not have two 
events, but only one under different descriptions, while causal relations (in the Humean sense) 
demand two distinct events. Then he concluded that if this is the argument, then it fails on three 
grounds. (i) A cause is a different thing from its effect, but also a reason is a different thing from the 
action it explains. (ii) The redescription of events in terms of their causes is as normal and 
uncontroversial as the redescription of actions in terms of their reasons (“We could redescribe this 
event ‘in terms of a cause’ by saying he was burnt”, Davidson 1963: 692). (iii) It is misleading to 
regard causal relations as empirical rather that logical: consider the synthetic statement ‘A caused B’; 
supposing that ‘the cause of B = A’, then by substitution one gets ‘the cause of B caused B’, which is 
analytic; therefore, the status as analytic or synthetic of this statement, as well as its explanatory 
value, depends on how events are described (Davidson 1963: 696). Third, in what is usually known 
as his master argument for a causalist theory of action and action explanation, Davidson argued as 
follows: “A person can have a reason for an action, and perform the action, and yet this reason not be 
the reason why he did it. Central to the relation between a reason and an action it explains is the idea 
that the agent performed the action because he had the reason” (Davidson 1963: 691). This ‘because,’ 
he emphasised, should be regarded as the sort of ‘because’ we find in causal explanations. Otherwise, 
  
 
we could not draw the distinction between mere rationalisations and rationalisations that are part of 
the process of deliberation that prompts the agent to act. Only if a reason is the cause of an action 
(rather than merely being in accordance with it) can the action depend on or be brought about by that 
reason. Suppose, for example, that Agnes intentionally goes to the kitchen. She could have gone there 
to eat, to say hello to her sister, to look for the cat, and so on and so forth. One of these reasons 
justifies her action. However, she acted only on one of these reasons. In other words, only one of 
these reasons is the reason why she went to the kitchen. Which one? The cause of her action.  
The interpretation of Davidson as the champion of an anti-Wittgensteinian and causalist 
philosophy of action has become a long-lasting stereotype in the history of analytic philosophy.  
However, it can be shown that this stereotype is to a large extent misleading. On the one hand, it is 
true that, in the 1950s and early 1960s, some of the Wittgensteinians –– though by no means all  of 
them –– defended something like Davidson’s reformulation of the logical connection argument. And 
it is also true that Davidson’s critique of such an argument had a major role in discrediting, within the 
analytic philosophical community, the reputation of the Wittgensteinian tradition in the philosophy 
of action. On the other hand, however, there are reasons for providing a more balanced interpretation. 
First of all, Davidson’s criticism assumed and employed some basic later Wittgensteinian 
philosophical tools and theses, from Anscombe’s notion of ‘under a description’ (Anscombe 1957) to 
Wittgenstein’s functional view of grammatical rules, according to which something is a rule if it is 
used as a standard of correctness, so that “any empirical proposition can be transformed into a 
postulate, and then becomes a norm of description”, but also the reverse can occur (Wittgenstein 
1953: §321, but see also Wittgenstein 1969: §97). Moreover, Davidson’s master argument ultimately 
consisted of a descriptive, rather than revisionary, grammatical investigation of terms such as ‘cause,’ 
‘reason,’ ‘action’ and ‘explanation’ (Engel 1996). In addition, the logical connection argument was 
by no means the core of the Wittgensteinian anti-causalist account of action and action explanation. 
In fact, as has been shown above, in the work of Wittgenstein and his pupils and followers there are 
at least three further arguments to the effect that rational explanations of intentional actions are not, 
and cannot be, causal: the argument from first person authority, the argument based on the objective, 
non-mental nature of reasons, and the argument focusing on the lack of laws in action explanations. 
Finally, and more importantly, it can be shown that Davidson’s was not at all a causal theory of 
action explanation, that is, a theory in which A causally explains B by virtue of there being a causal 
relation between A and B, so that the explanatory capacity of the explanation consists of the reference 
to that relation (Stoutland 1999 and Tripodi 2015b): xi  the basic reason for this alternative 
interpretation is the presence of a gulf, in Davidson’s article, between singular causal statements (i.e, 
statements expressing causal relations between events) and statements that causally explain the 
events. In Davidson’s view, causal relations hold between events, which are temporal individual 
  
 
entities that can be given under different descriptions (Davidson 1967). However, not only is the 
causal relation between two events independent of how the events are described (singular causal 
statements are extensional); but a causal relation between two events holds only if there is a “strict 
law” (i.e., a lawlike, precise, exceptionless and deterministic “homonomic” generalization), which 
can be formulated without ceteris paribus conditions and is exemplified by a true description of both 
events (Davidson 1970: 219; see also 1993: 8). Such causally related events must, in Davidson’s view, 
belong to a “closed system” of the kind described by physics; therefore they must be physical events, 
that is, they must have a physical description (Davidson 1993). This does not entail, however, that 
only physical events can be causally related: there are, on the contrary, causal relations between 
mental events (i.e., events with a mental description), or between mental and physical events. The 
crucial point is that according to Davidson causal relations hold regardless of how events are 
described (Davidson 1970). 
Davidson also maintained that we can know and describe a causal relation between two events 
without providing a causal explanation in his sense. This is a further consequence of his idea that 
causal relations hold no matter how events are described. Consider for example a sentence such as 
‘the cause of A caused A’: it is a true but entirely non-explanatory singular causal statement (Davidson 
1963: 696 and 1967: 692; see also Stoutland 1999). In addition, Davidson thought that there can be 
causal explanations without causal relations. What is the explanans in Davidson’s theory of action? 
Typically, it is a mix of the agent’s beliefs and pro attitudes. However, in Davidson’s view, beliefs 
and pro attitudes are not sufficiently “dynamic” to cause something, since they are dispositional states 
rather than episodic events: whether or not this is persuading, Davidson explicitly stated that there 
cannot be a causal relation between beliefs and desires, on the one hand, and the action performed, 
on the other hand, because the causal relation holds only between two events (Davidson 1967: 702; 
see also Davidson 1963: 693).  But let us go a bit deeper.  
According to Davidson, mental states such as beliefs and desires causally explain actions, which 
are events, and this entails that there must be at least one event “associated with” these mental states 
that is causally related to the action. This event is often the “onslaught” (i.e., the beginning, the 
forming) of the relevant mental state. The onslaught is also a physical event (i.e., it has at least one 
physical description, probably given in neural terms), and falls under a strict law belonging to physics 
(Davidson 1963: 694). However, does the reference to the onslaught make Davidson’s a causal 
theory? Not at all, for two main reasons. First of all, Davidson did not think that to provide a causal 
explanation of an action one is required to refer to the onslaught; on the contrary, beliefs and desires 
are the really explanatory factors or, in other words, the reasons for the action, but we normally 
provide a causal/rational explanation of our actions without knowing the onslaughts of such mental 
states, let alone their physical descriptions; in Davidson’s view, we give a causal explanation of 
  
 
something without knowing the causal relation involved and the physical description of the relata; 
after all, causal explanations are essentially intensional, for they depend on how things are described. 
This is enough to rule out the possibility that referring to causal relations has explanatory import, 
since causal relations hold no matter how things are described. Identifying and referring to a causal 
relation is not the appropriate thing to do, according to Davidson, if one wants to explain something 
causally or rationally, including intentional actions. Moreover, Davidson also holds that that we 
normally provide causal explanations without any reference to strict laws: rather, we explain actions 
by using “rough heteronomic generalizations,” that is, imprecise, implicit and non-exceptionless 
generalisations, which gives us the explanatory connection between the “cause” and the “effect” 
(Davidson 1970). Strict laws concern only physical events, but we hardly ever know the physical 
descriptions of the mental event we are focussing on. This does not prevent us from being acquainted 
with singular causal relations between events.xi  
Summing up: according to Davidson, causal explanations of actions are not statements mentioning 
causal relations and strict laws. Under this respect, they are not instances of the traditional causal 
theories that Wittgensteinian philosophers such as Anscombe, Kenny, Winch or von Wright took as 
their main polemical targets. But what are they, then? In his 1963 article Davidson wrote: “When we 
ask why someone acted as he did, we want to be provided with an interpretation”. And he added that 
explanations of actions in his sense are nothing but redescriptions of the actions, placed “in a wider 
social, economic, linguistic, or evaluative context” (Davidson 1963: 691). Using an extremely broad 
notion of causality, so as to include even value-oriented interpretations of intentional actions, 
Davidson was running the risk of creating a terminological misunderstanding. But apart from 
terminology, Davidson’s conception of action explanation did not conflict with the Wittgensteinian 
view. In 1971 von Wright came close to realising what was going on when he wrote: “Those who 
think that actions have causes often use ‘cause’ in a much broader sense than I do when I deny this. 
Or they may understand ‘action’ differently. It may well be, then, that ‘actions’ in their sense have 
‘causes’ in my sense, or that ‘actions’ in my sense have ‘causes’ in theirs” (von Wright 1971). It is 
also worth noting that the central role attributed by Davidson to the concept of interpretation is strictly 
connected to his thesis about the normativity of the mental: in his view, we ascribe beliefs, desires 
and other mental states to people following principles of rationality, which tends to make sense of the 
mental states and maximise their overall consistency; this view was, once again, in agreement with a 
later Wittgensteinian perspective in the philosophy of action. 
Leaving aside the terminological differences and the restricted debate over the logical connection 
argument, the nature and the sources of the disagreement between Davidson and the Wittgensteinians 
were subtle and difficult to identify. Roughly, Davidson agreed with the Wittgensteinians that rational 
explanations, which he somewhat misleadingly labelled ‘causal explanations’ are not nomic, whereas 
  
 
causal relations require (strict) lawsxi. Davidson also appeared to agree with the Wittgensteinians 
concerning the first person authority of agents in rational explanations. xi  The only real, deep 
philosophical disagreement between Davidson and the Wittgensteinians depended on the thesis that 
reasons are beliefs and pro attitudes. It is difficult to explicate what Davidson had in mind on the 
basis of the idea that only dispositional, static states, rather than episodic, dynamic events, can be 
reasons for acting. Arguably, he accepted “the linguistic evidence for a deep distinction, in our use of 
‘cause,’ ‘effect,’ and related words,” illustrated by Zeno Vendler, between occurrences of verb 
nominalisations that are fact like, and occurrences that are event like (Davidson 1967: 162; see also 
Vendler 1962). In Davidson’s view, reasons for acting, i.e., what rationally explains an action, is the 
combination of two different “facts”: that the agent has a certain belief and that he/she has a certain 
pro attitude toward the action; a combined fact of the form ‘that X believed that p, and that she desired 
that q’. This could partly explain why Davidson arrived at the misleading formulation, at the 
beginning of Actions, Reasons and Causes, that reasons are mental states. Here is where the real 
disagreement with Anscombe and the other Wittgensteinians lay: according to Anscombe, the agent’s 
reason is often simply that p. This was perhaps a deep disagreement, though not deep enough to 
justify the reception of Davidson’s 1963 arguments as the coup de grâce to the later Wittgensteinian 
tradition, after the blows inflicted upon it by, among others, Quine, Watkins, Popper, Gellner and 
Putnam. This radical and to a large extent misleading interpretation, as well as the sudden and great 
success of Davidson’s paper, was based on expectations, rather than arguments. Or perhaps better: it 
depended on the expectation that an argument against the last Wittgensteinian distinction having to 
do with the science/philosophy divide, namely, the distinction between reasons and causes, would 
have been put forward in the analytic philosophical community. These expectations, it goes without 
saying, were in turn products of the intellectual climate and the scientific transformation of the 
humanities described in chapter 4 above. 
 
5.5 The Return of Mentalism 
Browsing the list of articles published in The Journal of Philosophy and The Philosophical Review 
from 1951 to 1970, a third issue clearly emerges: the critique of the later Wittgensteinian view of 
mind.xi Focusing on this issue, during the 1950s and 1960s analytic philosophers in the United States 
kept on attacking and demolishing the cornerstones of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Three factors 
were particularly relevant. One was the fall of psychological behaviourism –– the methodological 
view according to which explanations in scientific psychology should rule out introspective data and, 
more generally, the reference to inner, unobservable mental states, limiting themselves to the 
consideration of behavioural stimuli and responses –– and the parallel crisis of its philosophical 
cognate, logical behaviourism, the reductive semantic view according to which words belonging to 
  
 
mentalistic language (such as “pain”, “desire”, “intention” and so forth) refer to behavioural 
dispositions, rather than to inner mental objects (see e.g. Watson 1913 and Skinner 1957; Ryle 1949). 
In 1948 the psychologist Edward Tolman had shown that even a simple maze performance by rats 
cannot be explained unless one postulates the existence of inner cognitive maps (Tolman 1948). Then 
in 1959 Noam Chomsky’s famous review tore apart B.F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (Chomsky 1959; 
Skinner 1957). Chomsky stressed that notions such as stimulus, reinforce, conditioning and so forth, 
which are typically employed by the behaviourists, are defined only in extremely simplified 
experimental conditions. Therefore, they are not suited for explaining such a complex phenomenon 
as human language. Chomsky put forward his famous argument from the poverty of the stimulus: 
children are not exposed to sufficiently rich data within their linguistic environments to acquire 
language, so that having ruled out the postulation of inner, innate grammatical rules, behaviourists 
are not able to account for language acquisition (Chomsky 1959).  
As soon as the term ‘behaviourism’ acquired a negative connotation, analytic philosophers 
associated it to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology, sometimes using also other pejoratives such 
as ‘verificationism’ and ‘operationalism’. For example, Gustav Bergmann was particularly eloquent 
when he wrote:  
 
Materialists replace philosophy by science. Or they mistake the latter for the 
former. The later Wittgenstein is no exception. Not surprisingly in one as 
preoccupied with language as he was throughout his career, the key science 
is the psychology and sociology of language, or if you please, of 
communication. Not that the Investigations is a conventional scientific book. 
It is merely a medley of comments. Some are very keen; some others, more 
or less obvious; the rest, standard armchair psychology in the standard 
behaviouristic style. (Bergmann 1961/1964: 354) 
 
Similarly,  Chihara and Fodor declared: “We… hold that the later writings of Wittgenstein express a 
coherent doctrine in which an operationalistic analysis of confirmation and language supports a 
philosophical psychology of a type we shall call ‘logical behaviorism’” (Chihara and Fodor 1965: 
281).  In the following years, this interpretation was shared by different philosophers such as Rorty 
and Robert Fogelin (Rorty 1977; Fogelin 1976). According to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
published in 1967 Wittgenstein’s conception of third-person psychological statements was heavily 
influenced by behaviourism (Kaufmann 1967: 270). And even to this day, the Stanford Encyclopaedia 
of Philosophy maintains that “Analytical behaviorism may be found in the work of Gilbert Ryle 
(1900–76) and the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–51)”xi (but then it adds in brackets the 
  
 
qualification: “If perhaps not without controversy in interpretation, in Wittgenstein’s case”) (Graham 
2000). 
It is a plain fact that the later Wittgenstein’s philosophical reputation was ruined by the charge of 
behaviourism. However, was the charge fully justified? There are at least some doubts about that. As 
Hacker more than once emphasised, Wittgenstein was not at any rate a methodological behaviourist 
à la Skinner. Moreover, according to Wittgenstein there are in principle reasons to think that the 
meaning of a linguistic expression cannot be explicated in terms of behavioural stimulus-response 
patterns. In particular, 
 
No attempt to explain the meanings of expressions in behaviouristic terms 
can explain the rule-governed connections within the network of language, 
for such connections are internal or logical, not causal, and correlation of 
stimuli and responses can at most establish external relations, not internal 
ones. (Hacker 2001: 60) 
 
Wittgenstein was aware that for his philosophy the relationship with the label ‘behaviourism’ was a 
delicate affair to handle. In a lecture delivered in Cambridge in 1936 he explicitly raised the question: 
“First of all it seems that we are partial for ‘behaviour,’ that we wish to explain everything in terms 
of it. Now why should we be biassed in this way? Is it because of some kind of materialism? What 
axe have we to grind?” (Wittgenstein 1936/1993: 280). Then in the Investigations he also wondered: 
“Why should I deny that there is a mental process?” (1953: § 306). In his view, that kind of “denial” 
did not get the point of his grammatical remarks:  “But ‘There has just taken place in me the mental 
process of remembering…’ means nothing more than: ‘I have just remembered…’. Denying the men-
tal process would mean denying the remembering; to deny that anyone ever remembers anything” 
(1953: § 306). Thus he commented: “‘Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you ulti-
mately really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?’— If I do speak of a fiction, 
then it is of a grammatical fiction” (1953: § 307). In fact, his purpose in the philosophy of psychology 
was to avoid at the same time both behaviourism and the myth of inner processes: “Our job is obvi-
ously not to reduce anything to anything, but only to avoid certain misleading ways of expression. 
Toothache is not a behaviour but an experience. ‘We distinguish between ‘behaviour’ and ‘experi-
ences’. Dancing is a behaviour, toothache an experience” (1936/1993: 279). At any rate, he seemed 
to be fully aware of the risk that his work may be misinterpreted in behaviouristic terms: “Now it 
looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we do not want to deny them” (Wittgen-
stein 1953: § 308). 
  
 
The story of the controversial representation of Wittgenstein as an outright behaviourist makes it 
evident that, as happened for example in the case of Davidson’s critique of the anti-causalist theories 
of reasons and action-explanations, the success, or more precisely the lack of success, of the later 
Wittgensteinian tradition depended on a large extent on coarse-grained, approximate but rhetorically 
efficacious challenges and controversies, rather than on fine-grained, specific, rigorous arguments. 
Consider, as a further indication, the philosophical, rather than scientific, critiques of logical behav-
iourism. Besides Putnam’s thought-experiment of the Super-Spartans, imaginary people who do not 
manifest any pain-behaviour even though they feel pain as we do (Putnam 1963), and besides 
Sellars’s philosophical myth, in which sensations as inner mental episodes are introduced by the ge-
nius Jones as theoretical, unobservable entities that have the power to cause intelligent behaviour 
(Sellars 1956; see also Tripodi 2011), besides the above-mentioned arguments it is likely that the 
most straightforward argument against logical behaviourism was the following: logical behaviourism 
is false because it is impossible to define a simple mental state (such as for example the desire to 
climb the mountain) in purely dispositional, let alone behavioural, terms, unless one mentions other 
mental states too (such as for example various beliefs concerning climbing and mountains). Notice 
that this argument was presented in 1957 by Roderick Chisholm and, independently, by Peter Geach 
in Mental Acts, one of the most famous Wittgensteinian little red books. However, apparently this 
was not regarded as a sufficient reason to revisit in a more balanced way the picture of the relationship 
between behaviourism and the later Wittgensteinian conception of mind (Chisholm 1957, Geach 
1957). 
Another factor that fostered the fall of the later Wittgensteinian view of mind was the rise of re-
ductionist philosophical theories. The scientific context facilitated the emergence of this kind of ma-
terialism. Consider in particular the development, in the 1950s, of biological studies of the brain, 
thanks to the encounter of biochemistry with electrophysiology, as well as the development of re-
search on brain systems, both in humans and in animals, as happened for example in the study of 
memory (Hodgkin and Huxley 1939, Hodgking et al. 1952; Mountcastle 1957, Hubel and Wiesel 
1959; Scoville and Milner 1957; see also Kandel and Squire 2000). The main reductionist view of 
the mind was the so-called mind-brain identity theory, according to which each type of mental state 
is contingently identical to a type of brain state. In the 1950s and 1960s this theory was defended by 
Ullin Place, J.J.C. Smart and David Malet Armstrong in Australia, and by Feigl and David Lewis in 
the United States (Place 1956, Smart 1959, Armstrong 1966 and 1968, Feigl 1958, Lewis 1966). 
Having studied in Oxford under Ryle, within the group of these materialists it was Smart who felt the 
need to resist the objections raised by linguistic philosophers against the mind-brain identity theory. 
In particular, Smart focused on the following “linguistic” objection:  
  
 
It is only a contingent fact (if it is a fact) that when we have a certain kind of 
sensation there is a certain kind of process in our brain. Indeed it is possible, 
though perhaps in the highest degree unlikely, that our present physiological 
theories will be as out of date as the ancient theory connecting mental pro-
cesses with goings-on in the heart. It follows that when we report a sensation 
we are not reporting a brain-process. (Smart 1959: 147)  
In line with a similar argument set up by Putnam a couple of years earlier, Smart replied: “Indeed, it 
is logically possible (though highly unlikely) that the electrical discharge account of lightning might 
one day be given up” (Smart 1959: 148; see also Putnam 1957). Nonetheless, it would be absurd to 
doubt that lightening is nothing but an electrical charge, or, in other words, that an adequate charac-
terisation of lightening is provided by an intra-theoretic reduction in electromagnetic terms. Unsur-
prisingly, Malcolm was one of the few to criticise the mind-brain identity theory in the name of 
Wittgenstein (Malcolm 1965). However, there were strong enough “external” factors to jeopardise 
the outcome of the debate between the Wittgensteinians and the Australasian materialists. This 
emerged clearly in a later discussion during the 1980s, when Malcolm confronted Armstrong on con-
sciousness, causality and the nature of mind (Armstrong and Malcolm 1984). As Armstrong summa-
rised on that occasion, 
If we take even a halfway scientific view of the matter (and that a scientific 
view of the matter is true, is a premise of my argument), then we will think 
that certain causal factors must be present. In (I) it is natural to assume that a 
state, presumably a brain-state, corresponds to the intention, but that the state 
passes away before I see the person. In (2) the state continues, and is present 
when I see the person. But, because of inhibiting causal factors at work, it 
does not have the effect of my asking the question. In (3) the state continues, 
and, when I see the person, the latter perception plus the state (plus many 
other causal factors) brings it about that I ask the question. (A strange case, 
(3'), is possible where I ask the question, but not as a causal result of the state.)  
If all this is denied, then I think that we are in the realm of magic and mystery. 
Human beings would not be within the causal order. Yet they manifestly are 
within that order. (Armstrong 1984: 214) 
It would have been difficult to state it more perspicuously than Armstrong did: the realm of science 
and causal order versus the realm of magic and mystery.xi During the debate, this was the key to the 
  
 
success of the Australasian materialists and, respectively, the key to the lack of success of their Witt-
gensteinian opponents: this counted more than Malcolm’s (and Wittgenstein’s) more or less solid 
arguments, and even more than the alleged truth of Smart’s and Armstrong’s theories, which would 
in fact in the following years be criticised and replaced by plenty of different theories and approaches, 
from functionalism to token-token identity theories up to eliminativism. 
Yet another factor causing the collapse of the later Wittgensteinian philosophical view of mind   –
– arguably, the historically most relevant factor –– was the paradigm shift that took place in the late 
1950s in the study of mind, a historical process usually referred to as the ‘emergence of cognitive 
science.’ The development of computers encouraged the idea that cognitive processes could be ana-
lysed in computational terms, that is, as mechanical procedures which can in principle be realised by 
a Turing machine (Turing 1936). Cognitive science was a child of the science-oriented intellectual 
culture briefly described in chapter 4 above, a culture growing up after the second world war in the 
American interstitial academy (Isaac 2012). According to historiographical convention, the cognitive 
revolution began in 1956 at a multidisciplinary symposium held at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (Miller 2003): George Miller gave a talk on short-term memory; Allen Newell and Her-
bert Simon presented a computer program that could prove mathematical theorems; Chomsky illus-
trated his generative-transformational linguistics. All of them noticed a deep convergence between 
different approaches and disciplines: they were all interested in studying human cognition; they took 
as a working hypothesis that cognitive processes have a computational nature; to a lesser extent, they 
attributed to the mind-software analogy –– which would four years later be philosophically developed 
by Putnam –– a leading explanatory role (Putnam 1960a). 
It seems reasonable to say that a paradigm shift –– a fortiori, one in which philosophy was only a 
single component of a complex, multidisciplinary scientific process –– could not be contained, let 
alone stopped, by mere philosophical arguments (Bloor 1976). Therefore it would be inappropriate 
here to present a detailed analysis of the philosophical relationship between Wittgenstein’s philoso-
phy of mind and the cognitive sciences.xi However, some comments might be worth making so as to 
justify the very assumption that the cognitive revolution was alien and even hostile to the later Witt-
gensteinian tradition. This assumption might seem controversial because it is not entirely clear 
whether, at least under a certain interpretation, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of mind can on the 
contrary be compatible with cognitive science: for example, not only did Wittgenstein’s notion of 
family-resemblances directly influence the prototype-theory of concepts introduced by Eleanor 
Rosch in the 1970s (Rosch 1973), but more recently Wittgenstein-inspired conceptions of lexical 
competence, conceived of as an ability to speak and understand words such as ‘cat’ and ‘chair’, have 
been presented within the field of cognitive science (Marconi 1997), and Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
  
 
of psychology have appeared to fit naturally with the cognitive perspective known as enactivism 
(Varela, Thompson and Rosch E. 1991; O’Regan and Noë 2001; Hutto 2013; see also Moyal-Shar-
rock 2016). All this notwithstanding, it is possible to show that some crucial aspects of cognitive 
science were indeed incompatible with the main tenets of the later Wittgensteinian conception of 
mind. Consider, as a general point, the view that cognitive processes are to be conceived of as calculi, 
in which inner representations are manipulated in accord with implicit, unconscious and innate rules: 
as is well-known, one of Wittgenstein’s central claims in the Investigations was that understanding 
is not a process, let alone an inner process (Wittgenstein 1953: § 154); the rule-following considera-
tions seemed to be at odds as with intellectualism as with the very idea of an entirely unconscious 
rule (Glock 2008a: 165; see also Hacker and Baker 1985 and Bouveresse 1991); the notion of an 
inner representation, whose centrality was second to none in cognitive science, was arguably a po-
lemical target of the private language argument (Fodor 1975; see also Frascolla, Marconi and Volto-
lini 2010: 2).  
To shed some light on the real bone of contention, two episodes are worth mentioning, character-
ised by an interesting mix of cultural hegemony on the part of “scientific philosophy” and the usual 
bit of misunderstanding. The first occurred in 1975, when in his The Language of Thought Jerry Fodor 
accused Wittgenstein’s private language argument of committing the worst philosophical sin of all: 
verificationism. According to Fodor, Wittgenstein’s purpose was to show that the attempt to use a 
private language correctly was entirely meaningless (Fodor 1975: 68-9).  With this purpose in mind, 
Wittgenstein as interpreted by Fodor characterised a private language either as a language “whose 
terms refer to things that only its speaker can experience or as a language for the applicability of 
whose terms there exist no public criteria (or rules, or conventions)” (Fodor 1975: 69). Given this 
definition, nobody, not even the private language speaker, is able to verify whether a term of that 
language is used correctly or incorrectly. Under Fodor’s interpretation, the point Wittgenstein was 
making is that no definite sense could be attached to the notion of a private language because nobody 
could ascertain whether a term belonging to the private language is used correctly, but –– this was 
the underlying assumption of Wittgenstein’s private language argument –– a term could be applied 
correctly only if someone could at least in principle verify its correct application. Since, in Fodor’s 
view, there is nothing to be said for “the verificationist principle that an assertion cannot be sensible 
unless there is some way of telling whether it is true,” Wittgenstein’s famous private language argu-
ment “is not really any good” (Fodor 1975: 70). 
Arguably, however, Fodor’s attack on the private language argument was rhetorically efficacious  
but exegetically wrong. As Diego Marconi argued convincingly,  
  
 
The trouble with a private language is not that we have no way of assuring 
ourselves that a term belonging to it is being used correctly (or coherently); 
the trouble is that we cannot be mistaken  about whether it is being used cor-
rectly, for “whatever is going to seem right to me is right”. The private lan-
guage is not a game at which we cannot win, it is a game at which we cannot 
lose. (Marconi 1995: 108) 
And this is the real reason why the private language-game is entirely senseless. Wittgenstein’s argu-
ment is not verificationist. All private language users know only too well how to ascertain that a  term 
belonging to the private language is being used correctly. The verification is so simple: if it seems to 
them that the term is used correctly, then it is; otherwise it is not. The verification is immediate, rather 
than precluded (Marconi 1995: 108). Pace Fodor, the point of Wittgenstein’s argument is ontological 
or semantic, rather than epistemological: there is no ‘being right’ or ‘being wrong’ in the use of a 
term belonging to a private language, whether the speaker knows it or not.xi 
The second telling episode in the dispute between cognitive scientists and Wittgensteinian philos-
ophers took place during the 1980s and 1990s, when the main course of the history of analytic phi-
losophy had already been decided. The main characters in this story were Chomsky, on the one hand, 
and two Oxford philosophers who were among the most authoritative interpreters of Wittgenstein, 
Anthony Kenny and Peter Hacker, on the other hand. As is well known, Chomsky attributed to gen-
erative linguistics the aim of explaining the knowledge of language of competent speakers. Based on 
native speakers’ grammaticality judgements, the linguist investigates the syntactic structure of sen-
tences, so as to build a complete theory of language, a grammar, regarded as a finite set of syntactic 
rules (Chomsky 1957). Therefore, prima facie, a grammar in Chomsky’s sense can be seen as a math-
ematical codification of empirical or intuitive data taken from the linguistic behaviour of ideal lan-
guage users. However, Chomsky was not content with accepting this preliminary characterisation. In 
his view, a grammar in his sense is also psychologically real: not only by applying the rules of a 
generative grammar G is a linguist able to generate all and only the sentences that a competent speaker 
would consider well-formed; but from this it is reasonable to conclude that the competent speaker 
knows G (Chomsky 1970 and 1986). However, how should this knowledge of grammar G be con-
ceived? As is obvious, competent speakers do not have explicit knowledge of G. According to the 
Wittgensteinians, however, they do not have tacit knowledge either. Black noticed that one cannot 
have tacit knowledge of G unless one is able to make it explicit, with a certain amount of ingenuity, 
that G is what one knows; but here the amount of ingenuity required was too high (Black 1970: 456). 
Malcolm stressed that it would be absurd to say that a speaker, let alone a child, possesses or is 
endowed with a theory of language (Malcolm 1971). Hacker argued as follows: “To ask someone 
  
 
how much English history he knows invites such answers as ‘I know the Tudor period in great detail, 
but the Stuart only superficially’,” whereas “it makes no sense to ask a native English speaker how 
much English he knows, and that is not because a native speaker by definition knows a lot!” (Hacker 
1990: 128). From a Wittgensteinian point of view, there is only one reasonable interpretation of the 
phrase “X knows grammar G”: G is a theory that (perhaps adequately) describes the data provided 
by X’s ability to speak and understand his native language. 
However, Chomsky in turn reacted, making it clear that he did not accept that reinterpretation of 
his work (Chomsky 1986, 1992, 1994). Initially he invoked a distinction from ordinary language 
between knowing a language and being able to use it: 
Consider two people who share exactly the same knowledge of Spanish: Their 
pronunciation, knowledge of the meaning of words, grasp of sentence struc-
ture, and so on, are identical. Nevertheless, these two people may –– and 
characteristically do –– differ greatly in their ability to use the language. One 
may be a great poet, the second an utterly pedestrian language user  who 
speaks in clichés. (Chomsky 1988: 9) 
Kenny and Hacker stressed that knowledge of language and ability to speak and understand are iden-
tified by the same behavioural criteria (Kenny 1981/1984; Hacker 1990). Chomsky’s alleged coun-
terexample of the poet and, say, the journalist did not prove anything: 
Does the fact that the one writes great verse and the other pedestrian prose 
show that knowing Spanish is a not a complex array of abilities? Not so; it 
merely demonstrates that one can know a language without being able to 
write poetry, speak a language without being able to turn an elegant phrase, 
or write decent letters without being a master of epistolary style. (Hacker 
1990: 130) 
This, however, was not the last word in the dispute, since Chomsky exhibited his philosophical skills 
by presenting a thought-experiment: 
Suppose that Juan, a speaker of Spanish, suffers aphasia after a severe head 
wound, losing all ability to speak and understand. Has Juan lost his 
knowledge of Spanish? Of course, Juan recovers the ability to speak and un-
derstand Spanish, because it is his native language, but what was retained was 
not the ability, because that was lost. What was retained was a system of 
knowledge, a cognitive system of the mind/brain. Evidently, possession of 
  
 
this knowledge cannot be identified with ability to speak and understand or 
with a system of dispositions, skills, or habits. (Chomsky 1988: 10) 
Chomsky’s was an imaginary case, but something similar happened in reality with the so-called blind-
sight phenomena: after having surgically removed his occipital cortex from the right hemisphere, 
patient DB said he did not “see” anything in his blind field; however, if forced to guess about whether 
a stimulus was present in his blind field, he could succeed in a variety of discriminations. In the early 
1970s Lawrence Weiskrantz interpreted this discovery as a confirmation of the existence of a divide 
between visual perception and visual sensation. In 1991 John Hyman, who studied at Oxford under 
Hacker’s guidance, provided a Wittgenstein-inspired analysis of the paradoxical character of blind-
sight. Hyman explained that the concept of vision is normally governed by two kinds of criteria: 
behavioural criteria, on the one hand, and the awareness of the seeing person, which can typically be 
expressed in linguistic terms, on the other hand. Normally these two kinds of criteria go hand in hand, 
whereas in the case of DB they are divided: only the former, but not the latter, is present. That is why 
it would be philosophically less misleading not to raise the question ‘But after all, does DB see or 
not?’ as if it were a factual question (Hyman 1991). 
In a similar vein, Kenny replied to Chomsky that normally we attribute knowledge of Spanish (i.e., 
the ability to speak and understand Spanish) on the basis of behavioural criteria: the person can readily 
speak, understand and think in Spanish. In the imaginary case, however, these criteria are not appli-
cable. Nonetheless, normally we also take for granted that if one is able to speak Spanish today, and 
one has neither studied Spanish nor come in contact with it during the last month, then, if not a crite-
rion, this is a very strong indication that one already knew Spanish one month ago. The thought-
experiment creates a contrast between two kinds of indications that normally go in the same direction 
but are now “whittled away” (Kenny 1981/1984: 247). Chomsky illustrates the “fuzzy edges of the 
concept knowing a language” (Kenny 1981/1984: 247). Therefore there is nothing wrong in saying, 
against part of the evidence, that Juan knew Spanish during aphasia: it is crucial, however, to under-
stand that in so doing we are making a decision, rather than a discovery, concerning the meaning of 
‘know’ in that context (Kenny 1981/1984: 248). The decision is not blind, since we may be persuaded 
to take it by considering the second part of the evidence, namely, that Juan recovered Spanish, not 
Japanese, without being exposed to it. Yet, this was a decision, which could have been different. 
Chomsky did not accept Kenny’s move, since he was convinced that there was a fact of the matter 
to be observed and described empirically in order to answer the question: After all, did Juan know 
Spanish during aphasia? Put into the corner by Kenny, Chomsky reacted by abandoning the consid-
eration of ordinary language and relying on the scientific character of his work. As a scientist, he 
  
 
maintained, he was free to introduce a new vocabulary. He wanted to answer affirmatively to this 
question even supposing that Juan never recovered the ability to speak Spanish: he was conceiving 
knowledge (of language) as a “cognitive structure,” a “computational system of the mind/brain,” 
since in his view when we speak of mind we are speaking of the brain at a certain level of abstraction 
(Chomsky 1988: 9). At that point Kenny in turn replied by supposing “that Professor Chomsky were 
now to die, and on opening his skull we discovered that there was nothing inside it except sawdust. 
This is indeed an exotic suggestion: if it happened it would be an astonishing miracle. But if it hap-
pened it would not cast the slightest doubt on what we all now know, namely, that Chomsky knows 
English extremely well” (Kenny 1981/1984: 250). Then Chomsky concluded: “The scientific ap-
proaches, I believe without exception, depart from the commonsense notion in several ways; these 
departures also affect the concepts of knowledge or understanding of language, use of language, rule 
of language, rule-guided linguistic behavior and others” (Chomsky 1986: 15). He also suggested that, 
if one likes, one could use the technical term ‘cognize,’ rather than the ordinary word ‘know,’ to refer 
to Juan’s peculiar mental state during aphasia. Later on he would comment caustically: “I used the 
word ‘cognize’ just to avoid pointless debates caused by irrational ideologies” (Smith 1999: 236). 
Once again, the “dark side” of the later Wittgensteinian tradition was identified with its non-scientific 
nature. 
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xi According to Tripodi (2015b), Anscombe is here employing what would later be known as the concept of good (or 
normative, as opposed to motivational) reasons, thus making sense of the idea of a pratical reality (see Dancy 2000 and 
also Williams 1980). Good reasons are those that there are in favour (or against) the action; they are normative, since 
they approve (or disapprove), are favourable (or adverse) toward an action, and since they make the action right (or 
wrong). The paradigmatic cases of this kind of reasons are moral reasons (Tripodi 2015b: 143). Tripodi (2015b) also 
conjectures that Anscombe’s argument based on backward looking motives is a simpler version of Dancy’s anti-causalist 
argument, according to which “motivational reasons (the reasons in the light of which one acts) must be the sort of things 
capable of being among normative reasons (the reasons that there are or that one has); otherwise, it would be senseless to 
ask, as we in fact do in everyday discourse, whether the agent actually acted for a good reason or, which is the same, 
whether the reason, for which he acted, was a good reason; therefore, motivational reasons cannot be mental states or 
events, let alone mental causes, for a mental state, like one’s believing or one’s desiring, is not a fact” (Tripodi 2015b: 
144; see also Dancy 2000: 118-19). 
xi Arguably, Stoutland (1999) was partly under the influence of Child (1994), thus diverging from Stoutland (1976) and 
(1982). 
xi As is well-known, all this is also compatible with Davidson’s so called anomalous monism, according to which (i) there 
are causal relations between mental events and physical events (as well as between mental events and other mental 
events); (ii) events that are causally related fall under strict laws; (iii) there are no strict psychophysical laws (as opposed 
to rough generalisations) (Davidson 1970). 
xi Not all the Wittgensteinians adopted the notion of nomic causation. For example, Anscombe did not (Tripodi 2015b: 
149). According to her, “causality consists of the derivativeness of an effect from its causes. This is the core, the common 
feature, of causality in its various kinds. Effects derive from, arise out of, come out of, their causes” (Anscombe 1971: 
136). 
xi More than twenty years later, as is well-known, Davidson provided a new theory of first person knowledge, which 
seems to be incompatible with a Wittgensteinian viewpoint (Davidson 1984a; see also Hacker’s 1997). At that time, 
however, his 1963 article had already run its course in the history of analytic philosophy. 
xi See for example Smart (1959), (1961), (1963) Bergmann (1960), Putnam (1957), Cook (1965), Rorty (1970). Malcolm 
(1963) was an attempt to defend Wittgenstein. 
xi Notice that the interpretation of Ryle as an analytic behaviourist is not unanimously accepted. According to Daniel 
Dennett, for example, it is nothing but an urban legend (Dennett 2000). 
xi Yet another aspect that is worth-emphasising here is that Smart made explicit use of Ockham's razor to justify his 
preference for the mind-brain identity theory over mind-body dualism  (Smart 1959). 
xi On this issue see for example Stern (1991), Proudfoot (1997), Bennett and Hacker (2003), Sullivan (2017). 
xi A fortiori, Fodor was right when he wrote that Wittgenstein’s argument was not applicable against (something like) his 
language of thought. This was true, however, neither because Wittgenstein’s argument was verificationist, hence flawed, 
nor because the language of thought is not private (since it is shared by different people and machines). Rather, the 
language of thought ––  not differently from a private language in Wittgenstein’s sense –– cannot be misunderstood or 
used mistakenly (in the normative sense, not in the sense in which we say that something goes wrong with the mecha-
nisms), therefore it is not a language at all (see Marconi 1995). 
 
  
 
6. Necessity, Style, and Metaphilosophy 
 
Even during the linguistic turn, in the 1950s and 1960s, analytic philosophers did not abandon their 
interest in metaphysics: not so much because of Strawson’s influential but idiosyncratic use of the 
term (Strawson 1959), but rather due to the fact that philosophers such as for example Bergmann, 
Chisholm, Smart and Donald Williams kept on doing metaphysics in the traditional sense, i.e., as a 
theoretical and highly speculative investigation on the necessary features and deep structure of the 
world (Fisher 2015). However, it is difficult to deny that there is a lot of truth in the historiographical 
stereotype according to which the novel account of necessity and possibility made available by the 
works of the Princeton philosophers Saul Kripke and David Lewis –– born in 1940 and 1941 
respectively –– had a major role in the revival of analytic metaphysics in the early 1970s (Kripke 
1972/1980; Lewis 1973; see also Soames 2014: chapters 6 and 7). These works objectively 
contributed to a further weakening of the later Wittgensteinian tradition in the history of analytic 
philosophy. The adverb ‘objectively’ suggests that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was not the direct 
target of Kripke’s and Lewis’s philosophical attacks, though it would be an exaggeration to say that 
the decline of the later Wittgensteinian tradition was just one of their accidental and unintended by-
products. The relationship between Wittgenstein’s view of necessity and the research programmes in 
metaphysics inaugurated by Lewis and Kripke is complicated and would deserve a book-length 
investigation (see, e.g., Kalhat 2007 and Glock 2007); for the present purposes, we have to be satisfied 
with a schematic outline of the story, in which emphasis is put on the issues that are likely to be more 
relevant to the overall history reconstructed in the present book. 
 
6.1 Wittgenstein and the Revival of Metaphysics 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein had famously affirmed: “There is only a logical necessity” (Wittgenstein 
1922: 6.37; see also 6.375) and “All happening and being-so is accidental” (1922: 6.41). On these 
points he never changed his mind. Rather he developed similar views in the context of his later 
grammatical investigations, using a partly new vocabulary and philosophical framework. By ‘logical 
necessity’ he meant the necessity of mathematical propositions, broadly conceived, so as to include 
logical laws, arithmetic equations, and geometric axioms and theorems. Realism and platonism were 
his main polemical targets: in his view, necessity does not inhere in things, belonging either to the 
physical world or to a Platonic realm, but is a by-product of our language, our forms of representation, 
our conceptual schemes. In a nutshell, a proposition p is logically necessary if we cannot conceive of 
not-p; the necessary is what we could not conceive as being otherwise (Wittgenstein 1937-1944/1983: 
IV, § 29; see also Marconi 2010: 139). In the first Critique Kant had argued that (i) mathematical 
propositions are paradigm-cases of necessary propositions, i.e., propositions that could not be 
  
 
otherwise; (ii) all necessary propositions are knowable a priori, and vice versa (Kant 1781-1787/1999: 
A xv; B3). Therefore Wittgenstein’s view of necessity –– which was mutatis mutandis also shared by 
Carnap –– can be seen as part of a broadly Kantian tradition in the philosophy of logic and 
mathematics (Williams 1974, Lear 1984; see also Carnap 1934 and 1947).xi Wittgenstein regarded 
logical laws and mathematical propositions as disguised grammatical rules, which have “the hardness 
of the logical must” (Wittgenstein 1953: § 437). The necessity of such rules corresponds to the 
inconceivability of their negations, which does not however depend on our powers of imagination 
being unequal to the task (Wittgenstein 1953: § 251). It sometimes happens that we are tempted to 
say “I can’t imagine the opposite” (Wittgenstein 1953: § 251): in such cases, it often seems to us that 
we discovered a necessary feature of the world, such as for example the property of being identical 
with itself (Wittgenstein 1953: § 216). On the contrary, Wittgenstein warned us, in such cases we 
have just found a grammatical connection, that is, an internal relation among concepts. According to 
Wittgenstein, metaphysics is just this: the confusion of a grammatical proposition, such as for 
example ‘Every rod has a length,’ with an empirical one, such as ‘This table has the same length as 
the one over there.’ Only in the latter case do we understand what it means to have a picture of the 
opposite, whereas in the former case “the picture attaching to the grammatical proposition could only 
show what is called ‘the length of a rod’” (Wittgenstein 1953: § 251). 
Within the above-outlined Wittgensteinian view of necessity, two distinct though intertwined 
elements can be discerned. The first was the analysis of what logical necessity positively is. The main 
result of this analysis was the above-described linguistic or conceptual view of necessity, which 
regarded necessary statements as grammatical rules in disguise. The second element was 
Wittgenstein’s anti-metaphysical stance, whose main expression was perhaps an argument against 
(the notion of) necessary facts or, more precisely, an argument to the effect that either F is a fact or F 
is necessary, tertium non datur. In the Tractatus the argument ran as follows (for this explicit 
formulation, see Marconi 2010: 145). Suppose F is a necessary fact. Given F, there is also P, the 
proposition that pictures F: otherwise it would not be true that “the specification of all true elementary 
propositions describes the world completely” (Wittgenstein 1922: 4.26) (assuming of course that “the 
world is the totality of facts,”  as it is stated in the Tractatus; Wittgenstein 1922: 1.1). As proposition 
P pictures a necessary fact, its negation, non-P, states an impossibility. However, “what is thinkable 
is possible too” (Wittgenstein 1922: 3.02) so that, by contraposition, what is impossible is 
unthinkable. It follows that non-P, which is impossible, is also unthinkable, hence it is not a genuine 
proposition or, in other words, it does not picture any state of affairs. The same can be said of P, 
namely, the picture of F (this is stated for example in Wittgenstein 1922: 4.0641 and 5.2341). Thus it 
can be concluded that F is not, and cannot be, a necessary fact: if F is necessary, it is not a fact; if it 
is a fact, it is not necessary. The concept of a fact is, in the theoretical framework of the Tractatus, 
  
 
logically related to the concept of contingency. However, as underlined above, the rejection of 
necessary facts is one of the main invariants in Wittgenstein’s philosophy: even when he abandoned 
the philosophical apparatus presented and employed in the Tractatus, he never rejected the main 
rationale of the Tractatus’s argument against necessary facts.  
For reasons provided in chapter 3 above, which have to do with the confusion between 
grammatical rules and analytic sentences, the first aspect of Wittgenstein’s account of necessity, 
namely, the view of necessity as a disguised byproduct of grammar, fell under the attack of Quine on 
analyticity and conceptual truth. Under this respect, and also because ontology played a major role in 
his philosophy, there is little doubt that Quine was among those who promoted a substantial “return” 
of metaphysics into the history of analytic philosophy. However, while with one hand he opened the 
door to metaphysics, at the same time with the other hand Quine offered analytic philosophers a 
powerful anti-metaphysical weapon, namely, extensionalism, characterised by radical scepticism and 
hostility towards modal concepts and, in particular, de re necessity. Yet, one trouble with Quine’s 
sceptical attitude was that it was not easily compatible with a balanced philosophical evaluation of 
the impressive results achieved by modal logicians from the late-1950s to the mid-1960s (Prior 1957; 
Hintikka 1961 and 1963; Kanger 1957; Bayart 1958; Montague 1960):xi as is well-known, a special 
place in this story was occupied by Kripke, a student of Quine at Harvard in the late 1950s, who 
introduced his highly influential possible-world semantics (Kripke 1959, 1962, 1963a, 1963b, 1965a, 
1965b).  
Then in 1970 Kripke delivered his famous lectures on Naming and Necessity at Princeton (Kripke 
1972/1980). He started focusing on an apparently marginal point. In the axiomatic system of modal 
logic presented by Ruth Barcan Marcus in the mid-1940s it was possible to prove that if a = b, then 
necessarily a = b; for example, if Hesperus = Phosphorus, then necessarily Hesperus = Phosphorus. 
On the one hand, it was difficult to reject this conclusion, which ultimately derived from two logically 
solid principles: the so-called Leibniz’s Law and, in particular, the half of the bi-conditional known 
as the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, according to which there cannot be numerically 
distinct entities that have all their properties in common; and the principle of the necessity of self-
identity, according to which necessarily every entity is self-identical. On the other hand, however, 
there were at least two big worries about the idea that if Hesperus = Phosphorus, then necessarily 
Hesperus = Phosphorus. First, according to a tradition dating back to Frege and Russell, proper names 
were to be regarded as synonyms of definite descriptions. For example, ‘Hesperus’ was considered a 
synonym of ‘the heavenly body visible in the morning,’ while ‘Phosphorus’ a synonym of ‘the 
heavenly body visible in the evening.’ Under that assumption one could easily imagine a state of 
affairs in which the heavenly body visible in the morning is, say, Venus, whereas the heavenly body 
visible in the evening is Mars, so as to conclude that ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ can be true without 
  
 
being necessarily so. As is well-known, Kripke dismissed this traditional semantic view by providing 
a new theory of reference, based on the idea that proper names are direct and rigid designators (Kripke 
1972/1980). xi  The second worry about the necessity of ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ depended on 
Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s Kantian views of necessity, according to which it cannot be necessary 
that Hesperus = Phosphorus, since all necessary statements are conceptual (grammatical or analytic), 
therefore they are knowable a priori, whereas we know only a posteriori, thanks to a scientific 
discovery, that Hesperus = Phosphorus.  
Here Kripke came close to contrasting explicitly the second basic element contained in 
Wittgenstein’s view of necessity, that is, his argument against necessary facts. Kripke drew a 
tripartition among different conceptual levels: the semantic level, which concerns the meaning of 
words and the concepts that we use to express thoughts; the epistemological level, which is about the 
way in which we obtain and justify our beliefs, either a priori or a posteriori; the metaphysical level, 
which has to do with the intrinsic nature of the world in itself, independently of the way in which we 
speak of it and the things we know about it. Then he suggested that the three notions of analytic, a 
priori and necessary are not co-extensional. The identity Hesperus = Phosphorus, for example, is true 
and necessarily so, since ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ refer to the same object, Venus, not only in the 
actual world but in all possible worlds. However, we know that Hesperus = Phosphorus only a 
posteriori. Now, what is the proposition expressed by the sentence ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’? This 
proposition can be interpreted as the fact that Hesperus = Phosphorus: this is, however, a necessary 
fact, but it is knowable only a posteriori, on the basis of scientific inquiry rather than mere semantic 
competence. As Putnam suggested in the same period, the picture of how substance and natural kind 
terms work is very similar to the picture of how proper names work; therefore additional examples 
of necessary a posteriori facts are salt = NaCl and water = H2O (Kripke 1972/1980; Putnam 1975). 
The claim that some necessary truths are knowable a posteriori and the subsequent rehabilitation of 
the notion of necessary fact were a serious challenge for a Wittgenstein-inspired conception of 
philosophy. Kripke’s a posteriori necessary facts seemed to provide counterexamples to 
Wittgenstein’s Kantian view of necessity. 
Notice, however, that abstracting from the specific context of the picture theory of meaning 
defended in the Tractatus, it is possible to glimpse a simple but powerful argument all along 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical work, early and late: consider a fact such as for example the fact that, 
say, salt = NaCl; it is conceivable, hence possible that this fact does not obtain; hence it is not 
necessary that salt = NaCl (Marconi calls it ‘the simple argument’ against necessary facts; see 
Marconi 2010: 149). This is not the place to provide a general discussion of Wittgenstein’s anti-
metaphysical arguments, let alone an evaluation of costs and benefits in Wittgenstein’s view, if 
compared with Kripke’s account. For the present purposes, however, it will be enough to stress the 
  
 
following points, so as to suggest that the issue is still controversial (Marconi 2010: 150-151). First, 
in the post-Kripkean age, something like Wittgenstein’s simple argument was discussed at length by 
analytic metaphysicians, especially in the context of the literature on the relationship between 
conceivability and possibility, and several different solutions were presented: for example, the 
rejection of the entailment from conceivability to possibility (Putnam 1975, Tidman 1994, Soames 
2003, Fiocco 2007), but also the idea that the argument equivocates between different senses of 
‘conceivable’ and ‘possible’ (Chalmers 2002; Yablo 2002). 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Kripke’s own solution was not immune to potential 
troubles. According to Kripke, assuming that salt is essentially NaCl, water is essentially H2O, and 
Hesperus is necessarily nothing but Phosphorus, then one cannot really conceive that salt is not NaCl, 
water is not H2O, or Hesperus is different from Phosphorus. When we have the impression to conceive 
such states of affairs, this is mere seeming: we are really conceiving something else, an epistemic 
counterpart of salt (respectively, water, Hesperus), that is, a situation in which something which is 
epistemically indiscernible from salt (water, Hesperus), but is not salt (water, Hesperus), turns out not 
to be NaCl (H2O, Phosphorus). Notice, however, that Kripke himself acknowledged that this strategy 
is not universally applicable: for example, he himself provided an anti-physicalist argument to the 
effect that it is conceivable, hence possible, that pain is not identical with stimulation of C-fibres 
(Kripke 1972/1980). Moreover, if one accepts that our ability to imagine counterfactual alternatives 
may have a breakdown, the fundamental arguments supporting Kripke’s theory of reference –– a 
theory, let us stress this point further, without which there would have been no Kripkean rehabilitation 
of the very notion of necessary fact –– can in turn be questioned. For example, Kripke argued that the 
name ‘Aristotle’ is not a synonym with ‘the author of the Metaphysics’ because intuitively the 
sentence ‘Aristotle is the author of Metaphysics’ is not a tautology, so that, in other words, ‘Aristotle’ 
is not a synonym of ‘the author of Metaphysics’ because we can conceive of a case in which Aristotle 
was not a philosopher and it was, say, Theophrastus who wrote the Metaphysics. Now, it is natural to 
wonder: if our conceivability intuitions are open to question and may be wrong –– as suggested by 
the cases of salt, water and Hesperus –– what guarantees that they are not deceiving us in the case of 
‘Aristotle’? (Yablo 1993: 16; Marconi 2010: 153). 
Last, but not least, it is noteworthy that in the early 1970s it was probably not so easy to understand 
what exactly was going on in Kripke’s work: how much old-style conceptual analysis, how much 
metaphysical theorising, how much reliance upon sophisticated but pre-theoretical intuitions. As 
Williamson underlined, in 1982 Nathan Salmon was the first interpreter who explicitly claimed that 
in Kripke’s work the linguistic aspect was marginal whereas the metaphysical aspect was crucial 
(Williamson 2014; see also Salmon 1982); as to the third aspect –– the appeal to intuitions –– it was 
arguably the most difficult to understand, though a suggestion in the right direction had been provided 
  
 
by Quine, when he coined the term ‘Aristotelian essentialism,’ emphasising and criticising a certain 
similarity between essentialism, a basic feature of Barcan Marcus’s and Kripke’s views of de re 
necessity, and Aristotelianism, after all a common-sense philosophy (Quine 1966). 
Arguably, regardless of his philosophical genius, regardless of the subtle questions concerning the 
exegesis of his work, and even regardless of the soundness of his arguments, the success of Kripke’s 
objectively anti-Wittgensteinian rehabilitation of necessary facts was also motivated by “external” 
reasons, that is, by its ability to satisfy a broadly cultural need, having to do with the leitmotif shared 
by Quine and most analytic philosophers in the United States after the second world war: the support 
to the scientific, rather than humanistic, self-image of philosophy. Under an additional assumption, 
Kripke found space for building peculiarly philosophical theories. The underlying assumption and 
the argument stemming from it were roughly the following: as the necessity of a statement such as 
‘Salt = NaCl’ depends on how the world is, rather than on how our linguistic framework or conceptual 
scheme is constructed, perhaps also the necessity of a conceptual and allegedly a priori statement 
such as ‘Triangles have three angles,’ far from being determined by the normative or, more precisely, 
constitutive character of a geometrical rule, depends on the necessary fact that triangles have three 
angles; this fact is correctly described by the statement in question. But there is no guarantee that all 
necessary facts are as obvious as the fact that triangles have three angles: therefore it is perhaps 
possible that we will discover (even by doing armchair philosophy) new, previously unknown, 
necessary facts, or that a conceptual, allegedly necessary statements turn out to be false: think, for 
example, of a statement such as ‘Knowledge is true justified belief’ (Gettier 1963). End of the 
argument. As we will see below in this chapter, this issues would be more sophisticatedly discussed 
by Timothy Williamson (Williamson 2007). From a historical point of view, however, David Lewis 
was the philosopher who was mainly responsible for occupying the space created by Kripke’s 
successful rehabilitation of the notion of necessary fact in a Quinean, science-oriented philosophical 
scenario. 
Lewis’s contribution to metaphysics originated within the philosophy of language, in particular 
from the attempt to solve the problem of counterfactual conditionals, which had been previously 
discussed, among others, by Nelson Goodman and Robert Stalnaker (Goodman 1947; Stalnaker 
1968). As is well-known, Lewis provided his own theory: “‘If kangaroos had no tails, they would 
topple over’ seems to me to mean something like this: in any possible state of affairs in which kan- 
garoos have no tails, and which resembles our actual state of affairs as much as kangaroos having no 
tails permits it to, the kangaroos topple over” (Lewis 1973: 1). The basic notions used by Lewis in 
his analysis –– possible worlds and similarity among worlds –– seemed to require a metaphysical 
foundation (Lewis 1973: ch. 4). Lewis was ready to provide one, presenting a clearcut version of 
modal realism, which in the following decades was bound to be considered the benchmark and 
  
 
standard in the field of analytic metaphysics and beyond. As he made it clear, he believed that “there 
are possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit”; these worlds are “ways things could 
have been besides the way they actually are” (Lewis 1973: 84). Possible worlds are not, however, 
linguistic or abstract entities (1973: 85, 90). Lewis suggested looking at the actual world, that is, the 
spatiotemporal world that we happen to inhabit; possible worlds, he pointed put, are the same kind of 
entities as the actual world, though different things happen in them; they are fully real, but 
spatiotemporally and causally isolated.  
The details of the theory are not particularly relevant here, for the present purposes. It is more 
significant to notice that Lewis justified his view by reinterpreting his PhD supervisor Quine, under 
whom he studied at Harvard during the 1960s, after spending a year in Oxford in the late 1950s, 
where he attended lectures by Strawson, among others, and was tutored by Iris Murdoch (Soames 
2014; Williamson 2014; Janssen-Lauret and Macbride 2017; Janssen-Lauret 2017; Divers 2017). If, 
following Quine, to be is to be the value of a variable, then ontological and metaphysical work 
consists of being committed to the existence of whatever falls, in our best theories, under the range 
of an existential quantifier: modal discourse is indispensable to our best theories, in particular to 
quantified modal logic, and Lewis’s modal realism is a way to take such discourse at face value, thus 
committing oneself to the existence of possible worlds (Lewis 1973). A theory has, in Lewis’s Quine-
inspired view, to be ontologically austere: modal realism is qualitatively, if not quantitatively, 
parsimonious, and this is all we need, since we evaluate how economic a physical theory is not on 
the basis of the number of particles, but rather on the basis of the number of types entities –– particles, 
forces, fields and so forth –– which it postulates (Lewis 1973: 87). Naturalism and extensionalism 
are further Quinean constraints to satisfy: reducing counterfactuals in terms of possible worlds plus 
a vague but (according to Lewis) legitimate relation of similarity, and conceiving possible worlds as 
ordinary concrete objects, Lewis’s theory ultimately reduced modal concepts to non-modal notions, 
thus fully vindicating Quine’s program (Lewis 1973; see also Sider 2003). 
Soon –– within a decade or so –– Lewis’s modal metaphysics would occupy a central position in 
the history of analytic philosophy: the number of citations reported at the end of chapter 1 above 
offers a sufficiently clear indication of this centrality; no doubt Lewis is the most-cited author among 
analytic philosophers in the last thirty-five years (Buonomo and Petrovich 2018). This does not mean, 
however, that many –– let alone most –– analytic metaphysicians accepted the controversial theses 
of his modal realism. On the contrary, as Lewis himself complained, most of them took towards modal 
realism an “incredulous stare,” a gesture to say that Lewis’s theory was too bizarre to be possibly true 
(Lewis 1986: 133, 135, 165). The centrality of Lewis did not depend on particular substantive theses 
but rather on his metaphilosophical and methodological influence, as well as on his role in many 
debates as a touchstone or even a polemical target: Lewis’s philosophy became a paradigm case and 
  
 
a model of a philosophical activity based on building explanatory, general and substantive theories, 
characterised by technical sophistication and a realistic spirit. An activity that was rooted in common 
sense and ordinary language: for example, the point of departure of Lewis’s work in Counterfactuals 
was the common-sense “incontrovertible” claim that things could have been different in countless 
ways (Lewis 1973). An activity which was, at the same time, capable of being highly speculative, 
leaving aside the preoccupations deriving from the manifest image of man in the world, in a way 
similar to that in which contemporary theoretical physics in the twentieth century said farewell to 
common sense and ordinary language (Williamson 2007: 19). 
Here we come close to the main metaphilosophical point, on which Lewis focused explicitly in his 
influential book On the Plurality of Worlds, published in 1986. He claimed that a good reason to 
consider true a metaphysical conjecture (such as the hypothesis that there are possible worlds in his 
sense) is its theoretical fruitfulness (1986: 3). A metaphysical conjecture is not meant to be 
conclusively verified or falsified; rather, it should be regarded as an “offer you can’t refuse” after 
evaluating its costs and benefits “in theoretical unity and economy” (1986: 4).  Under this respect, 
metaphysics is not different from physics and mathematics: for example, Hilbert accepted the set-
theoretical universe, calling it a paradise for mathematicians, since “set theories offers the 
mathematicians great economy of primitives and premises, in return for accepting rather a lot of 
entities unknown to Homo javanensis” (Lewis 1986: 4); similarly, “as the realm of sets is for 
mathematicians, so logical space is a paradise for philosophers. We have only to believe in the vast 
realm of possibilia, and there will find what we need to advance our endeavours” (1986: 4). According 
to Lewis in both cases the price is right, though the benefits are probably more spectacular in the 
mathematical parallel. But even if the benefits were not worth the cost (“because they can be had 
more cheaply elsewhere”, 1986: 5), a philosophical methodology was set up: just as in mathematics, 
ontology is derived by abductive reasoning, the so-called inference to the best explanation, according 
to which a good, though not conclusive, reason to regard a philosophical theory as true is to consider 
it the most fruitful account of the available data. The structure of Lewis’s book On the Plurality of 
Worlds –– a set of replies to objections addressed to modal realism in order to show that his was the 
best available explanation –– reveals this point clearly (Lewis 1986). Lewis’s methodology, which 
became widely shared among analytic philosophers within the field of metaphysics and beyond, owed 
several debts to Quine: first, ontological questions were solved by advancing indispensability 
arguments (Quine 1948), though to a large extent Lewis moved beyond Quine, since he applied the 
same kind of non-deductive arguments to possible-worlds metaphysics (Williamson 2014); second, 
even though he accepted a kind of analytic-synthetic distinction (Lewis 1969), Lewis presented a 
methodologically continuist metaphilosophy, according to which not only are scientific results 
relevant to the philosophical ones, and vice versa, but philosophy and science (including both 
  
 
mathematics and the natural sciences) apply the same kind of cost-benefits analysis. 
 
6.2 Style and/or Metaphilosophy 
It goes without saying that Lewis’s Quine-inspired methodology and metaphilosophy were alien and 
even hostile to the later Wittgensteinian tradition, which regarded philosophy as a humanistic 
discipline, whose aims and methods are qualitatively different from those of science. In the next 
chapter it will be shown how analytic philosophers in “the age of David Lewis” struggled for 
hegemony in the American academy (Bonino and Tripodi 2019).xi In what follows –– for the sake of 
a comparison with Lewis, and with the aim of better understanding what was at stake from a 
methodological and metaphilosophical point of view in analytic philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s 
–– let us redirect our glance to Britain, where the story told in this book began, briefly focusing on 
the two arguably most authoritative British philosophers in that period: Peter Strawson and Michael 
Dummett. Strawson was the Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at the University of 
Oxford from 1968 (after Ryle retired) to 1986; Dummett was the Wykeham Professor of Logic at 
Oxford from 1979 (when Ayer retired) to 1992. They were both sympathetic to and influenced by the 
later Wittgensteinian tradition, though it is obvious that they were not old-fashioned linguistic 
philosophers and that their philosophical style was very different not only from that of the later 
Wittgenstein but also from that of philosophers such as Winch, Anscombe, Kenny or Hacker.  
Since the 1950s and all along his career, Strawson had defended and renovated the later 
Wittgensteinian tradition: in 1956 he safeguarded the analytic-synthetic “dogma” from the attack of 
Quine (Grice and Strawson 1956); in 1963 he disputed Carnap on behalf of Wittgenstein, whose 
grammatical investigations he interpreted in terms of connective analysis (Strawson 1963); when his 
supervisor Paul Grice told him, “If you cannot put it in symbols it’s not worth saying”, he retorted: 
“If you can put it in symbols, it’s not worth saying” (O’Grady 2006); last but not least, he made Kant 
accessible to the ears of analytic philosophers, and this was relevant too, if Putnam in agreement with 
Cavell was right when he wrote that “for the most part the philosophers who find Wittgenstein’s 
thought difficult to grasp are people who have little time for Immanuel Kant” (Putnam 1997: 193; see 
also Cavell 1958/1969 and 1962/1969; Strawson 1959 and 1966).xi  As is well-known, in 1959 
Strawson published Individuals, thus introducing descriptive, as opposed to revisionary, metaphysics. 
His intended task in the book was to do descriptive metaphysics, which “is content to describe the 
actual structure of our thought about the world” and is not “concerned with producing a better 
structure” (Strawson 1959: 9). At the beginning of the essay Strawson emphasised the main 
similarities and differences between descriptive metaphysics and old-fashioned Oxford linguistic 
analysis, which is very well-known but deserves to be quoted at length: 
 
  
 
How should it [i.e. descriptive metaphysics] differ from what is called 
philosophical, or logical, or conceptual analysis? It does not differ in kind of 
intention, but only in scope and generality. Aiming to lay bare the most 
general features of our conceptual structure, it can take far less for granted 
than a more limited and partial conceptual inquiry. Hence, also, a certain 
difference in method. Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of 
the actual use of words is the best, and indeed the only sure, way in 
philosophy. But the discriminations we can make, and the connections we can 
establish, in this way, are not general enough and not far-reaching enough to 
meet the full metaphysical demand for understanding. For when we ask how 
we use this or that expression, our answers, however revealing at a certain 
level, are apt to assume, and not to expose, those general elements of structure 
which the metaphysician wants revealed. The structure he seeks does not 
readily display itself on the surface of language, but lies submerged: He must 
abandon his only sure guide when the guide cannot take him as far as he 
wishes to go. (Strawson 1959: 9-10) 
 
To the extent in which it resembled connective analysis, descriptive metaphysics greatly differed  
from traditional, speculative metaphysics, of which Lewis’s was a sophisticated variation. This issue 
has to be handled with the due caution since, as Williamson recently remarked, not only did Lewis in 
his first work –– Convention. A Philosophical Study –– tend to accept a form of analytic-synthetic 
distinction, much to his supervisor’s regret (Lewis 1969; Quine 1969a), not only did he frequently go 
metalinguistic, but at the same time Strawson “was quite willing to speak in a ground-level 
metaphysical idiom” (Williamson 2014: 10; see also e.g. Strawson 1959: 103). Nevertheless, this is 
not enough to obliterate the differences: as Williamson himself stressed, Strawson “was more prone 
than Lewis to characterise philosophical questions as questions about words or concepts” 
(Williamson 2014: 9). The essential difference is that instead of purporting to delineate the ultimate 
structure of the world, Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics –– as an evolved version of old-style 
connective analysis –– investigated the connections between the fundamental concepts we use to talk 
about ourselves and the world, in a nutshell, our conceptual scheme. Its ultimate aim was to describe 
and clarify such concepts, rather than explain and discover substantive truths (Hacker 2003: 49). 
On the other hand, however, Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics shared important features with 
Lewis’s substantive metaphysics: abstraction, generality and systematicity. Descriptive metaphysics 
investigates concepts that are highly general, and they are general qua categorial, since they subsume 
specific concepts under them. Such concepts are also irreducible, basic and, in a special sense, non-
  
 
contingent: examples of such concepts are material object, property, relation, causation, space and 
time (Hacker 2003: 54). Not only does descriptive metaphysics describe such general concepts; it 
systemises them.  
Strawson paid his metaphilosophical debts towards Wittgenstein when he wrote:  
 
If I share anyone’s conception of what our general philosophical aim or 
objective should be, it is, if I have understood him correctly, that of 
Wittgenstein, at least in his later period. That is, our essential, if not our only, 
business is to get a clear view of our most general working concepts or types 
of concept and of their place in our lives. We should, in short, be aiming at 
general human conceptual self-understanding. (Strawson 2003: 12) 
 
However, at the same time Strawson was aware that his intent to obtain an abstract, general and 
systematic theory of how our conceptual scheme works moved him away from Wittgenstein. In 
particular, while acknowledging that Wittgenstein devoted his genius and formidable powers to 
liberate ourselves from false understanding, tearing away “the veil of simple seductive illusions or 
pictures that pervaded or constituted much existing philosophical theory and that prevented us from 
seeing clearly,” he also wrote: 
 
But I must add, as I think, that his [Wittgenstein’s] almost obsessive anxiety 
to liberate us from false pictures, from the myths and fictions of philosophical 
theory, led to a certain loss of balance in his thinking. It did so in two ways. 
First, it led to a distrust of systematic theorizing in general and hence to a 
disregard of the possibility, indeed, to my mind, the fact, that the most general 
concepts and categories of human thought do form in their connections and 
interdependencies an articulated structure that it is possible to describe 
without falsification. Indeed, what I tried to show in my work on Kant is that 
the first Critique contains, besides much else that is more questionable, the 
general outline of many essential features of just such a description. 
(Strawson 2003: 12)xi 
 
So there were two different tendencies in Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics. One was a search for 
generality and systematicity, which moved it away from Wittgenstein-inspired connective analysis, 
resembling Lewis’s metaphysics instead. The other was the conception of philosophy as a peculiarly 
conceptual enterprise, whose aim is to describe our conceptual scheme, rather than the intrinsic nature 
  
 
of things in the world; this tendency made Strawson’s work belong to the Wittgenstein-inspired 
tradition of conceptual analysis, rather than to the tradition of speculative metaphysics. Putting special 
emphasis on the latter aspect, Hacker once remarked that Strawson’s “descriptive metaphysics 
preserves only the letter but not the spirit of traditional metaphysics” (Glock 2003a: 2; Hacker 2003). 
Hacker’s evaluation is correct: there is no doubt that Strawson regarded descriptive metaphysics as a 
conceptual enquiry rather than a substantive theory. For the present purposes, however, the very idea 
of preserving the letter of traditional metaphysics while rejecting its spirit requires further attention. 
Should the former expression, ‘preserving the letter,’ be interpreted as suggesting that Strawson was 
ready to accept something like Lewis’s metaphilosophy, according to which philosophical theories 
are confirmed or disconfirmed on the basis of a cost-benefits analysis, as it happens in mathematics 
and the natural sciences? No, it does not. Rather, it may be interpreted as saying that Strawson’s 
philosophical style –– not his metaphilosophy –– was similar to that of Lewis. There were of course 
several differences between Strawson’s and Lewis’s literary styles; the analysis of such differences 
goes far beyond the scope of this chapter. However, Strawson’s and Lewis’s writings had many 
“stylistic” similarities, in the philosophical rather than in the literary sense: they both built highly 
abstract, general and systematic theories; they both provided philosophical arguments; both of them 
sometimes went metalinguistic, introducing primitive concepts and describing complex ones, but 
other times they remained at the ground level of metaphysical discourse. In other words, whatever 
their literary style, Strawson and Lewis had a similar philosophical style; yet, they had a different 
metaphilosophy: one interpreted his philosophical theories as conceptual descriptions, the other as 
substantive explanations.xi To see more clearly how that was possible, let us briefly focus on the figure 
of Dummett. 
Dummett was neither a pupil nor an orthodox follower of Wittgenstein; he was supervised by 
Urmson and arguably his main source of inspiration was Frege. However, he was under the influence 
of Anscombe and Geach, and his philosophy was sprinkled with several Wittgensteinian insights. 
This is true first of all of his reconceptualisation of the metaphysical problem of realism in semantic 
terms (Dummett 1963/1978). Dummett interpreted realism as a thesis that depends on the validity of 
the principle of bivalence for a controversial class of propositions (arithmetic statements, statements 
about the past or the future, etc.) or, more precisely, as the claim according to which a statement 
belonging to one of such controversial classes is true or false independently from the evidence that is 
available even in principle (Dummett 1959); therefore realism is directly connected to a view of 
meaning based on transcendent truth-conditions (Dummett 1959; 1963/1978). According to 
Dummett, if one adopted an alternative theory of meaning based on assertibility conditions, one could 
defend antirealism in several fields: the philosophy of mathematics, the metaphysics of the past and 
the future, and so forth. This theory of meaning had to be a theory of understanding that satisfies two 
  
 
constraints: the acquisition requirement and the manifestability requirement (Dummett 1959 and 
1975). Dummett’s programme for an antirealist semantics borrowed many insights from 
Wittgenstein: the connection between meaning, understanding and use; the emphasis on the public 
(manifest) nature of language; the view of linguistic understanding as an ability, rather than as a form 
of propositional knowledge; the constitutive relation between the justification of a statement and its 
sense; the attention-shift from truth to the criteria of truth; the constructivist challenge to platonism 
in the philosophy of mathematics (Dummett 1975b and 1991). 
However, like Strawson, Dummett distanced himself from Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy. He 
once said that after the Investigations where published, he was deeply impressed, and for some time 
he regarded himself –– “no doubt wrongly” –– as a Wittgensteinian (Dummett 1993: 169). In the 
preface to The Logical Basis of Metaphysics he confessed that he was aware “how anti-
Wittgensteinian” his semantic programme was. And he commented: 
 
We all stand, or should stand, in the shadow of Wittgenstein, in the same way 
that much earlier generations once stood in the shadow of Kant; and one of 
my complaints about many contemporary American philosophers is that they 
appear never to have read Wittgenstein. Some things in his philosophy, 
however, I cannot see any reason for accepting: and one is the belief that 
philosophy, as such, must never criticise but only describe. This belief was 
fundamental in the sense that it determined the whole manner in which, in his 
later writings, he discussed philosophical problems; not sharing it, I could not 
respect his work as I do if I regarded his arguments and insights as depending 
on the truth of that belief. (Dummett 1991: xi) 
  
Dummett felt the need to distance himself from Wittgenstein even more radically than Strawson did 
before. Not only did Dummett aim to build a general and systematic theory of meaning, considering 
a “disadvantage” in Wittgenstein’s approach “the relatively unsystematic character of his discussions” 
(1991: 306); not only did he state that ordinary language is not sacrosanct; but he was also convinced 
that his theory of meaning could not succeed without a certain amount of technical, especially logical, 
sophistication; actually, he said the same not only for the theory of meaning but, more generally, for 
analytic philosophy, to which he fully and wittingly belonged, being indeed one of those who most 
contributed to its “creation” as a historically well-defined phenomenon (Dummett 1994).xi  For 
example, in the Introduction to The Logical Basis of Metaphysics he wrote: 
 
Philosophy is, after all, a craft, as is plumbing. Many years ago a plumber 
  
 
who had come to our house to make some urgent repair which my wife had 
vainly attempted herself said to me, ‘You don’t want to go at it bald-headed, 
like your good lady here’. Philosophy would interest me much less if I did 
not think it possible for us eventually to attain generally agreed answers to 
the great metaphysical questions; but I should not have written this book 
unless I also thought that we should do better not to go at them bald-headed 
(Dummett 1991, 19)  
 
So Dummett came to abandon also the penultimate Wittgenstein-inspired metaphilosophical 
commandment for a conception of philosophy as insubstantial qua conceptual. The metaphysical 
questions Dummett was interested in were traditional questions such as “Do we have free will? Can 
the soul, or the mind, exist apart from the body? How can we tell what is right and what is wrong? Is 
there any right and wrong, or do we just make it up? Could we know the future or affect the past? Is 
there a God?” (Dummett 1991: 1). He was convinced that, under the influence of Wittgenstein, 
analytic philosophy recently passed through “a destructive phase,” during which “it appeared as 
though demolition was the principal legitimate task of philosophy.” Dummett pointed out: 
 
Now most of us believe once more that philosophy has a constructive task; 
but, so thoroughly was the demolition accomplished, that the rebuilding is of 
necessity slow… Although we no longer regard the traditional questions of 
philosophy as pseudo-questions to which no meaningful answer can be given, 
we have not returned to the belief that a priori reasoning can afford us 
substantive knowledge of fundamental features of the world. Philosophy can 
take us no further than enabling us to command a clear view of the concepts 
by means of which we think about the world, and, by so doing, to attain a 
firmer grasp of the way we represent the world in our thought. It is for this 
reason and in this sense that philosophy is about the world. (Dummett 1991: 
1) 
 
Now, what has been noticed above about Strawson’s philosophical style –– that is, its being very 
similar to that of Lewis, notwithstanding the ultimate metaphilosophical differences between them –
– is even more evident in the case of Dummett: if, as Dummett held, philosophy aims to provide by 
pure reflection a technically sophisticated and systematic description of the most general and 
structural features of reality (Glock 2008b: 128), arguably no differences at all were left between 
Dummett’s and, say, Lewis’s philosophical style; Dummett filled the last gap dividing the style of 
  
 
Lewis from the style of Strawson.xi This is very significant because philosophical style is like history: 
it is written by winners. The decline of the later Wittgensteinian tradition in the history of late analytic 
philosophy is perhaps condensed here, in the science-oriented, rather than humanities-oriented 
philosophical style of the two most authoritative Wittgenstein-inspired philosophers in Britain in the 
1970s and 1980s.xi 
It has been suggested above that Dummett’s claim that philosophy, qua general and systematic, is 
a substantial enterprise can be regarded as his abandonment of the penultimate Wittgenstein-inspired 
metaphilosophical commandment. Why ‘penultimate’? Because after all, on the basis of a 
Wittgenstein-inspired theory of meaning, Dummett kept on regarding philosophy as a peculiarly 
conceptual inquiry and logic as a metalinguistic investigation, for example about the meaning of the 
logical constants; and also because he labelled philosophical problems ‘substantive,’ but nonetheless 
he did not mean to say that their solution depended on the existence of independent facts of the matter 
beyond our linguistic or conceptual frameworks. For these reasons –– notwithstanding the kind of 
positive, systematic and general theory that he presented in his philosophy of language, or, in other 
words, notwithstanding his Lewis-like or science-like philosophical style –– Dummett rejected the 
main methodological ideas behind Lewis’s metaphilosophy. At the end of the 1970s, during a 
conversation with his PhD student Williamson (a full-blooded Lewisian, from a methodological point 
of view), he declared: “The difference between us is that you think that inference to the best 
explanation is a legitimate method of argument in philosophy, and I don’t” (Williamson 2014: 25). 
As Williamson later explained, Dummett held that the issue of whether a putative metaphysical 
explanation is meaningful or not must be settled first before we can judge their value and explanatory 
import. But once the intelligibility issue has been settled, nothing much is left for inference to the 
best explanation to do (Williamson 2014: 25). Not only was Dummett’s characterisation of the 
difference right, but he had a certain clairvoyance. The point of divergence on which he focussed 
would emerge again less than two decades later with the publication in 2007 of The Philosophy of 
Philosophy by Williamson: the philosopher who, after the period in which the Chair had been held 
by David Wiggins, have since 2000 become the Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford. 
 
 
6.3 Philosophy at Face Value 
Roughly, the aim of Williamson’s 2007 book was twofold. First, to improve on “the usual stories 
about the history of twentieth-century philosophy” by providing an accurate and updated description 
of the methodological and metaphilosophical features of “the liveliest, exactest, and most creative 
achievements of the final third of that century: the revival of metaphysical theorising, realist in spirit, 
often speculative, sometimes common-sensical, associated with Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Kit Fine, 
  
 
Peter van Inwagen, David Armstrong and many others: work that has, to cite just an example, made 
it anachronistic to dismiss essentialism as anachronistic” (Williamson 2007: 19). Second, in a more 
“prescriptive” part of the book, to provide compelling arguments to defend this updated picture. He 
deliberately omitted a sustained discussion of Wittgenstein’s view (“I wanted to address the situation 
of philosophy now, not fifty years ago”); nonetheless, as he himself recently acknowledged, some 
anti-Wittgensteinian arguments were implicit in the book (Williamson 2011: 130, 132, 133).  
Preliminarily, Williamson made it explicit that he found Quine’s arguments to the effect that “a 
boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn” (Quine 1951b: 34) 
much less compelling than they once appeared, especially because he did not feel special qualms in 
using the term ‘synonymous’; therefore he was convinced that any objection to analyticity “can hardly 
be based on Quine’s arguments, since his only objection to defining ‘analytic’ in terms of 
‘synonymous’ is to the use of ‘synonymous’” (Williamson 2007: 50-51; see also Quine 1951b: 24, 
35). According to Williamson, the reason why ‘analytic’ in contemporary philosophy “carries 
obsolescent philosophical baggage” has to do more with Kripke than with Quine, since Kripke 
showed that ‘analytic’ can no longer have the central role that it used to have in the work of Carnap, 
Wittgenstein and Strawson: “‘Analytic’ does neither the purely epistemological role of ‘a priori’ nor 
the purely metaphysical work of ‘necessary’” (Williamson 2007: 51; see also Williamson 2011: 133).  
However, Williamson clearly thought that an explicit and eventually compelling anti-
Wittgensteinian argument was required. Whatever role had been left for conceptual truth after Quine 
and Kripke, he argued, it does not justify the Wittgenstein-inspired picture of philosophy as an a 
priori enterprise, whose main statements are conceptual, hence insubstantial. To this effect, he defined 
conceptual sentences in terms of what he called ‘epistemological analyticity’: failure to assent to an 
epistemologically analytic sentence is constitutive of (at least partial) failure to understand at least 
one word occurring in it (Williamson 2007: 73; see also Tripodi 2011: 103). Then he gave 
counterexamples to epistemological analyticity, with the aim of illustrating “the point that even basic 
disagreement in logic is compatible with shared meanings” (Williamson 2011: 133). In particular, he 
described Peter, a competent native speaker of English, who is not disposed to assent to the logical 
truth ‘Every vixen is a vixen’ (Williamson 2007: 85 and ff.). Peter has a certain logical insight, 
according to which the sentence ‘Every vixen is a vixen’ presupposes that there is at least one vixen. 
He also holds the belief that there are no foxes, and never have been any: the apparent evidence to 
the contrary is caused by widespread fox-hallucinations organised by MI6. Based on both his deviant 
logical theory and his conspiracy theory, Peter does not accept ‘Every vixen is a vixen,’ though he 
has a full understanding of the words occurring in it. Stephen is a competent native speaker of English 
with some worries about vagueness. If asked to provide a semantic assessment of ‘Every vixen is a 
vixen,’ Stephen’s immediate reaction is ‘What about borderline cases?’ On reflection, he believes that 
  
 
borderline cases for vague terms create truth-value gaps. Furthermore, Stephen believes that some 
clearly female evolutionary ancestors of foxes are borderline cases for ‘fox’ and consequently for 
‘vixen’. Therefore he does not assent to ‘Every vixen is a vixen’ (he is agnostic about that), but he 
has a full understanding of it. Williamson’s point is clear enough: Peter’s and Stephen’s refusing to 
accept that simple logical truth is not the result of deviant, partial or different understanding, but 
rather the consequence of a genuine philosophical doubt. Moreover, “since there clearly could have 
been, and perhaps are, people such as Peter and Stephen, we have counterexamples to epistemological 
analyticity” (Williamson 2007: 91). Then he concluded: as the possible cases of Peter and Stephen 
show, not even the most elementary case possible of an analytic truth is epistemologically analytic; 
hence, no sentence at all is epistemologically analytic. In particular, no theses of philosophy are 
insubstantial by virtue of their being epistemologically analytic. 
Williamson’s arguments had been widely discussed and criticised and a detailed discussion cannot 
be attempted here.xi For the purposes of the present historical investigation, however, the following 
comments are worth making. First of all, seeing from outside the great success of The Philosophy of 
Philosophy and, indeed, its very publication are extremely relevant for the understanding of the 
historical-philosophical topic addressed in this book (Williamson 2007). No matter whether 
Williamson at last really found the decisive reasons against the later Wittgensteinian tradition, there 
is little doubt that his arguments  –– for obvious chronological reasons –– could not have been the 
historically real causes of the decline.xi It is noteworthy, however, that in 2007, at a time when the 
decline of the later Wittgensteinian tradition had already happened, in the arguably most authoritative 
and influential metaphilosophical work published in the last two decades in the analytic tradition, the 
author felt the need to provide new and eventually compelling arguments against Wittgenstein’s 
metaphilosophy. This very fact –– as well as the considerable success of the book in the analytic 
community –– may be interpreted as an indirect confirmation of one of the main claims defended in 
this book: that in the history of analytic philosophy the later Wittgensteinian tradition was not 
“defeated” by mere arguments. 
Moreover, arguably two central assumptions in Williamson’s arguments against epistemological 
analyticity are Quine’s confirmation holism, according to which “no given argument or statement is 
immune from rejection by a linguistically competent speaker” (Williamson 2007: 97), and Putnam’s 
and Burge’s semantic externalism, according to which understanding depends on participating in a 
social practice, rather than accepting a linguistic rule (Putnam 1975, Burge 1979; see also Williamson 
2007: 91).xi This suggests a last comment. As hinted above, Kripke’s “discovery” of a posteriori 
necessity rehabilitated the notion of necessary facts, making room for substantial philosophical 
theorising. Then the space created by Kripke was occupied by Lewis’s metaphysics, based on 
abductive reasoning. However, the passage from Kripke to Lewis relied on an underlying assumption: 
  
 
that Lewis’s science-oriented methodology was applicable universally or at least in many 
philosophically interesting cases, not only to study the facts known a posteriori by the natural 
scientists, in which substance and natural kind names were involved, that is (in other words, not only 
in the cases that were most favourable to a Kripke-style treatment, such as for example ‘Salt = NaCl’). 
Williamson’s anti-exceptionalist metaphilosophy put the finger on this very point. In his view, 
philosophically interesting questions about, say, knowledge, meaning or justice are never merely 
about the concepts of knowledge, meaning or justice (2007: 77); rather, they should always be taken 
at face value (2007: 23, 31). This seems to suggest that they should always be treated scientifically, 
as we treat, say, salt, water or cats. In other words, if knowledge is like salt, meaning like water and 
justice like cats, we could investigate and hopefully discover their essence. Philosophy is nothing but 
metaphysics, and metaphysics in turn coincides with science: same method (inference to the best 
explanation), same purposes (“to acquire, in the long run, some sort of knowledge of how things are”) 
(Williamson 2010: 17).  
One thing that a reader of The Philosophy of Philosophy can perhaps notice is that at a certain 
point Williamson no longer argues for his methodological and metaphilosophical preferences; he 
takes it to be enough to refute the theories of meaning on which philosophical exceptionalism, 
including Wittgensteinian exceptionalism, is based. Therefore his ultimate move seems to be that of 
shifting the burden of proof to his exceptionalist opponents: it is up to you, he seems to argue, proving 
that knowledge is not quite like salt, that meaning is not quite like water and that justice is not quite 
like cats, so that we should not investigate them as if they were substances or natural kinds whose 
essence we want to discover by working scientifically. It may be controversial whether this  step is 
legitimate or not. However, the story of the decline of the later Wittgensteinian tradition reconstructed 
in this book, which is part of the wider history of the loss of centrality of the humanities in the post-
WWII cultural context, in the US first and consequently also in the UK, may help one understand 
why many philosophers, especially in the analytic community but also beyond, find that move rather 
natural.  
A related controversial issue concerns the restrictions that a scientifically oriented and long run 
perspective might put on the choice of topics. In a reply to Adrian Moore’s 2009 review, Williamson 
directly considered “an alternative way of doing philosophy to the one urged in The Philosophy of 
Philosophy: more humanistic, concerned to preserve unsystematic insights, respectful of the 
complexities of actual life and language, sensitive to deep differences in conversational and historical 
context.” And he commented: “When one examines his text more closely, however, one finds that its 
unsystematic, unscientific air depends not on avoiding theoretical commitments but on avoiding 
making good on them. This is particularly clear in his repeated invocation of unspecified rules. If he 
were to state the content of the supposed rules, and provide some evidence that they are really in 
  
 
force, his claims would then be open to testing and challenge of kinds that only the evasiveness of 
his presentation now protects them from. He would become embroiled in just the kind of ‘scientific’ 
discourse he shuns” (Williamson 2009: 135). The historical analysis of the new rigourism in the 
humanities provided in chapter 4 above seems to pose a problem –– or at lest a question –– to such a 
perspective, suggesting with Keynes and Wittgenstein that in some cases, in the short run in which 
we live, we are not able to apply scientific and systematic theorising –– and its rigid and fully explicit 
rules –– to a philosophical, cultural, social and economic “material which is itself much too vague to 
support such treatment” (Keynes 1978, vol. XIV: 379; see also Wittgenstein 1964/1975). Arguably, 
in such cases the alternative –– in practice, if not in principle –– is not between treating the material 
scientifically or investigating it humanistically, but rather between going humanistically and changing 
topic, taking into account a less complex and vague material; yet in some cases, for example in 
economics, the topic change may not be without consequences. 
 
Notes 
xi For different interpretations see for example Conant (1991), Putnam (1994), Forster (2004). 
xi As is well-known, during the 1940s Ruth Barcan Marcus anticipated some of these results in her pioneering studies 
(Barcan Marcus 1946 and 1947). 
xi There might be some interest in the fact that among the misleading pictures of naming in Naming and Necessity Kripke 
briefly discussed Wittgenstein’s considerations on the name ‘Moses’ in the Investigations (Kripke 1972/1980: 31; Witt-
genstein 1953: § 79). 
xi On the overall sense of the expression ‘the age of David Lewis’ see the Introduction to Bonino and Tripodi (2018b) and 
also Eric Schliesser’s comments in his blog: https://digressionsnimpressions.typepad.com/digressionsimpres-
sions/2016/05/on-late-analytic-philosophy-or-the-age-of-david-lewis.html (Schliesser 2016). It is also worth recalling 
that at the University of Manchester Helen Beebee and Fraser Macbride are guiding a research project devoted to this 
issue: The Age of Metaphysical Revolution. David Lewis and His Place in the History of Analytic Philosophy 
(http://www.projects.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/lewis/). 
xi More precisely, while many American analytic philosophers had low familiarity with Kant, in Britain Kant was studied 
as a historical subject (Glock 2003a; see also Körner 1955,  Bennett 1966). 
xi Strawson also suggested that Wittgenstein’s anxiety to liberate us from false theories and his obsessive mission to 
destroy the “houses of cards” led Wittgenstein “to minimise or dismiss, or at least give too little acknowledgement to, 
some pervasive features of our experience and of our ordinary non-philosophical thought”: in particular, “the reality of 
subjective experience in all its richness and complexity”, and “the inescapable presence in our thought of abstract inten-
sional objects” (Strawson 2003: 12). 
xi This is the second or third time this book has drawn a distinction between philosophical style and metaphilosophy. In 
particular, please see the considerations on the reception of Gellner’s Words and Things in chapter 2 above. In that case, 
however, what was at stake was, first and foremost, Gellner’s literary style or, if you like, the literary genre of Words and 
Things.  
xi It is interesting to read how Lynd Forguson in her ‘Oxford and the “Epidemic” of Ordinary Language Philosophy’ 
described Dummett: “Among those who had disapproved of Austin’s influence at Oxford was Michael Dummett, who 
looked to Frege for philosophical inspiration, and who was much more interested in the developments in the more formal, 
systematic analytic philosophy then being produced in the United States than he ever was in the concerns of the Oxford 
linguistic philosophers” (Forguson 2001: 340). 
xi Notice that in the 1970s Davidson visited Oxford many times, spending in particular an entire academic year in Oxford 
in 1973-1974. He presented his programme for the construction of a theory of meaning, which he regarded as a philo-
sophical and semantic parallel of Chomsky’s generative linguistics. He often confronted Dummett and they gave joint 
seminars (Davidson1999). Incidentally, in the late 1980s most of Oxford philosophers who took part in the debate over 
the theory of meaning favoured Davidson. However, they did not interpret the discussion as a metaphilosophical, let alone
  
 
a stylistic one (Davidson 1984). More generally, as Williamson once recalled, “most Oxford philosophers hoped to avoid 
his [Dummett’s] anti-realism. Indeed, many of them spent their time struggling desperately to do so. Yet they felt it 
always there, ready to engulf them if they made one false move. They tried to beat Dummett at his own game, perhaps 
with one or two changes in the rules” (Williamson 2018: 154)   
xi Another leading analytic philosopher who contributed to keep the name of philosophical theorising high, without being 
a metaphysician, was John Rawls. His awareness of the Wittgensteinian a-theoretical and anti-theoretical views depended 
on his confrontation with Dreben at Harvard. According to Dreben, there are no theories in philosophy, and this is why 
metaphysics is nonsense. As Rawls once explained: “One thing he [Dreben] means is that philosophical arguments rest 
on premises, or taking certain things as given –– on ‘data,’ as he often says… Burt would not, of course, deny the plain 
fact that philosophers make many complicated arguments. But he thinks that at bottom there are no arguments one phi-
losopher can use to convince another of a metaphysical point. At the basic level, philosophers simply rely on and appeal 
to different “data.” It is a standoff with no resolution by argument. Burt has said that Quine is a metaphysician, a meta-
physician of science. By that he means that Quine does not argue for physicalism, or scientific realism.  He assumes it 
and works out his view from there. There is no theory of truth, no theory of meaning, no theory of knowledge, no theory 
of perception, and the rest, despite centuries of philosophers discussing these things....[T]he theory of quantification is a 
theory, but he stresses that it is a theory in logic and mathematics.  It is not philosophy, which has to do with understanding 
and should lead to that” (Rawls, 2001: 419, 421-422). 
xi See for example Schröder (2009); Wikforss (2009); Moore (2009); Kornblith (2009); Boghossian (2011); Horwich 
(2011); Marconi (2011); Tripodi (2011). 
xi Williamson is not the only leading philosopher in Oxford who recently felt the need to deal with issues coming from 
the past of linguistic philosophy: Ofra Magidor is the Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at the University 
of Oxford; her Category Mistakes is a further example of the same kind of work (Magidor 2013). 
xi Williamson makes a subtle qualification: “But neither epistemological holism nor semantic externalism figured as 
premises of the argument. Rather, the argument appealed to features of the relevant systems of belief that make episte-
mological holism plausible, and to features of our ascription of beliefs that make semantic externalism plausible” 
(Willliamson 2007: 91) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
7. Concluding Remarks. The Last Decades  
 
The starting point of the present book was a fact to be explained: the decline of Wittgenstein in the 
history of analytic philosophy. In the 1950s Oxford and to a lesser extent Cambridge were the mecca 
of analytic philosophy, and the influence of Wittgenstein was pervasive. During that period, most 
Oxbridge philosophers shared a body of views and attitudes stemming from Wittgenstein’s teaching. 
In particular, most of them were convinced that science and philosophy lay on different levels and 
have different aims and methods. The British scenario made it reasonable to suppose that the 
Wittgensteinian paradigm was about to have a similar impact on the philosophical landscape of all 
English-speaking countries, including the United States. However, things went on differently, so that 
the later Wittgensteinian tradition –– not only its assumptions and methods but also its purposes and 
philosophical style –– has been largely forgotten or rejected by present-day analytic philosophers. 
 
7.1 A Synopsis 
To set the stage for the required explanation, the book has preliminarily focused on the earliest attacks 
against the later Wittgensteinian tradition, which were part of the intellectual war between the London 
School of Economics and the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. The main characters of this 
story were Popper, Watkins and, above all, Ernest Gellner, the author of Words and Things, published 
in 1959. Gellner’s philosophical and sociological critique of Oxford linguistic philosophy was 
influential. He addressed issues such as the hostility of linguistic philosophy towards science, its 
opposition to philosophical progress, its naif use of paradigm case arguments and its sacred devotion 
to ordinary language, its relativism and, above all, its trivialisation of the task of philosophy. Yet, it 
would be an overstatement to suppose that the decline of Wittgenstein in the history of analytic 
philosophy depended on Gellner’s impact. Not only did most Anglo-American analytic philosophers 
react with hostility towards Words and Things, mainly because of its non-academic style; but it is 
also worth noticing that Gellner (as well as Watkins and Popper) taught in London and criticised 
Oxford philosophy, while from a geopolitic, economic, and even philosophic point of view the centre 
of the world had moved, and Britain had irremediably become more peripheral, with respect to the 
United States. Accordingly, a lesson that can be drawn from this early story is that the explanation of 
the decline of Wittgenstein has to be searched for, first of all, in the United States, the core country, 
within the analytic philosophical community (interpreting the meaning of ‘analytic,’ at least as a first 
step, in terms of a recognisable philosophical style). 
The most remote but still significant reason for the decline of Wittgenstein is that American 
philosophy was for a long time, as it were, a-Wittgensteinian, lacking acquaintance with 
Wittgenstein’s thought, early and late. The early reception of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in the United 
  
 
States was characterised by incomplete and distorted understanding or, more precisely, by its 
confusion with logical positivism, and Carnap’s philosophy in particular. In the present book this has 
been shown by providing some data concerning the articles published in The Journal of Philosophy 
and The Philosophical Review between the 1920s and 1950s. The confusion between Wittgenstein 
and Carnap was partly justified: Wittgenstein and Carnap had similar semantic views, based on the 
notions of grammar and syntax, respectively, and a similar account of a priori statements; they both 
rejected platonism in the philosophy of mathematics and, perhaps more importantly, they agreed that 
natural science is a substantive theory, which aims to discover new facts, whereas philosophy  
operates a priori, aiming to obtain conceptual clarity. On the other hand, there were also deep 
differences between them. From a broadly cultural point of view, Wittgenstein was a strenuous 
advocate of the autonomy of humanistic understanding, including philosophical understanding, 
whereas Carnap defended a scientific conception of man and the world, and to a certain extent he was 
involved in the unity of science project; moreover, Carnap didn’t share entirely Wittgenstein’s 
concerns with non-empirically verifiable theories, be them scientific or philosophical. On the whole, 
taking into account the similarities and differences between Wittgenstein and Carnap, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the confusion between them had negative consequences for the early 
reception of Wittgenstein in the United States, mainly because in the same period Carnap found 
himself under the fire of Quine. In particular, Quine pushed philosophy towards methodological 
naturalism, the view according to which science and philosophy are continuous with each other, for 
any statement of the former can be relevant to the latter, and vice versa. Methodological naturalism 
was at odds with the metaphilosophical views held not only by Carnap but also by Wittgenstein and 
the entire later Wittgensteinian tradition. 
Arguably, in the 1950s and 1960s there were grounds to claim that Quine’s attack on Carnap’s 
analytic-synthetic distinction could not be automatically applied to Wittgenstein’s grammatical-
empirical distinction. However, with very few exceptions, the Wittgensteinians did not provide a 
commensurate response to Quine. Perhaps they were not fully aware of the historically objective 
conditions that made Quine’s attack so successful and epoch-making, so as to indirectly weaken the 
Wittgensteinian tradition, which was not Quine’s direct polemical target. After the second world war 
in the United States, during a huge expansion of higher education, the style and methods of the 
humanities and the social sciences were modelled on the natural sciences. In chapter 4 above this 
process –– the so-called new rigourism in the human sciences –– has been presented by comparing 
the rise of analytic philosophy in America in the hands of Quine with the transformation of economics 
in the hands of Paul Samuelson and his neoclassical colleagues. This may be seen as the central 
chapter of this book. Standing out among the explanatory factors of the decline of Wittgenstein is the 
contrast between Wittgenstein’s later philosophical style –– firmly anchored in the humanistic camp, 
  
 
in the old, non-rigourist and non-scientifically oriented sense of the term –– and the style and methods 
of analytic philosophy. 
The period 1951-1970 was also characterised by the “advent” of the later Wittgenstein in the 
United States, thanks to well-informed authors such as for example Sellars and Cavell. However, in 
the context of the new rigourism in the humanities, analytic philosophers reacted with hostility. The 
book focuses on three main episodes or groups of episodes: Putnam’s 1962 attack on Malcolm’s 
grammatical investigation of dreaming; Davidson’s 1963 criticism of Wittgenstein’s view that reasons 
cannot be causes; and a variety of critiques of the later Wittgensteinian view of mind (in particular, 
the book briefly examines the fall of behaviourism and the rise of cognitive science, discussing 
Fodor’s critique of Wittgenstein’s private language argument and the later debate between Chomsky 
and the Wittgensteinians on knowledge of language). In most, if not all, cases, the science-philosophy 
divide was questioned, and it clearly emerged that the “dark side” of the later Wittgensteinian 
tradition was widely identified with its non-scientific nature. Some of the anti-Wittgensteinian 
arguments presented by American analytic philosophers, such as for example Putnam’s, were 
relatively solid (though perhaps not perfectly targeted); others, such as Fodor’s, were based on a 
misleading interpretation of Wittgenstein; yet others, such as Davidson’s, depended on 
terminological, rather than substantial, divergences. Most of these arguments, if not all of them, are 
better interpreted as expressions of the just mentioned new rigourism in the humanities –– a socio-
cultural process that to a large extent was objectively hostile to the later Wittgensteinian tradition –– 
rather than as refutations of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Arguably, this may raise some doubts 
on one of the founding myths of analytic philosophy, namely, the idea that analytic philosophy 
constitutively proceeds by proofs and refutations. 
A further point concerned Wittgenstein’s view of necessary statements as grammatical rules in 
disguise, and his arguments against the very notion of necessary fact. In the Quinean, science-oriented 
philosophical scenario of the 1970s and early 1980s, Kripke’s rehabilitation of necessary facts created 
a new space, which was promptly occupied by David Lewis and his methodologically continuist 
metaphilosophy. In the book the work of Lewis has been compared with that of the two arguably most 
authoritative British philosophers during the same period, Strawson and Dummett, both deeply 
influenced by Wittgenstein. Significantly, there is a strong similarity in philosophical style between 
Lewis, the metaphysician, and Strawson and Dummett, the Wittgenstein-inspired conceptual analysts. 
More precisely: all of them built general and systematic philosophical theories; Lewis and Dummett 
shared, in addition, the use of logically sophisticated tools. Identity of style doesn’t entail full 
metaphilosophical and methodological agreement, especially in presence of a disagreement on the 
theory of meaning; nonetheless, it is a clear sign of the analytic hegemony and the decline of 
Wittgenstein (arguably, philosophical style matters for the explanation of the decline of Wittgenstein 
  
 
more than specific arguments and views about modalities and metaphysics). 
 
7.2 The Wittgensteinian Field 
In the early 1980s the decline of the later Wittgensteinian tradition was already apparent: for example, 
as emphasised in chapter 1 of this book, in the period 1986-2015 Wittgenstein occupied the 63rd 
position in the ranking of the most cited authors in analytic philosophy journals (Buonomo and 
Petrovich 2018: 166). Thus, it is natural to wonder: What happened in the last decades? The first thing 
to be noticed is that, even after the decline happened, Anglo-American academic culture has 
experienced, as it were, a sort of rediscovery of various forms of philosophy somewhat inspired by 
Wittgenstein’s later thought. An accurate picture of the heterogeneous ways in which Anglo-
American philosophers have been Wittgensteinian in the last thirty-five years or so (especially in 
epistemology, in the philosophy of language and mind, or from a stylistic and methodological point 
of view) falls outside the limits of this book. However, as a possible guide for future work, some data 
taken from the Web of Science are worth consideration (https://apps.webofknowledge.com). 
The analysis of the citation indexes that are included in the Web of Science dataset allows a focus 
on the presence and role of the later Wittgenstein, rather than of Wittgenstein in general, in recent 
Anglo-American philosophy. Within the Web of Science Core Collection three citation indexes are 
selected in the period 1986-2015: Arts & Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI), Conference 
Proceedings Citation Index – Social Science & Humanities (CPCI-SSH), and Book Citation Index – 
Social Sciences & Humanities (BKCI-SSH). In this dataset there are approximately 2350 articles 
belonging to the fields “Philosophy”, “Ethics”, “Logic” or “History and Philosophy of Science,” in 
which Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations are cited (Wittgenstein 1953). Co-citation analysis 
is applied to this corpus by using the open source software tool VOSviewer (www.vosviewer.com; 
van Eck and Waltman 2010 and 2014). Co-citation analysis measures the similarity between two 
documents by calculating the number of times in which they are cited together in the references of 
all documents belonging to a given corpus (Small 1973 and 1999). In the present case, the given 
dataset is the just mentioned ‘humanistic’ sub-corpus of Web of Science, in which the Investigations 
are cited. Co-citation analysis indicates the number of times in which the works are cited together 
with the Investigations within the given corpus. For the sake of simplicity, only documents having at 
least 30 citations are taken into account. Arguably, co-citation analysis can serve as a proxy to 
measure the “areas of influence” of Wittgenstein’s Investigations or, perhaps more precisely, its 
“areas of interest” in the considered period. Using VOSviewer, the results of co-citation analysis can 
be visualised on a map, as in figures 1 below. The size of an item’s label and circle depends on the 
strength of the item, i.e., the number of times in which this document is cited together with the 
Investigations. The distance between two documents in the visualisation approximately indicates the 
  
 
relatedness of the documents in terms of co-citation links, where a co-citation link is a link between 
two items that are both cited by the same document (van Eck and Waltman 2019: 26). On the basis 
on the co-citation strength among the documents, the software makes some co-citation patterns 
emerge (in the form of coloured clusters). This is an unsupervised, data-driven and bottom-up 
process, which depends only on the data and algorithms. However, clusters in themselves have no 
meaning; when possible, they are recognised and labelled by an interpreter. Since, as is obvious, the 
Investigations themselves are by far the work that is most frequently cited together with the 
Investigations, the item ‘Philosophical Investigations’ has been removed manually from the map. 
In the considered period –– 1986-2015 –– the Cited reference search tool of Web of Science indi-
viduates 2354 articles and 48104 co-cited references, 60 of which have at least 30 citations.xi Figure 
1 below visualises the results of co-citation analysis on a map. 
 
Figure 1. Wittgenstein’s Investigations: co-citation map (1986-2015) 
 
On the map above four main clusters can be easily discerned (i.e., a domain expert is able to attach 
an appropriate label to each cluster). First, the red cluster seems to represent analytic philosophy. This 
cluster includes Davidson’s Essays on Actions and Events (Davidson 1980), Fodor’s The Language 
of Thought and Psychosemantics (Fodor 1975), Kripke’s Naming and Necessity (Kripke 1972/1980), 
Evans’s The Varieties of Reference (Evans 1980), Millikan’s Language, Thought, and Other Biolog-
ical Categories, Searle’s Intentionality (Searle 1983), Nagel’s ‘What is like to be a Bat’ (Nagel 1974), 
  
 
Putnam’s ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’ (Putnam 1975), Burge’s ‘Individualism and the Mental’ 
(Burge 1979), as well as Sellars’s Science, Perception and Reality and McDowell’s Mind and World 
(Sellars 1963; McDowell 1994); it is worth noting that Ryle’s The Concept of Mind belongs to this 
cluster (Ryle 1949), and also that Dummett’s Truth and Other Enigmas (Dummett 1978b) and Frege: 
Philosophy of Language (Dummett 1973) seem to be strictly related to this cluster, though the algo-
rithm assigns them a different colour (fuchsia). 
The second co-citation pattern, the blue one, is the cluster of Wittgenstein studies: On Certainty is 
the biggest circle in it, i.e., the work that is most frequently cited together with the Investigations; 
other co-cited works are the Tractatus, Culture and Value, Zettel, The Blue and Brown Book, Philo-
sophical Grammar, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics and Remarks on the Philosophy of 
Psychology (Wittgenstein 1969, 1922, 1980a, 1967, 1958, 1974, 1978, 1980b); notice also that Cav-
ell’s The Claim of Reason is frequently cited together with these Wittgensteinian documents (Cavell 
1979). 
The third, yellow cluster indicates the debate on Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. The 
biggest item in this cluster is Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Kripke 1982)    
–– the most cited item of the entire map –– but also Brandom’s Making it Explicit and Articulating 
Reasons (Brandom 1994 and 1999), McGinn’s ‘Wittgenstein on Meaning’ (McGinn 1984), Baker 
and Hacker’s ‘Scepticism, Rules and, Language’ (Baker and Hacker 1984), Boghossian’s ‘The Rule-
Following Considerations’ (Boghossian 1989) and McDowell’s Mind, Value and Reality (McDowell 
1998) belong to it.  
The fourth cluster is green and seems to refer to the issues of anti-foundationalism and relativism: 
the most frequently co-cited items here are Quine’s Word and Object and Ontological Relativity and 
Other Essays (Quine 1960b and 1969), Davidson’s Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Davidson 
1980 and 1984b), Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and Consequences of Pragmatism 
(Rorty 1979 and 1982), Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1970), Heidegger’s 
Being and Time (Heidegger 1927/1962) and Hume’s A Treatise on Human Nature (Hume 1739). 
 
7.3 The Sociology of Academia and the Decline of Wittgenstein 
Whatever the variety of the recent rediscoveries of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, 
another general feature that emerges in the last three or four decades is the decline of Wittgenstein 
from the point of view of the sociology of academia. A starting point for this kind of consideration may 
be a brief evaluation of Kripke’s account of Wittgenstein’s rule-following remarks in terms of a sceptical 
paradox: “No course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course of action can be made out 
to accord with the rule” (Wittgenstein 1953: § 201; Kripke 1982). The topic is very well-known, so that here it 
will suffice to summarise it by using Kripke’s own words: 
 
  
 
The basic point is this. Ordinarily, I suppose that, in computing “68 + 57” as I do, I 
do not simply make an unjustified leap in the dark. I follow directions I previously 
gave myself that uniquely determine that in this new instance I should say “125”. 
What are these directions? (Kripke 1982: 10) 
 
Kripke’s interpretation was not welcomed by Wittgensteinians such as Winch, Baker and Hacker, Anscombe, 
and Malcolm; the Wittgensteinians did not focus, as most commentators would in the next decades, on 
singular points of divergence; rather, they straightforwardly denied that the Investigations contain the rule-
following paradox as Kripke described it (Winch 1983, Baker and Hacker 1984, Anscombe 1985, Malcolm 
1986). Analytic philosophers, on the other hand, took a much more positive attitude towards Kripke’s work. 
Not only were Kripke’s typically and uncompromisingly analytic style and his specific views on Wittgenstein’s 
rule-following considerations significantly similar to the style and views of his contemporary Crispin Wright, 
a British philosopher and a leading figure in the analytic community, professor of philosophy at St. Andrews 
and then at New York University, where he defended a Dummett-inspired form of anti-realism in the 
philosophy of mathematics and a theory of meaning based on assertibility conditions (Wright 1980); but in 
the following years Kripke’s essay was also discussed, either sympathetically or critically, by a number of 
other leading analytic philosophers such as for example David Lewis, John McDowell, Simon Blackburn, Paul 
Boghossian, Philip Pettit, and Paul Horwich.xi This lively debate, together with the results of co-citation 
analysis provided above –– which show that Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is 
the work that in the last decades, in Anglo-American philosophy, is most frequently cited together 
with Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations –– partly explains the widespread feeling that Kripke’s 
essay on Wittgenstein had a significant impact and occupied a central position in the recent history of analytic 
philosophy.xi Nonetheless, the issue requires further attention and a subtler analysis, since some details 
are still missing. 
In a recent article attention has been focussed on a corpus provided by Proquest, which contains the 
metadata –– author, title, year, university, abstract and more –– of the more than 30,000 doctoral dissertations 
in philosophy discussed in the United States from the late nineteenth century to 2010 (www.proquest.com) 
(Bonino and Tripodi 2019). Within this corpus, the metadata has been selected from the 329 dissertations in 
philosophy in which the name ‘Wittgenstein’ occurs in the abstract. It is worth noticing that over the period 
1981-2010 only 22 out of 329 dissertations are devoted to Kripke’s work on Wittgenstein’s rule-following 
considerations (Bonino and Tripodi 2019: footnote 12). Prima facie, this result, which corresponds to the 
6.6% of the 1981-2010 corpus, is difficult to accommodate with the above-mentioned widespread sentiment 
of the strong impact of Kripkenstein in the recent history of philosophy (a feeling which seems to be confirmed 
by co-citation analysis). Looking closer at the data, however, a possible explanation emerges: 15 out of the 
22 Kripkensteinian dissertations were defended in high-ranked universities such as Princeton, Harvard, 
Columbia, Michigan, Berkeley and so forth. Among them there was, to mention just one example, Essays on 
Meaning and Belief, the dissertation written by Paul Boghossian, the future professor of philosophy at New 
York University: a thesis discussed at Princeton in 1987 under the supervision of Paul Benacerraf. 
There seem to be three clues here: the widespread feeling, at least partially supported by the analysis of 
  
 
co-citations, that Kripke’s Wittgenstein had a great impact on analytic philosophy in the last thirty-five years; 
the small number of American PhD dissertations in philosophy devoted to Kripke’s Wittgenstein in the same 
period; the prevalence of high-ranked universities within the set of dissertations dedicated to Kripke’s 
Wittgenstein. What does all this suggest? Roughly, that in the considered period analytic philosophy, as it is 
represented for example by Kripke’s work and the replies provided by most of its commentators, has shaped 
the historical views of contemporary philosophers (hence the widespread feeling mentioned above). Strictly 
speaking, analytic philosophy has not been prevailing, in the sense of being approved by the majority of 
philosophers in the United States (never mind in the entire Western world) (cf. Searle 1996, Glock 2008b: 1); 
rather, it has been hegemonic, in Gramsci’s sense of being a form of cultural supremacy, which is produced 
by a socially –– or, in this case, institutionally –– powerful group (Gramsci 1948-51: Q. 19, § 24). These 
considerations invite a further enquiry in the social (or academic) context of analytic philosophy, and more 
generally of the humanities, in the Anglo-American world, especially in the United States, since the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. 
In Saul Bellow’s last novel, published in 2000, the protagonist Abe Ravelstein –– a literary alter-
ego of Allan Bloom, the conservative political theorist who used to be an old friend of Bellow in 
Chicago and  in 1987 became famous for his book The Closing of the American Mind –– provided a 
gloomy picture of the state of the humanities in American higher education: 
 
A summary of his [Ravelstein’s] argument was that while you could get an 
excellent technical training in the U.S., liberal education had shrunk to the vanishing 
point. We were in thrall to the high tech, which had transformed the modern world. 
The older generation saved toward the education of its children. The cost of a B.A. 
had risen to $150,000. Parents might as well flush these dollars down the toilet, 
Ravelstein believed. No real education was possible in American universities except 
for aeronautical engineers, computerists, and the like. The universities were 
excellent in biology and the physical sciences, but the liberal arts were a failure. The 
philosopher Sidney Hook had told Ravelstein that philosophy was finished. “We 
have to find jobs for our graduates as medical ethicists in hospitals,” Hook had 
admitted. (Bellow 2000: 80; see also Bloom 1987) 
 
This passage is a vivid description of the crisis of the humanities that had occurred in the United 
States since around 1975: an institutional legitimacy crisis in the context of economic stagnation; 
whereas people were confident that there was a good return on investment in, say, physics research, 
it became more and more doubtful whether there was any return on investment in the humanities 
(Menand 2000: 118, 130). ‘Crisis’ had been the suggestive term used by Plumb in 1964 to announce 
the scientifically oriented redefinition of the humanities after the second world war (Plumb 1964; see 
also chapter 4 above); the same word, ‘crisis,’ literally described the state of the humanities in the 
United States since around the mid-1970s. In both cases it was a crisis of legitimation with respect to 
  
 
the scientific and technical disciplines (Menand 2000: 175). However, only the more recent crisis –– 
the crisis in the literal sense –– was characterised by serious economic pressures on the liberal arts 
college and humanities departments (Menand 2000: 130): the country went into a recession, the 
college population decreased, a long-term job-crisis for American PhD candidates started, the demand 
for college professors dropped and, as a consequence, the resources for research in the humanities 
dropped as well. 
Therefore, Ravelstein’s complaint seemed to be well-justified. Interestingly enough, in reviewing 
Bloom’s bestseller Cavell identified several points of agreement concerning the evaluation of the 
recent crisis in the humanities: 
 
A first agreement concerns the illustriousness (in Emerson's sense, which includes 
illustrativeness) of the university in the life of a democracy; a second concerns the 
irreplaceability of Great Books  –- what Thoreau calls scriptures –– in (let's call it) a 
humanistic education; a third concerns the unaware imbibing of European thought 
by a chronically unprepared American constitution …; a fourth moment of 
agreement concerns the goal of a democratic university education as keeping open 
the idea of philosophy as a way of life, call it the life of the mind …; a fifth sense of 
my agreement with Bloom concerns the threat that a discourse about such issues, 
such as the prose fashioned in Bloom's book (manifestly the product of a lifetime 
of reading and of a devotion to teaching), is becoming unintelligible to the culture 
that has produced it, and not only to the young (in my experience, less to them 
than to others). (Cavell 1989: 606-607; see also Bloom 1987) 
   
The state of affairs described by Bellow, Bloom and Cavell was a child of its times. The oil crises in the 1970s 
and the consequent stagflation had major consequences for the history of economic thought: as John 
Kenneth Galbraith once put it, that was the moment when “the age of John Maynard Keynes gave way to the 
age of Milton Friedman” (as is well-known, the leading economist of the Chicago school, a critic of state 
intervention in the economy, profoundly influenced by von Hayek) (Galbraith 1987: 273); this era, which lasted 
until the present day, is sometimes labelled the age of neoliberalism (Harvey 2005).xi Si parva licet, at the 
time when Keynesianism suffered its worst decline and monetarism came to the fore, the reduction in 
government expenditures on science and the subsequent demand “to do better with less” had also 
consequences on the single humanistic disciplines, including philosophy (Elzinga 2012: 420). In a nutshell: in 
the new context of scarcity the struggle for hegemony changed its features, becoming a very concrete battle 
for academic positions. 
All this had effects on analytic philosophy and the Wittgensteinian tradition, as is clearly visible, for 
example, in the analysis of the academic success of PhD candidates in philosophy in the context of 
American universities in the period from 1951 to 2010 (Bonino and Tripodi 2019). In the 1950s and 1960s 
–– in a period of relatively high economic growth and consequent increase in scientific investments, including 
  
 
investments in the developing human sciences –– the candidates who chose Wittgenstein as the topic of their 
dissertations had not yielded a lower academic success than the candidates who chose other topics, 
including analytic philosophy; on the contrary, the later period –– 1981-2010 –– corresponds to an entirely 
different picture, characterised by a significant difference between the two groups, so as to make the decline 
of Wittgenstein clearly manifest in the relatively low academic success of the Wittgensteinian candidates. Not 
only does the data allow one to approximately identify the time at which the process began: the 1970s or at 
the latest the 1980s, when the academic success of Wittgensteinian candidates suddenly decreased, 
becoming much lower than that of their analytic colleagues (Bonino and Tripodi 2019: 13). The data also 
suggests the metaphoric place where the academic decline began. Over the considered period, 1951-2010, 
Wittgenstein never ceased to be a much-discussed topic in the dissertations; he was the second most 
mentioned twentieth-century philosopher both in the abstracts and in the titles of the theses, just after 
Heidegger. This seems to make it very unlikely the hypothesis that the academic decline of Wittgenstein was 
due, so to speak, to the adverse Zeitgeist; presumably, in that case, people would simply have written few 
dissertations on him. On the contrary, the decline seems to be a consequence “of a process driven from the 
top, a process guided by a relatively small number of people, i.e. those academics who hold the power of 
influencing the recruitment policies in philosophy departments” (Bonino and Tripodi 2019: 28). Once again, 
all this suggests that analytic philosophy is hegemonic in Gramsci’s sense, rather than numerically 
prevailing. After the 1980s, the percentage of Wittgensteinian dissertations consistently decreased: 
perhaps the PhD students in philosophy gradually realised that writing a dissertation on Wittgenstein would 
be a disadvantage in their academic career; better stand on the analytic side (Bonino and Tripodi 2019: 28).xi 
 
Notes 
xi If the minimum number of citations of a cited reference is 20, of the 48104 cited references, 123 meet the threshold. If 
the minimum is 10, then 368 cited references meet the threshold. A detailed analysis of such complex Wittgensteinian 
maps is left for future work. Here it is enough to observe that in the more complex maps approximately the same clusters 
are visible. 
xi Lewis (1983), McDowell (1984), Blackburn (1984), Boghossian (1989), Pettit (1990), Horwich (1990); see also Kusch 
(2006). It is also worth noticing that Kripke is American and worked at Princeton, and that his pioneering work on modal 
logic (as well as its use of logic in philosophy) fully belongs to the so-called new rigourism in the human sciences (on 
this see chapter 4 above). 
xi Incidentally, this is the kind of belief that can make some readers of the present book somewhat perplexed, notwith-
standing all the evidence for the decline of Wittgenstein provided in the previous chapters. 
xi The relationship between the history of economic theories and the history of other human sciences, including philoso-
phy, would deserve an extensive separate investigation. It can be noticed, however, that arguably in the 1950s and 1960s 
economics was already, to a certain extent, an “imperialistic” science (chapter 4 above contains some loose indication of 
this state of affairs). But it was only soon after the rise of monetarism and the decline of Keynesianism that economics 
started to claim explicitly to be so (Stiegler 1984; see also Mäki 2012). In particular, it would be interesting to understand 
the ways in which the British dialectic between Cambridge and the London School of Economics continued in the United 
States, both in economics and in philosophy; unfortunately, this, too, goes well beyond the feasible scope of the present 
book. 
xi The article retrieves and counts in the Wittgensteinian abstracts and in the analytic ones a list of “metaphilosophical” 
terms: ‘theory,’ ‘account,’ ‘problem,’ ‘argument,’ ‘claim,’ ‘thesis,’ ‘explanation,’ ‘solution,’ ‘objection,’ ‘system,’ ‘puz-
zle,’ ‘result,’ ‘conclusion,’ ‘assumption,’ ‘constraint,’ ‘hypothesis,’ ‘consequence,’ ‘defence,’ ‘requirement,’ and ‘attack’. 
The terms belonging to this list are typical of a scientifically oriented philosophical style (and, with some caveats, of a 
science-oriented metaphilosophy). They occur in the analytic abstracts more than twice the number of times than they do 
in the Wittgensteinian ones. This conclusion is welcomed here, as a nice confirmation of a claim made more than once in 
this book concerning the crucial role of a science-like philosophical style in the story of the decline of the later Wittgen-
steinian tradition in the history of analytic philosophy. 
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